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Joint Interagency Evaluation: Manning a Civil Reconstruction and Stabilization Response Capability

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PREFACE

This document was prepared by the Institute for Defense Analyses for the Chief of Staff, United States Joint Forces Command, in fulfillment of the task, "Joint Interagency Evaluation: Civil Reconstruction and Stabilization Reaction Force." The objective of the study is to recommend a method for recruiting (identifying and selecting), organizing, training, and deploying civilian experts who are not currently part of the Federal government in reconstruction and stabilization operations for the newly established Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization in the Department of State. Rapid deployment of organized joint, interagency, multinational, and/or multilateral civilian experts to a nation at risk of collapse or emerging from conflict can reduce the requirement for military forces. An effective system for recruiting, selecting, training, and organizing expert individuals and teams of personnel is required.

Using literature review and interviews of key personnel, this study examines a variety of domestic, international, government, and private for-profit and non-profit personnel models and compares them along dimensions desired by the sponsor. The study further combines this comparative examination with observations on precedents for building civil capacity for overseas contingency deployments. Finally, the study recommends an optimal long-term reserve system and an interim contract-based system to establish a Civil Response Force to meet both sponsor and Department of State objectives.

The IDA Technical Review Committee was chaired by Mr. Robert R. Soule and consisted of Major General Dave Baratto, USA (Ret.), Mr. Rafael R. Bonoan, Dr. Glenn Gotz, Mr. Larry Sampler, Mr. Mark Stout, and General Gordon Sullivan, USA (Ret.).

JOINT INTERAGENCY EVALUATION: MANNING A CIVIL RECONSTRUCTION AND STABILIZATION RESPONSE CAPABILITY

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A. OVERVIEW AND OBJECTIVES

Experience accumulated by the U.S. Government (USG) during operations in Panama, Somalia, Liberia, Haiti, the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq indicates that planning and execution of these complex Reconstruction and Stabilization (R&S) operations must include both military and civilian resources from the USG, other donor nations, the wider multilateral community of intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, the private sector, and the host nation. Recent experience also demonstrates that military and civilian procedures for planning and conducting complex R&S operations must be improved to achieve more timely, effective, and efficient responses. Frequently, the lack of an ability to respond to an emerging crisis with operationally deployable civilian experts to shore up deteriorating indigenous institutions allows an adverse situation in a country to fester and worsen, often reaching a point where military intervention is required. Additionally, the critical transition between conflict and a stable self-governing environment requires carefully planned and executed transitions from intervening military control, when applicable, to international civilian control, and ultimately to host nation control.

In past large-scale R&S operations, the USG or international community have cobbled together individuals and organizations with varied degrees of expertise and experience across a disparate range of skills (security, medical care, restoration of power, provision of potable water, sanitation, food distribution and re-establishment of agriculture, policing, judiciary, economics and business development, humanitarian relief, representative governance and administration, provision of services, civil society, construction, etc.) to serve in interim functions until local capacity can assume these responsibilities. These interim bodies frequently relied on volunteer, available, but untrained personnel (who were often unfamiliar with each other and the specifics of the situation), and often neglected the collective lessons of past operations.[1] The USG has

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[1] James Dobbins, et al., America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA: 2003. See also Oakley, et al., Policing the New World Disorder: Peace Operations and Public Security, National Defense University 1998, Washington, DC: 1998, and Robert Orr, ed.,

taken steps to expand contractor personnel rosters and civilian programs in certain areas such as policing and the judiciary, and to improve their training and capabilities. The USG seeks to examine additional models to obtain and deploy civilian operationally deployable rapid response capabilities for R&S operations; this study is part of that effort.

IDA was selected by United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) Chief of Staff to evaluate options for establishing and maintaining an operationally deployable United States Government (USG) "civilian R&S standby capability" to conduct a variety of R&S tasks during complex contingencies and post-conflict situations. The resulting Civil Response Capability is intended to work in close coordination and collaboration with U.S. government and allied military and civilian partners and the host nation, thereby reducing the requirement for military engagement in these areas. The study used emerging concepts, organizational structures, and task lists developed by the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization in the Department of State (S/CRS) as a foundation, while focusing on the potential personnel pools and systems that could be employed to man the S/CRS operational organizations.

IDA examined various conceptual models for providing personnel for an operationally deployable civilian response capacity. IDA evaluated the various models against the following criteria:

- **Management Structure and Equipment.** The research team considered where the management structure might be housed (i.e., within which USG agency or through what kind of external body), and examined the bureaucratic management structure necessary to operate and sustain the various models.
- **Personnel Skills and Areas of Expertise**. The team examined the types and numbers of personnel that would be needed to respond to the R&S tasks included in the S/CRS task list, including the availability and supply of skilled personnel from which potential models might draw, and how or whether such recruitment would compete with current organization and procedures.
- **Force Numbers and Structure.** IDA considered the capacities of the models to meet requirements for large numbers of individuals and/or organized teams in large operations. The S/CRS operational concepts envision the potential for three simultaneous deployments as the most stressful case, spanning low, medium, and high levels of commitment.

Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction, Center for Strategic and International Studies Press, Washington, DC: 2004.

- **Operations and Logistics.** In this context, operations pertain to the human resource operation, rather than field operations. IDA considered how individuals are recruited, vetted, trained, and deployed, and the incentive structures that attract individuals to participate in the system. The team examined the logistics (transportation, administration, and communication) and security requirements for the models, and considered what standard operating procedures or memoranda of understanding arrangements would be required with other supporting agencies/departments.
- **Training.** The team examined the training required to support the models. Consideration was given not only to sectoral or functional training, but also to training in operational environments, communications, information technology, security/survival, media relations, administration/management, language, cultural skills, and cross-cutting issues (human rights, anti-corruption, inclusive processes, etc.).
- **Legislation.** The team highlighted information about significant legislative considerations for implementation of the models and identified where legislative changes might be required.
- **Interoperability.** The team examined the models to see if critical civilian capabilities might be substituted for or replace military operational capabilities in the field and the conditions under which substitution would be warranted. The team examined relevant information on potential international and domestic partner organizations.
- **Impact on Interagency Processes.** The team considered how the models would fit into joint civilian-military R&S operations, including unity of effort, chain of command, accountability, and reporting structures.
- **Cost.** The team estimated rough order of magnitude relative costs of the models, including information concerning the trade-offs between speed, USG control, unity of command, and cost. This effort focused primarily on "institutional" costs to run the personnel system, rather than operational costs concerned with employment.

B. ASSUMPTIONS, ORGANIZATION, AND METHODOLOGY

Expectations about the conditions under which the notional civilian response capability would operate were based on discussions with S/CRS staff and included the following:

- The total S/CRS HQ staff in Washington would not exceed 80 persons.
- S/CRS would not assume responsibility for any current programs in other agencies that deal with stabilization and reconstruction operations, such as the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) in the Agency for International

Development (USAID), the justice and rule of law programs administered by the Department of State Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL), as well as those programs administered by the Department of Justice in their International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) and Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training (OPDAT).

- The emerging concepts of operational employment of personnel (organized as teams employed at the operational and tactical level and often operating with military counterparts) would be reflected in the study.
- S/CRS concepts of operation envision deployment criteria similar to military requirements. Some personnel may receive up to 30 days notice for preparation to deploy, while other team members may be required to be available for deployment within 72 hours.
- Funding for institutional capacity would be available from Commerce, Justice, and State appropriations, and operational funding would be from mission-specific and supplemental funds.

These expectations were adopted as assumptions used to guide the study. However, in the case of the overall size of the S/CRS staff, the team recommends that the requirements established by the concept of operations and size of the resulting capability be used to drive the size of the S/CRS staff.

The team developed a simple approach to organizing the data. In drawing comparisons between models, qualitative and quantitative information was developed from literature searches of official documents, after-action reports from operations, functional reports and proposals, and from interviews with representatives of organizations and agencies exemplifying the various models. The information developed for each model was compared along dimensions of the evaluation criteria described above. Several of the models that were examined had been developed to accomplish specific tasks. Therefore, the team also assessed the ability of such "focused" models to accomplish tasks within the six general task groupings developed by S/CRS. The six task groups were: Transitional Security, Rule of Law, Infrastructure, Humanitarian/Transition, Economic and Social Well-Being, and Governance and Participation.

During the course of research, the team developed useful information from other initiatives and authorities, such as the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), the United Kingdom's Global and African Conflict Prevention Pools, and the U.S. Coast Guard.

The study is organized into chapters describing the models, observations on related information and processes, and findings and recommendations. There is a long-term optimal recommendation and an interim recommendation, the latter of which is calculated to facilitate an immediate capability and lay a foundation for the long-term recommendation. A statement of estimated cost (based primarily on man-years of labor) is incorporated into the recommendations.

The methodology was fairly straightforward. The IDA team conducted a literature review followed by a series of interviews with relevant organizations and agencies in the United States and Europe to determine the capabilities, and where possible, the cost, of various personnel models currently in use. The information was organized into model descriptions along the criteria specified by S/CRS, and a qualitative comparative analysis was made to determine which models met the individual criteria. Then models were compared to determine which ones offered the best capabilities within the assumptions/parameters stated in the study.

The information generated by the observations were included in the methodology because no existing model provided the comprehensive capability desired by the sponsor or dictated by S/CRS requirements. These observations revealed significant precedent for authorities and interagency burden sharing which could be adopted for use by the S/CRS and their government partners.

C. FINDINGS

After surveying the various models, it became apparent that evaluation would be hampered by limited comparability in information. To address the complexity of comparing such disparate models, it became useful to group them based on shared characteristics. These groupings were:

- ***Managed Rosters and Centralized Individual Recruiting*** with possible pre-determined skill requirements and personnel recruited on an as needed basis, by either government or private sector organizations. These models do not provide a significant standing capacity, training or exercise capability, often defer institutional costs to be defrayed by operational funds, and, with the exception of the United Nations, do not provide a robust and broad set of skills. They are considered of only marginal utility for adoption by S/CRS:
  - United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UN DPKO)
  - European Union (EU)
  - Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)

- Canadian Resource Bank for Democracy and Human Rights (CANADEM).

- ***Pre-Arranged Contractual Agreements*** wherein either government or private sector employers have planned for general requirements and await the specifics of a situation to implement. Contractual arrangements can be cost-effective and provide a broad range of skills. There are issues associated with employment in non-permissive environments, oversight, authorities, management requirements in the field, and with the ability to generate the numbers of skills and organization required. Contractual arrangements offer immediate utility to S/CRS for fulfilling the bulk of their requirements in the short term:
  - U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)
    - Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI)
    - Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA)
  - U.S. Department of Justice (DoJ)
    - International Criminal Investigative and Training Assistance Program (ICITAP)
    - Office of Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training Program (OPDAT).

- ***Capabilities-Based Planning Systems*** that take pre-existing capabilities or pledges and develop the plans to activate and integrate them. The DART and USAR offer an attractive method to man, train, organize, and equip teams that require executive authority and rapid deployment. FEMA offers precedent for authorizing interagency taskings and coordination:
  - USAID Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) and Urban Search and Rescue (USAR)
  - United Kingdom (UK) Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit (PCRU) and Global and African Conflict Prevention Pools
  - Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).

- ***Assets on Standby*** wherein human resources are on call for specific tasks or can be mobilized and diverted to the requirement when needed. The NWCG offers a comprehensive system for organizing, training, developing, and tracking personnel. The USIP ORLO proposal and the AFP-IDG offer innovative methods to adapt current small scale authorities in use by the DART, USAR, and NWCG to large scale comprehensive overseas operations:
  - National Wildfire Coordinating Group (NWCG)

- United States Institute of Peace (USIP) Office of Rule of Law Operations (ORLO) proposal
- Australian Federal Police-International Deployment Group (AFP-IDG)
- Military Reserve Components (RC).

The grouped models were compared and contrasted against the study's pre-determined criteria (Management Structure and Equipment, Personnel Skills and Areas of Expertise, Force Numbers and Structure, Operations and Logistics, Training, Legislation, Interoperability, Impact on Interagency Processes, Cost). None of the models examined offered a complete solution to the objective of identifying a personnel system that would meet all of S/CRS and JFCOM requirements. Models offering more pre-deployment screening and training opportunities were more costly. Models focused on specific tasks were more efficient.

In the course of the study, the team developed information related to interagency authorities, domestic consequence management, the use of domestic capabilities for overseas employment, contracting and human resource systems, etc. This information was coupled with the most appropriate features of several models that were examined to develop a solution that would accommodate all of the sponsor and S/CRS requirements. Because of the nature of the challenge, hybrid solutions appear to offer the best capability to recruit, select, and train personnel for use in Reconstruction and Stabilization operations by the Department of State.

D. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Optimal/Long-Term Solution

For the long term, S/CRS and the DoS should establish a partnership with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of Defense (DoD) to exploit the potential for transformation and develop a new organization that would combine the requirements of DoS and DoD in stabilization and reconstruction operations with requirements of DHS in the areas of consequence management. This organization could be authorized by Congress using the force generation and employment authorities governing the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) as a precedent. This organization could be established within either DHS or DoS depending on the criteria for employment (domestic or overseas priority response) but, like the USCG, could have authority under Executive orders and Congressional oversight to deploy capabilities (in modules or as individual personnel) under S/CRS to execute reconstruction and stabilization tasks.

The establishment of a national capability to execute these tasks, distributed throughout the nation on a community volunteer basis, would enhance coordination between civilian agencies and jurisdictions, together with the military reserve components that are located in the same communities. These personnel would also share responsibilities for homeland security and consequence management. Establishing and strengthening these relationships would have beneficial effects on potential operations overseas, through increased interoperability and interagency coordination.

The new organization would focus on operational execution of tasks in the S/CRS framework, with an initial emphasis on the critical shortage of executive authority policing and rule of law packages that inhibit transitional security, consistently hamper R&S operations, and slow the withdrawal of military forces. Adapting the United States Institute of Peace Office of Rule of Law Operations (ORLO) and Australian Federal Police International Deployment Group (AFP-IDG) models, the USG and S/CRS should:

- Establish a 6,000-person Rule of Law Reserve force that would comprise community police units, special police units, judicial teams composed of judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, bailiffs and court clerks, personal security detachment police, and administrative and logistics personnel. The police units would be established as a reserve within communities throughout the United States and would receive compensation for their required training while in reserve status. They would have to be certified sworn officers and would attend training at about one-half the time of a military reservist (one weekend every other month and one week per year). (Cost: $100 million for salaries and limited equipment)
- Establish a 2,500-person Civil Response Corps (CRC) that would comprise experts from civil society and Federal, State, county and municipal jurisdictions and with the same dual-use authorities as the Rule of Law Reserve. This Civil Response Corps would execute operational tasks as implementers under the direction of S/CRS Advance Civil Teams (ACT) in task areas not already covered by existing programs in other government agencies or to augment those programs. They would be available to train on an as needed basis but would be required to train every third year if they have not been deployed on a mission for the previous three years. (Cost: $25 million)
- Manage the Rule of Law Reserve and Civil Response Corps using systems adapted from the National Wildfire Coordinating Group (NWCG) Incident Qualification and Certification System (IQCS) and Resource Ordering and Support System (ROSS), established under the interim system. (Cost: $1 million)

- Establish and coordinate R&S training centers in cooperation with the National Defense University, U.S. Joint Forces Command (interagency training proponents and force provider), Army War College (Army is the DoD Executive Agent for R&S operations), United States Institute of Peace and the Naval War College to conduct exercises at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. These exercises should be made available for participation with Department of Homeland Security to ensure that training benefits the domestic consequence management requirements. (Cost: $25 million)
- Continue the logistical contracting, subject matter expert Personal Service Contracts (PSC) and Section 3161 appointment programs, and Memoranda of Agreement (MoA) that will be established in the interim system to complement and support the Rule of Law Reserve and Civil Response Corps.
- S/CRS will have to substantially increase its staff to lead and manage this system: the 80-person office currently envisioned would have to expand to about 200. Included in that number would be additional HR personnel, intelligence and interagency operations officers, exercise and operational planners, training, contracting and logistics officers, and transportation coordinators.

The study estimated that establishing the reserve and training for one year would cost approximately $200 million.

The interim solution, below, would provide immediate capabilities and establish the mechanisms for implementing the long-term solution.

2. Interim Solution and Steps toward Optimal Solution

The Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization should establish a family of contract vehicles and Memorandum of Understanding (MOAs) to develop a Civil Response Force while the Rule of Law Reserve and Civil Response Corps are established. These contracts and MOAs should be organized as follows:

- S/CRS should contract for consulting services (the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) has such a service) to develop the job descriptions for manning the S/CRS operational organizations (Humanitarian Reconstruction and Stabilization Teams (HRST), and Advance Civil Teams (ACT)). (Cost: $500,000)
- S/CRS should prearrange Personal Service Contracts using vehicles and authorities similar to the USAID Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) Response Alternatives for Technical Services (RATS) concept or Section 3161 Appointments as Exceptions to the Civil Service Act for by-

name experts who will be used in key positions in HRSTs or ACTs. Execution of these arrangements could be made from operational funds.

- S/CRS should negotiate a contract with a single firm (either non-profit or for-profit) with a vehicle and authorities similar to the USAID Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) Support Which Implements Fast Transitions (SWIFT) program or the DoD Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) to obtain skilled individual personnel and organized teams for implementing projects and programs. (SWIFT uses up to five pre-certified contractors, while LOGCAP authorities emphasize using one contractor. Both systems are based on Indefinite Delivery Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) contracting authorities, yielding substantial flexibility.) This will require institutional funding to have contract personnel interact with S/CRS personnel in developing the HR annexes to support emerging operational plans. Activation of the contract will require operational funding. (Cost: $10 million over five years. This contract will cover (1) HR and operational planning, (2) using job descriptions and Work Breakdown Structure to develop a mobilization guide and field operations guide modeled on the NWCG guides and the USAID Field Operations Guide, (3) implementing a system like IQCS/ROSS, and (4) providing selected personnel for training and exercises as required.
- S/CRS should negotiate a contract under LOGCAP type authorities for logistical support, including communications, transportation, security, etc., in the absence of DoD support. Similar LOGCAP Baseline Plans for DoD have been negotiated that provide logistical and other specified support for 1,500 personnel for 180 days. This will require some institutional funding for planning and operational funds for execution. (Cost: $500,000)
- S/CRS should obtain Executive Authority to negotiate Memoranda of Agreement/Understanding with other government agencies and departments to gain access to their expert personnel in the event of a deployment. Examples are the Departments of Energy, Agriculture, Justice, the Centers for Disease Control, etc.
- S/CRS should obtain Executive Authority to negotiate Memoranda of Agreements/Understanding from state, county, and municipal/city jurisdictions and to solicit volunteers with special implementation and management skills. Volunteers should be eligible for deployment and have the permission of their respective jurisdictions to take temporary appointments with S/CRS.
- S/CRS should negotiate support agreements with select domestic NGOs such as Engineers Without Borders, the National Association of State Courts, etc., to gain access to their experts.

- DoS should expand the Orientation and In-Processing system with a standby module for S/CRS operations. DoS should negotiate an agreement with DoD to retain and jointly operate the Federal Deployment Center at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. (Cost: $200,000)

The total cost of this interim contracting effort should be approximately $3.5 million the first year, and $2.5 million each year thereafter, exclusive of operational costs for actual missions.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

I. INTRODUCTION

A. STRATEGIC CONTEXT

Over the past 15 years, the U.S. has been involved in several major post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization (R&S) operations, and contributed significant resources to many more. U.S. military forces led or contributed to many of these efforts to defeat despotic regimes or to neutralize warring parties, and U.S. civilian capacity has been frequently called upon to assist in the reconstruction of post-conflict areas. Once security conditions permitted, the U.S. and other intervening states have sought to establish a stable environment, with a legitimate, representative political system and market economy. Because failed and failing states provide a key challenge to current U.S. foreign policy and national security, inasmuch as they provide breeding grounds for terrorism, crime, trafficking, humanitarian catastrophes and other threats to U.S. interests, ad hoc responses are no longer enough. Successful R&S operations are essential to U.S. national interests and security.[1]

Experience accumulated by the U.S. Government (USG) during operations in Panama, Somalia, Liberia, Haiti, the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq indicates that planning and execution of these complex R&S operations must include both military and civilian resources from the USG, other donor nations, and the wider multilateral community of intergovernmental, private sector, and nongovernmental organizations, and the host nation. Recent experience also demonstrates that military and civilian procedures for planning and conducting complex R&S operations must be improved to achieve more timely, effective, and efficient responses. Frequently, the lack of an ability to respond to an emerging crisis with operationally deployable civilian experts to shore up deteriorating indigenous institutions allows the situation within a country to fester and worsen, often reaching a point where military intervention is required. Additionally, the critical transition between conflict and a stable self-governing environment requires carefully planned and executed transitions from intervening military control, when

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1 National Security Strategy of the United States, 2002, and draft Department of Defense Directive 3000.cc. See also the Defense Science Board 2004 Summer Study, "Transitions to and from Hostilities."

applicable, to international civilian control to host nation control. In past large-scale R&S operations, the USG or international community have cobbled together individuals and organizations with varied degrees of expertise and experience across a disparate range of skills (security, medical care, restoration of power, provision of potable water, sanitation, food distribution and re-establishment of agriculture, policing, judiciary, economics and business development, humanitarian relief, representative governance and administration, provision of services, civil society, construction, etc.) to serve in interim functions until local capacity can assume these responsibilities. These interim bodies frequently relied on volunteer, available, but untrained personnel (who were often unfamiliar with each other and the specifics of the situation), and often neglected the collective lessons of past operations.[2] The USG has taken steps to expand contractor personnel rosters and civilian programs in certain areas such as policing and the judiciary, and to improve their training and capabilities. The USG seeks to examine additional models to obtain and deploy civilian operationally deployable rapid response capabilities for R&S operations; this study is part of that effort.

This strategic context in which R&S operations are conducted is illustrated in Figure I-1. The blue-green line in the chart represents the affected or host nation institutional capability to function (one definition of a capable state is one that can protect its territorial and political integrity, and operates in accordance with internationally recognized norms of behavior both domestically and internationally). As institutions or the state come under stress and cannot respond the capacity for governance diminishes. Civilian agencies (the blue line) are almost always involved at some level to try and reverse the trend, but eventually in many cases, the situation deteriorates to the point where there is a requirement for a substantial military intervention. In some cases the domestic governing institutions fail, in others they are removed. The military intervention, the red line, due to the critical importance of the security situation, soon overtakes the involvement of the assisting civil agencies and the domestic government in providing security and other capabilities. As the security situation improves, the assisting civilian agencies assume greater responsibility for task accomplishment and leadership

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2 James Dobbins, et al., America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA: 2003. See also Oakley, et al., Policing the New World Disorder: Peace Operations and Public Security, National Defense University 1998, Washington, DC: 1998, and Robert Orr, ed., Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction, Center for Strategic and International Studies Press, Washington, DC: 2004.

and they eventually transfer authorities and responsibilities to the host nation government.

The strategic and organizational context of this challenge is that the "life cycle" of stability and instability that afflicts many countries over time is addressed by agencies of the USG and the international community that are focused only on parts of the overall problem. The colored boxes and ovals depict this part of the context. Assisting agencies are funded, organized, deployed, operated, and evaluated on how they execute their core competencies, be they development, negotiation, combat, humanitarian relief, governance, public security, etc. Funding is often provided for a specific agency requirement, and lacks the flexibility necessary to respond to changing requirements on the ground. As an example, a U.S. military officer commanding a battalion has the authority to dispense $50,000 under the Commander's Emergency Response Fund/Program (CERF or CERP) per project. The commander can commit $100,000 per project with additional justification. The U.S. Ambassador to a country, operating under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as amended, can dispense $50,000 per *emergency* until supplemental funding arrives.

The organizations are not well prepared to function across the transitional seams that mark such long operations. The conditions that define the requirements for the military to provide public security, for example, eventually change, thus permitting a transition to civilian policing, but the conditions and criteria are undefined, the military and police trainers do not have common operational guidelines or the flexibility to train together, and decision authority for making such a determination is not specified in advance. Little preparation is done to facilitate transitions such as this, and the organizations and individual actors rarely work together to describe their necessary working relationships before the crisis.[3] While the focus should be on building local national capacity, significant amounts of energy are spent measuring inputs rather than outcomes. Finally, the operational deployability of significant numbers of civilian assets is limited, frequently forcing the military to accept responsibility for extended periods of

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[3] Until recently, only about 10 percent of military joint exercises contained a portion of the scenario that addressed either pre-crisis stabilization or post-conflict reconstruction and stability operations. Civilian agencies lack the manpower and resources to work with the military on a frequent and regular basis to provide interagency inputs to military exercise planning and execution, and operational plans and execution. As an example, in the fall of 2004, the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs at the Department of State had over 100 requests for personnel from throughout the State Department to participate in military exercises, but expected to fill only 12 to 20 of the requests. (Interviews with Joint Staff J-7 Exercises and Department of State Bureau of Political-Military Affairs)

time for tasks that are outside military core competency.[4] The object of several proposals and initiatives in recent years has been to create more civilian capacity, elevating the level of the blue line in Figure I-1 and squeezing the "trough" toward the middle.[5]



Figure I-1. Stabilization and Reconstruction Context and Challenges

Phasing has been a point of contention in the field: operators recognize that conditions change, but that criteria for distinct transitions are hard to describe in advance and even harder to measure on the ground. Transitions occur over a period of time, rather than as a sharp discontinuity. However, for policymakers, phasing is useful to describe conditions for analytical work, to group tasks, and to assign primary and supporting responsibilities to agencies and organizations. Additionally, there is disagreement on the number of phases. Therefore, for the purpose of illustrating the interagency challenges only, the phases in Figure I-1 are taken from the U.S. Joint Forces Command

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4 The Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq in December 2003 was at only 55 percent of its authorized strength. At peak strength, January through March 2004, it got up to about only 77 percent of authorized strength. Additionally, the prescribed tour length of six months actually averaged about three months per staff member, with a resulting negative effect on project continuity and interagency working relationships. (IDA Draft Report on Non-Security Metrics for the Coalition Provisional Authority (TBP) and interviews with the Coalition Provisional Authority Inspector General)

5 See the publications of the Association of the U.S. Army/Center for Strategic and International Studies Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project at http://www.csis.org/isp/pcr/--index.htm and Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction. Op. cit.

(USJFCOM) National Political-Military Plan (NPMP) template that has been developed for experimentation (not authoritative doctrine):

- 0 = Peacetime Engagement
- 1 = Interagency Assessment and Preparation
- 2 = Rehearsal, Prepositioning Enablers, Strategic Deployment and Civil/Military Resource Buildup in Region
- 3 = Initial Entry Operations of Intervention Resources
- 4 = Stability and Reconstruction Operations (Military to Civilian Lead)
- 5 = Post-Conflict Peace Building, Transition and Indigenous Military Force Restructuring (Civilian to Indigenous Authority)
- 6 = Durable Peace (External Civil and Military Mentoring)
- 7 = Sustainable Peace and Normal Relations (Long-Term Development).[6]

To address these challenges of operationally deployable civilian capacity and poor interagency coordination, the National Security Council agreed to establish within the Department of State (DoS) the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS)[7], which the State Department directed on 30 July 2004.[8] The office currently has approximately 50 staff drawn from existing interagency resources and reports to the Secretary of State. The current objective is to increase the staffing of this office to approximately 80 people. The mission of S/CRS is to lead, coordinate, and institutionalize USG civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations, and to help stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife so they can reach a sustainable path to peace, democracy, and a market economy. In analyzing this mission, S/CRS developed the following five functions, around which it orients its operational concepts and teams:

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6 In this formulation, Phase 7 eventually becomes a Phase 0. There are other formulations of phases for both analytical and operational purposes. Some current DoD thinking focuses on six phases (Shape, Deter, Seize the Initiative, Dominate, Stabilize, and Enable Civil Authorities). Civilian and military organizations must settle on standard definitions and planning terms (and cycles) if operations are to be coordinated, effective, efficient, and successful. In this regard, the S/CRS and the United Kingdom Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit have held meetings and agreed to develop a common methodology for terms, metrics, and assessments.

7 NSC meeting notes, 24 April 2004.

8 U.S. Department of State Memorandum, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, Washington, DC: 30 July 2004.

- Monitor and Plan: Develop clear policy options concerning states and regions of greatest risk and importance, and lead U.S. planning focused on these priorities to avert crises, when possible, and to prepare for them as necessary.
- Mobilize and Deploy: Coordinate the deployment of U.S. civilian resources and implementation of programs in cooperation with international partners to accelerate transitions from conflict to peace.
- Prepare Skills and Resources: Establish and manage an interagency capability to deploy personnel and resources in an immediate surge response, and the capacity to sustain assistance until traditional support mechanisms can operate effectively.
- Learn from Experience: Incorporate best practices and lessons learned into functional changes in training, planning, exercises, and operational capabilities that support improved performance.
- Leverage International Resources: Work with international organizations (IO), international governmental organizations (IGO), international financial institutions (IFI), individual states, and non-governmental organizations (NGO) to harmonize approaches, coordinate planning, accelerate deployment of assets, and increase the interoperability of personnel and equipment in multilateral operations.

The S/CRS office is structured and will operate based on the assumption that the USG will require the capacity to be involved in two to three R&S operations concurrently, each of which might last 5 to 10 years.[9]

Two distinct groups of personnel resources will be required for R&S operations. One group provides *policy formulation, planning, and management* of operations, and these are governmental responsibilities. Because an affected nation will require R&S support at the national, provincial, and municipal echelons of government, personnel resources will need to be drawn not only from USG federal level agencies (civilian and military), but also from state, county, and municipal governments to ensure the appropriate skill sets are acquired for this group. Because these individuals filling staff and leadership positions will be selected in theory because they have appropriate technical skills, their additional pre-deployment training requirements are mostly related to how they will work together within the organizational structure established for the contingency within the specific headquarters and the anticipated operational environment.

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9 Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, Organization and Mission Brief and Department of State press release cited at http://www.scrs_pa@state.gov.

The other group of personnel resources will be required to perform the *actual R&S work*. These resources may be acquired from military, police, intergovernmental, and international humanitarian organizations, or contractors – either non-profit NGOs or for profit commercial enterprises. The military typically considers these resources as "task units" while the civilian agencies consider them "implementing partners." Because these resources will work together to accomplish specific tasks, they need not only individual skills, but also pre-deployment unit or team training and, when deployed, should be capable of operating as a unit.

S/CRS has developed an operational concept to operate at the national strategic, theater strategic, operational, and tactical levels, through organizations staffed with functional and regional interagency experts and organized to work with existing national security and foreign policy structures.[10] At the national strategic level, S/CRS will form, with interagency partners and the appropriate regional bureau from the Department of State, a Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group (CRSG) that will function as a Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC). At the theater strategic or regional level, should the requirement to integrate efforts with the military dictate, a Civil Military Planning Team[11] (CMPT) will deploy to co-locate with a Geographic Combatant Commander (GCC) to work final plans and integrate the application of resources. At the operational level, an Advance Civil Team (ACT) will deploy to fall in on the U.S. Mission/Embassy within the country and to work with a Joint Task Force (JTF), if one is deployed. This operational level ACT could also serve as the nucleus of the U.S. presence in country if there is no U.S. Mission. It will also serve as the Headquarters for a number of regional ACTs deployed into the affected nation to directly manage programs and implementing partners, in conjunction, once again, with any military units deployed to the respective region. These regional or tactical level ACTs could operate independently or, in conjunction with military forces, form the nucleus of a Regional Reconstruction Team (RRT). A logical connection with the military can be established with Civil Affairs organizations. S/CRS has established contact with the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and

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[10] Discussions on the evolving concepts with sponsor liaison to S/CRS and S/CRS staff. See the Essential Task Matrix at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/53464.pdf. Additionally, S/CRS has developed an interagency planning framework that has been published by the U.S. Joint Forces Command J-7 as a pamphlet; "US Government Draft Planning Framework for Reconstruction, Stabilization, and Conflict Transformation," version 1.0, 1 December 2005.

[11] Formerly known as a Humanitarian Reconstruction and Stabilization Team (HRST)

Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC) and USMC organizations to pursue this operational linkage.

S/CRS will draw personnel to staff these operational organizations from five pools.

- S/CRS staff may be assigned to an operational organization.
- S/CRS will have an Active Response Corps (ARC) of approximately 100 additional regional and functional expert personnel assigned to appropriate bureaus within DoS. They will operate on a daily basis in their respective specialty to maintain their skills, but will be S/CRS assets subject to call at the discretion of the Coordinator.
- S/CRS will have access to a Standby Response Corps (SRC) of approximately 400 State Department personnel within the bureaus who are bureau assets and are "earmarked" for deployment upon coordination between the Coordinator and the respective bureau chief.
- S/CRS will have access to Federal program managers and experts from throughout the USG who can design, manage, and implement programs at the national level. Members of this Technical Corps (TC) are deployed upon appropriate coordination between the owning agency and the Department of State.
- S/CRS plans to have access to implementing partners (individuals or organizations) from U.S. civil society (both government and private sector) to deploy as functional or regional experts to advise or serve as members of CRSG, HRST, or ACTs; or to deploy as task units and implement the projects and programs determined, resourced, and supervised by S/CRS through its operational organizations. This resource pool is conceptually a Civil Response Corps (CRC).

Personnel from any given pool could conceivably deploy as a member of any given team. It is impossible, given the skill sets required at each employment level to restrict any given pool to the support of a smaller set of deployable teams than the five illustrated. For instance, personnel from S/CRS could conceivably deploy to ACTs or to positions supervising critical implementing elements. Also, members of the Civilian Response Corps with critical skills could deploy to advise the CRSG, or to an HRST or ACT. While organizationally it is impossible to pre-specify which pool(s) might feed into which deployable team(s), it is possible to identify skill sets required in the teams and trace that skill back to a specific position within a government organization or civil response corps position, (when created). This establishes the requirement to develop a product similar to a Table of Organization and Equipment that specifies the individual

and collective skills of each deployable team and matches the individual requirements to a source within one or more of the five personnel resource pools. The concept for personnel resources and operational organization is illustrated in Figure I-2.



Figure I-2. Personnel Resources and Operational Organizations

Given this context and strategic challenge, S/CRS and USJFCOM have established a relationship to explore and develop organizations and processes that bring the full capability of the military and civilian components of government and society to bear on R&S operations. The USJFCOM is a DoD interface with the USG for interagency experimentation, training, and coordination, including R&S operations and transitions from hostilities. The goals of this interface are to develop appropriate doctrine to unify the USG effort and, in the case of crisis and post-conflict operations, to identify means of reducing the need for military personnel engaged in R&S by rapidly inserting civilian personnel to reverse a deteriorating situation or to assume post-conflict responsibilities. An immediate gap in interagency coordination and response capacity has been a standby surge capability to execute tasks that are civilian in nature in R&S operations. Possessing such a capacity should provide for the accomplishment of R&S

tasks with more efficient resource allocation (under appropriate conditions) and achieve a reduction in military engagement in these activities.

B. STUDY OBJECTIVE AND TASKS

The Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA) was selected by the USJFCOM Chief of Staff to evaluate options for establishing and maintaining an operationally deployable USG "civilian R&S standby capability" to conduct a variety of R&S tasks during complex contingencies or post-conflict situations thereby reducing military engagement in these areas, in close coordination and collaboration with U.S. and allied military and civilian partners. The objective recognizes the proposed concepts of operations and organizational structure for S/CRS personnel in the field. The study used S/CRS emerging concepts, organizations and task lists as a foundation, while focusing on the potential personnel pools and systems that could provide input to the S/CRS operational concepts and organizations.

- IDA examined various conceptual models to provide personnel for an operationally deployable civilian response capacity, including an order of magnitude rank-ordering estimate of cost. The study considered a range of domestic and international models and also examined the potential to combine the best or most appropriate aspects of each into a hybrid.
- IDA evaluated the various models against the following criteria (provided by S/CRS and weighted by S/CRS and JFCOM). These criteria were subsequently modified and generalized based on the amount of information and time available.
  - **Management Structure and Equipment.** The research team considered where the management structure might be housed (i.e., within which USG agency or through what kind of external body (NGO, academic, etc.)), and examined the bureaucratic management structure necessary to sustain the model. The team considered the flexibility and capacity of each model to expand for large-scale deployments and to contract as needs and funding warrant, considering unity of command, oversight, speed, and control issues. The goal is to keep overhead to a minimum consistent with capabilities. (S/CRS priority)
  - **Personnel Skills and Areas of Expertise**. The team examined requirements to respond to the range of possible R&S tasks included in the S/CRS task list, including the availability and supply of skilled personnel from which potential models might draw, and how or whether such recruitment would compete with current reserve structures. The goal is to maximize the numbers of skill sets available. (S/CRS Priority)

- **Force Numbers and Structure.** IDA considered the capacities of the models to meet requirements for large numbers of individuals and/or organized teams in large operations. (Example: Individual health car professionals vice a health clinic). S/CRS pre-supposes three simultaneous deployments as the most stressful case, spanning a low, medium, and high level commitment. The goal is to be able to deploy both individuals (physicians and nurses) and/or capabilities (a health clinic able to serve X numbers of people). (S/CRS priority)
- **Operations and Logistics.** In this context operations pertains to the human resource operation, rather than field operations. IDA considered how individuals are recruited, vetted, trained, and deployed, and the incentive structures that attract individuals to participate in the system. This included information about the pros and cons of USG security-cleared personnel, contractors, participants from state and municipal governments, private sector, business associations, academia, and international personnel with experience in other governmental and legal structures, etc. The team examined the logistics (transportation, administration, and communication) and security requirements for the models, and considered what standard operating procedures or memoranda of understanding arrangements would be required with other supporting agencies/departments. The objective is to maximize the ability to get skilled and trained personnel and to be able to support them in the field. (S/CRS priority)
- **Training.** The team examined the training required to support the model. Consideration was given not only to sectoral or functional training, but also to training in the operational environment, communications, information technology, security/survival, media relations, administration/management, language, cultural skills, and cross-cutting issues (human rights, anti-corruption, inclusive processes, etc.). The team also considered which models would provide the most opportunity for frequent interagency training on a routine basis to enhance rapid operational capability. The objective is to maximize the availability for training on a routine, frequent basis, thereby improving responsiveness and effectiveness and reducing the learning curve in the field. (JFCOM priority)
- **Legislation.** The team provided information about significant legislative considerations for implementation of the models considered and identified where legislation would be required to implement the recommended model. The goal is to obtain the maximum capability while minimizing the legislative burden, through the creative use of existing authorities where possible.
- **Interoperability.** The team examined the models to see if civilian and military capabilities might be interchangeable, and the conditions under

which substitution would be warranted, including relevant information on potential international and domestic partner organizations and identifying potentials for reduced U.S. military engagement in redundant areas. The goal is to maximize this quality, and it is linked directly to training. (JFCOM priority)

- **Impact on Interagency Processes.** The team considered how the models would fit into joint civilian-military R&S operations, including chain of command, accountability, and reporting structures. The goal is to have a system that creates synergy at the policy level and in the field, and reduces obstacles to effective coordination.
- **Cost.** The team estimated rough order of magnitude relative costs of the models, including information concerning the trade-offs between speed, USG control, unity of command, and cost. This focused primarily on "institutional" costs to run the personnel system, rather than operational costs concerned with employment. The goal is to show the relationship between added capability and cost. (S/CRS priority)

- IDA identified and described similar significant capabilities that exist and/or are under development within the international community, including the UN and EU, and other regional multilateral organizations, and national governments.
- IDA recommends a civil R&S standby capacity model based on the above analysis and legislative considerations with respect to current outstanding authorities.

C. ASSUMPTIONS, ORGANIZATION, AND METHODOLOGY

Expectations about the conditions under which the notional civilian response capability would operate were based on discussions with S/CRS staff and included the following:

- The total S/CRS staff would not exceed 80 persons
- S/CRS would not assume responsibility for any current programs in other agencies that deal with stabilization and reconstruction operations, such as the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) in the Agency for International Development (USAID) or the justice and rule of law programs administered by the Department of State Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) or the Department of Justice International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) or Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training (OPDAT)
- The emerging concepts of operational employment of personnel would be reflected in the study

- Deployability criteria would incorporate a 30-day notification of intent or potential intent to deploy in support of a specified mission, and a requirement to deploy within 24-72 hours (depending on skills and situation) of notification of an execution order.
- Funding for institutional capacity would be available from the Commerce, Justice, and State Appropriations and operational funding would be from mission specific and supplemental funds.

These expectations were adopted as assumptions used to guide the study. However, in the case of the overall size of the S/CRS staff, the team recommends that the requirements established by the concept of operations and size of the resulting capability be used to drive the size of the S/CRS staff.

The team developed a simple approach to organizing the data as reflected in Figure I-3. First, models were identified, (such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency and the Australian Federal Police International Deployment Group). These models are aligned along the horizontal axis and are conceptually unlimited in number. The nine assessment criteria (described in detail above, such as Management, Training, etc.) are aligned on the vertical axis. Both S/CRS and US JFCOM assigned priorities to these assessment criteria, as specified above. The third axis, running "into the page" are the task groupings that S/CRS must have the skills to execute. They are:

- Transitional Security
- Rule of Law
- Infrastructure
- Humanitarian/Transition
- Economic and Social Well-Being
- Governance and Participation.

In drawing comparisons between models, qualitative and quantitative information was developed from literature searches of official documents, operational after action reports, functional reports and proposals, and from interviews with representatives of organizations and agencies exemplifying the various models. The team recognized early in the study that comparable information would probably not be available for all models, due to national authorities and program restrictions, various personnel and financial accounting systems, and differing terminology, doctrines, etc. Therefore, qualitative assessments supported with quantifiable information (where available) has been used.

The team attempted to keep the assessment at a level of generality required to achieve comparability.



Figure I-3. Organizing the Data

For the purposes of discussion, due to the complexity of comparing fifteen[12] models with limited comparability in information, it is useful to band models together based on some common characteristics. These model groupings were:

- ***Managed Rosters and Centralized Individual Recruiting*** with possible pre-determined skill requirements and personnel recruited on an as needed basis, by either government or private sector organizations:
  - United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UN DPKO)
  - European Union (EU)
  - Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)
  - Canadian Resource Bank for Democracy and Human Rights (CANADEM)

[12] Because the contractual models in USAID OFDA, OTI, and DoJ ICITAP and OPDAT use contracting firms and individual contracts they add to the count.

- ***Pre-Arranged Contractual Agreements*** wherein either government or private sector employers have planned for general requirements and await the specifics of a situation to implement:
  - U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) and Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA)
  - U.S. Department of Justice (DoJ) International Criminal Investigative and Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) and Office of Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training Program (OPDAT)
- ***Capabilities-Based Planning Systems*** that take pre-existing capabilities or pledges and develop the plans to activate and integrate them:
  - USAID Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) and Urban Search and Rescue (USAR)
  - United Kingdom (UK) Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit (PCRU) and Global and African Conflict Prevention Pools
  - Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
- ***Assets on Standby*** wherein human resources are on call for specific tasks or can be mobilized and diverted to the requirement when needed:
  - National Wildfire Coordinating Group (NWCG)
  - United States Institute of Peace (USIP) Office of Rule of Law Operations (ORLO) proposal
  - Australian Federal Police-International Deployment Group (AFP-IDG)
  - Military Reserve Components (RC)

IGOs, IOs, NGOs, countries and agencies use some form of the above models either exclusively or in combination to meet their R&S requirements.

During the course of research, the team developed information that was of use from other parallel initiatives, such as the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) and the United Kingdom's Global and African Conflict Prevention Pools, and the role that business enterprises have in R&S operations. The information generated by the observations were included in the methodology because no existing model provided the comprehensive capability desired by the sponsor or dictated by S/CRS requirements. These observations revealed significant precedent for authorities and interagency burden sharing which could be adopted for use by the S/CRS and their government partners.

The methodology was fairly straightforward. The IDA team conducted a literature review and series of interviews, in the United States and Europe, with relevant

organizations and agencies to determine the capabilities, and where possible, the cost, of various personnel models currently in use. The information was organized into model descriptions along the criteria specified by S/CRS and a qualitative comparative analysis was made to determine which models appear to meet the individual criteria. Then models were compared to determine which ones offered the best capabilities within the assumptions/parameters stated in the study. These most attractive aspects were then combined with precedents and capabilities contained in the observations to develop appropriate recommendations for civilian response capacity that met S/CRS needs.

CHAPTER II

MODEL DESCRIPTIONS

II. MODEL DESCRIPTIONS AND ANALYSES

This chapter describes the 15 models the team examined, grouped into the four broad categories described in Chapter 1:

- ***Managed Rosters and Centralized Individual Recruiting*** with possible pre-determined skill requirements and personnel recruited on an as-needed basis, by either government or private sector organizations:
  - United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UN DPKO)
  - European Union (EU)
  - Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)
  - Canadian Resource Bank for Democracy and Human Rights (CANADEM)
- ***Pre-Arranged Contractual Agreements*** wherein either government or private sector employers have planned for general requirements and await the specifics of a situation to implement:
  - U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) and Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA)
  - U.S. Department of Justice (DoJ) International Criminal Investigative and Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) and Office of Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training Program (OPDAT)
- ***Capabilities-Based Planning Systems*** that take pre-existing capabilities or pledges and develop the plans to activate and integrate them:
  - USAID Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) and Urban Search and Rescue (USAR)
  - United Kingdom (UK) Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit (PCRU) and Global and African Conflict Prevention Pools
  - Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
- ***Assets on Standby*** wherein human resources are on call for specific tasks or can be mobilized and diverted to the requirement when needed:
  - National Wildfire Coordinating Group (NWCG)
  - United States Institute of Peace (USIP) Office of Rule of Law Operations (ORLO) proposal
  - Australian Federal Police-International Deployment Group (AFP-IDG)
  - Military Reserve Components (RC)

The assignment of organizations to specific groups is for the ease of organization and some, but not total, comparison, since several organizations use a combination of methods to fill personnel requirements.

A. MANAGED ROSTERS AND CENTRALIZED INDIVIDUAL RECRUITING

1. The United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO)

a. General[1]

The United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) plans, prepares, manages, and directs UN peacekeeping operations, so that the operations can effectively fulfill their mandates under the overall authority of the Security Council and General Assembly, through the directive authorities vested in the Secretary-General.

DPKO provides political and executive direction to UN peacekeeping operations, and maintains contact with the Security Council, troop and financial contributors, and parties to the conflict in the implementation of Security Council mandates. DPKO has within its structure a Human Resource Office of 115 personnel. This office handles hiring and payroll for the international staff required for UN missions, observers and special representatives. The office does not coordinate the provision to a mission of military or police units or organizations by the member states. DPKO supports 18 current peacekeeping missions (one in planning) and 11 political missions (Special Representatives of the Secretary General or observer missions). They have 90,000 personnel (both civilian and military) in the field (as of the end of June 2005), controlled and supported from UN Headquarters in New York with a total staff of 600.[2]

To augment planning capabilities at the New York headquarters in the event of a crisis, certain member states have pledged to provide additional staff to the UN DPKO through on-call lists. The UN DPKO Military On-Call List consists of these groups:

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1 For a more complete discussion of the UN system, see Appendix E. For a discussion of other international organizations and their capabilities, see Appendix F. These organizations have the capacity to complement/supplement the organizations described here and others in accomplishing reconstruction and stabilization operations.

2 The information in this section is from interviews held with Donna-Marie Chiurazzi-Maxfield and Shari Klugman, Chief and Deputy Chief (respectively) of Personnel Managmenet and Support Service, Administrative Support Division, DPKO, and from briefings and conversations with Dr. Jane Lute, Assistant Secretary General for Mission Support, DPKO.

- Group One – Provides 9 key staff planners from Member States to augment DPKO planning effort within 7 days
  - Initial stages of new mission planning in New York
  - Nucleus of deployed new mission staff
- Group Two – Deploys remainder of new mission staff to staging or mission area within 14 days after notification
- Group Three – A separate pool of individuals who may be activated based on agreed response times
  - UN Military Observers
  - Military experts for various missions.

In addition, the UN established the Stand-by High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG), a multinational initiative created in 1996 to provide a non-standing, rapidly deployable peacekeeping force as part of the UN Standby Arrangement System. Sixteen nations participate: Argentina, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Italy, Ireland, Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Spain, and Switzerland; and five observe Cote d'Ivoire, Czech Republic, Hungary, Jordan, and Sweden. A brigade pool of units exceeding the force requirement are earmarked from each participating nation for SHIRBRIG deployment, but nations decide force commitments for each mission. Units must react within 15 to 30 days of a national decision and must be self-sufficient for the first 60 days of an expected 6-month mission. These selected units remain under national control until deployed. The SHIRBRIG force is tailored to specific missions and may have 4,000 to 5,000 troops. SHIRBRIG was first declared available in January 2000; it deployed to the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) for a 6-month mission and was ready for another deployment in January 2002.

In other United Nations System (UNS) activities, staffing is usually accomplished by project or consultancy. Each organization recruits through its own separate process and there is no central personnel management. Personnel are sometimes recruited on short-term contracts from outside the UN or from other long-term UN staff, but only the permanent UN staff can rotate assignments.

Resources can be mobilized through pre-arranged agreements with partners and on-call rosters of specialized personnel, from strategic stocks, kits, and standardized equipment, and service packages or modules.

To staff missions with the appropriate expertise, UN DPKO, like other elements/agencies of the UN, runs its own Human Resources (HR) office under the UN

system. Of the 115 personnel in the HR office, 52 are in administration and payroll (they do their own payroll for the missions), and there are 14 permanent placement officers who do the recruiting and hiring, with 14 support staff and the availability to bring on five "surge" recruiting personnel. The rule of thumb for hiring staff is to expect one placement officer to fill 120 positions per year. At maximum staffing, that equates to 19x120=2,280 per year. While the HR office can meet the requirements for sustained staffing, their processes run the risk of not identifying the best candidates, due to the volume associated with new or expanded missions.

As an illustration, to generate the personnel to fill the latest requirements for the UN mission in Sudan, they received 96,000 applications for the 6,200 positions. They were able to physically screen only 48,000 of those applications. The others were not examined. Of those 48,000, only 1,500 made it past the first review and only 1,310 of the applicants met the requirements. UN DPKO personnel management recognizes that the key to remedying this situation is to develop a comprehensive HR planning mechanism and have pre-vetted candidate rosters organized into categories of skill sets by implementing a system that will provide generic requirements and personnel management fields with which their recruiters will work.

The DPKO strategy for enhancing capabilities is to organize around stated requirements. DPKO is developing 16 occupational groups that will be assigned to their recruiting staff, essentially making each of the recruiters a personnel commodity manager for filling requirements based on mission tasks for any specific UN mission as appropriate. The occupational groups are subdivided into task clusters for temporary fill, specific skills, and global skills.

The HR leaders within DPKO are trying hard to implement a requirements-based human resource planning process that will link their recruiting, pay, retention and professional/career development system to the operational requirements in the field. They are also constrained by the nature of the Security Council resolutions that impact on those processes of establishing requirements and planning for generic missions. Currently UN DPKO is prevented from performing strategic planning, obtaining intelligence, and writing doctrine that would standardize many of their functions.

DPKO uses "Galaxy" (the UN automated human resources management system), but the DPKO personnel office believes this system is not suitable for operational field HR recruiting and work. It is designed to support the UN headquarters. For example,

resumes and applications can only be queried using four questions that are extremely difficult to compose and are not tailored to inquiries about fieldwork, deployability, etc.

The absence of continuity in the "peace operations" field as a profession and the resulting lack of training, education, and professional development opportunities and infrastructure places DPKO at a disadvantage when recruiting. DPKO competes with other UN departments and agencies for similar talents where those career enhancing opportunities and infrastructure exist (an example is the development field and the UN Development Programme (UNDP)). UNDP recently hired away six DPKO candidates because they offer higher paid scale. Development positions in UNDP are viewed as long term, professionally enhancing, while peacekeeping staff are generally viewed as "temps" with lower skill and qualification requirements. The DPKO HR office expects, as a central function, that their new requirements based personnel planning system will create professional paths for people who wish to develop a career in peacekeeping operations.

b. Comparison Criteria: The UN DPKO model offers robust and comprehensive skill sets but is resource intensive and does not provide the rapidly deployable capabilities required by S/CRS. Training responsibilities are those of the individual and the deployed mission.

Management: This is a model that hires directly into the UN system and requires a full service (recruit, hire, assign, payroll, benefits, etc.) human resources office to administer the system. While extraordinarily flat compared to the number of people in the field, the overhead for this type of system probably exceeds what is possible within the Department of State or S/CRS. The overall headquarters (HQ) to field personnel ratio is exceedingly small and the organization is felt to be too flat. All 31 missions are run from UN headquarters in New York with no intermediate HQ. Only one mission, in Liberia, is an "integrated" mission, wherein the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) is responsible for all UN Agency (UNA) activities and all UNA operating in the country report to UN HQ through the SRSG. This is a departure from all previous missions where UNA retained direct authorities from their parent agency headquarters in New York, directed by the councils other than the UN Security Council (UNSC) (such as the Economic and Social Council (EOSOC), etc.).

Personnel Skills and Areas of Expertise: The DPKO system can accommodate all skill sets with the notable exception of organized security units with executive authority. (The DPKO HR office is drafting their occupational group breakdown and

expects approval by the end of 2005.) Those organized security units (peacekeepers) come from contributing member states separate from the hiring of UN civilian staff, and operate under UN Rules of Engagement.

Force Numbers and Structure: There are two major categories of personnel operating in UN Peacekeeping Operations – units and individuals provided by member states to fulfill their member state contributions and the UN recruitment of international staff. Member state contributions are guided by political decisions and the UNSC Resolution (UNSCR) system. DPKO and other UN agencies are authorized to hire international mission staff. There are no inherent limits to the modules or the expandability that can be provided by this system, provided there are enough recruiters and HR personnel. The yearly recruiting rule of thumb of 120 placements per recruiting officer equates to 2,280 (procured by 19 officers (14 plus five surge officers assisted by 14 technicians), approximately two times the staff authorization number for the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in Iraq, and the CPA number does not include implementing partners, only the HQs. The constraint within the system is the time it takes to recruit, hire and assign for the mission, which can be a matter of days or months, because of the self selecting nature of the personnel being recruited and the fact that no pre-hiring actions may be taken in the absence of a UNSCR. This is a significant challenge for the personnel system when setting up a mission, although steady state operations are easier to maintain.

Operations and Logistics: Both are controlled by the mandate (UNSCR) and the situation. Decisions are made at HQs about every aspect of the mission. For instance, provision of water may be made by contracting for water purification, hiring water specialists to work with indigenous personnel, or contracting for water delivery. Each decision then has an impact on the HR plan to support the mission. HR is leveraging the transformation of mission planning to aggregate support tasks for all operating agencies (common communications, logistics, motor transport pool, aviation, food service, etc.) within a mission/country.

Training: Limited training/in-processing is conducted at UN HQ. There are specific technical courses that mission personnel can attend, but the HR model is to hire an experienced person for the task and have the mission in country provide whatever training is required to adjust the competencies to the situation. DPKO mission personnel do not conduct training exercises, and DPKO headquarters staffs rarely attend member state training exercises. The UN budgets 2 percent of the overall staff costs for personnel training. Although the UN has an elaborate standby arrangement system for receiving

trained and certified modular capability, there are significant challenges to integrating the various contributions and ensuring their interoperability and readiness.

Legislation: To establish this type of HR system would either increase significantly the size of the S/CRS staff, or require a similar increase in the staff of DoS/HR.

Interoperability: This system poses no particular challenges to interoperability on an individual basis, since requirements for language and technical skills can be written into the job description. However, UN methods of operation and standards would create some interoperability issues with the USG if they were to be adopted.

Impact on Interagency Process: This system would have relatively little impact on the interagency process because it is simply an additive HR system. The only issue that may arise would be agencies competing for the same personnel within the same pool.

Cost: UN missions are expensive and the establishment of a Human Resources office in each of the major UN departments and agencies is redundant. The overhead at HQs, while small in numbers, pays very well and personnel costs for management are high. As an example, to hire U.S. equivalents for one supervisor, 19 recruiting officers, and 14 technicians (GS15, 13, 9) would cost $1.8 million in direct salary alone. Since training costs for in-processing new hires are embedded in the missions' operational costs and their situations are dissimilar, DPKO and the UN have little visibility over the single cost of an international staff person through the entire cycle of recruitment, hiring, deploying, training, etc. Additionally, the UN system of assessed costs, dues, and mission contributions does not relate to the Federal relationship between the Federal government and the 50 states.

2. European Union (EU)[3]

a. General

EU crisis management has evolved to include more operations with civil-military aspects and greater cooperation with the United Nations. The European Security Strategy set forth the call for "effective multilateralism," which supports the UN and others. This signals more cooperation with the UN and an increase in missions which will be hybrids

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3 This information is developed from the European Union website (see specific citations in following footnotes (http://europa.eu.int/pol/cfsp/index_en.htm) and from interviews conducted in Brussels, Vienna, and by telephone in the fall of 2004 and spring of 2005.

supporting the UN. The EU has adopted new policy priority areas including Civil Administration, Civil Protection, Rule of Law and Lessons Learned. New mission support activities include logistics, human resources, and budgeting. The EU relies on member states to provide both organizations and individuals to staff missions and execute tasks, while the EU staff focuses on policy, integration of national capacities, standards, and procedures.

EU crisis management is currently focused upon four themes: civil-military planning, training, communications, and lessons learned/best practices. Other new issues include increased attention to Africa, with the creation of the Ad Hoc Africa Group, as well as greater cooperation with military aspects and policing.

Although not a EU program,[4] the Italian Carabinieri has established a Stability Police School in Verona. This school will train indigenous police forces, mostly from African nations, on how to conduct stabilization operations. The first class is scheduled for September 2005 and is intended to provide a pool of specially trained police to assist during complex contingencies in their region of the world.

The EU Directorate IX - Civilian Crisis Management, DGE External and Politico-Military Affairs, Council of the European Union, has grown since 2001. Originally it was staffed with about 10 people (7-8 political officers and a few police advisors), most of them on 3-year contracts. It has grown to 15 people with 7 police officers and 8 technical experts, all on 3-year contracts.

The new policy priority areas include Civil Administration, Civil Protection, Rule of Law and Lessons Learned. The new mission support activities include logistics, human resources, and budgeting.

The number of civilians deployed to EU missions include 550 to the European Police Mission to Bosnia-Herzegovina (EUPM) and 200 to the EU mission to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), also known as EUFYROM or Operation Proxima. Some judges have been deployed to Georgia for the "EUJUST THEMIS" mission; the prosecutors are there for an initial three months. The first out of Balkan area ESDP mission was in Africa (Artemis).

b. Comparison Criteria: The EU is expanding its capability, but its reliance on "seconded personnel" and national contributions extends the time required

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4 The Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) is a G-8 initiative funded by the USG.

for deployment. The EU training system has some advantages in burden sharing, but it is still focused on a narrower set of skills than required by S/CRS.

Management: Recruitment of experts for missions is initiated by the EU in a call for contributions to member states, asking for volunteers for mission such as Iraq. Candidates are evaluated against a list of qualifications and skills needed and participation in EU training courses is compulsory. Some of this training is paid for by the EU and in some cases by member states. The EU Directorate does not maintain a single database for Civilian Crisis Management personnel, but relies on a collection of nationally kept databases and lists. Most member states have databases with individuals listed while others have pools with numbers. With regard to police, typically a whole unit is provided as opposed to individual police officers. Member states have different levels of capacity. Some have police pools with well-established units and databases with Rule of Law and Civil Administration experts. In others the databases are held by NGOs within the state.

Personnel Skills and Areas of Expertise: The EU focuses on administration, policing, rule of law and civil protection (an emerging concept of civil defense, environmental protection, disaster management and consequence management). However, the EU has been in discussions with the UN DPKO to provide a 5,000 troop battle group on standby to reinforce or provide "over the horizon" military back-up to UN peacekeeping missions.

Force Numbers and Structure: The current system accommodates both individual experts and organized units. The expansion of the EU has created expectations that there will be more access to a wider range of personnel and organizations. The system itself is limited only by the willingness of the member states to make contributions to the EU staff and budget, and to heed calls for seconded personnel and mission units. Recent difficulties with the EU constitutional referenda and the impasse on the EU budget may attenuate any growth in either capacity or ability to coordinate within the EU or between the EU and other governments or agencies.

Operations and Logistics: The EU tailors each mission to the wishes of the member states and the resolutions of the EU executive bodies. This process yields a significant difference in mandate from mission to mission. When the EU decides it will pursue a mission members of the Civilian Crisis Management Unit speak to the member states' Ministry of Foreign affairs about specific requirements. Each national Ministry of Foreign Affairs often needs to coordinate with the respective Ministries of Interior and

Justice depending on national circumstances. As the mission is assembled and plans come together, decisions are made about budgeting and EU and national responsibilities for logistics.

Training: While there is no EU-run training program for Civilian Police (CivPol) as individual "beat cops," national training is augmented by European-wide training for commanders offered by the European Police College (CEPOL) created by the European Council of Ministers. CEPOL is a network of national training institutes designed to forge a common approach to policing in Europe. While it coordinates training standards for all types of policing in Europe, it provides direct training through the CEPOL Commander Course for Crisis Management, intended for Senior Managers of EU missions. As of 2004 there had been 11 such courses held in different members states, each with 20 students. The students were senior officers of Lt. Col and higher rank. Course number 12 is scheduled for France in October 2005. A new Strategic Planning Course to be led by Italy was slated for May 2005, with future courses based in Brussels in 2006.

Crisis management exercises have been undertaken with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE). Tabletop exercises occurred in 2003 and in 2004, and exercised Operational Headquarters synchronizing operational concepts with Rule of Law, CivPol, and the Military. Participants interacted via videoconference.

Legislation: Adopting the EU model would require significant legislation, as it is an international organization that depends on member states. Establishing this type of HR system would either increase significantly the size of the S/CRS staff, or require a similar increase in the staff of DoS/HR and significant legislation to address the relationship of the Federal government to the states. The extensive network of member states, secondment procedures, training partners, etc., would require extensive coordination just to get personnel into the process. Legislation would also be required to set up similar contingency funding mechanisms.

Interoperability: The EU is strengthening its relationships with the UN and the OSCE, and thereby adopting standards and procedures that differ in many respects from those used by the USG. There is a growing institutional training capacity that will inculcate those standards and skills within the EU. Some of the issues covered in modules of the training for mission commanders include strategic planning development: Concepts of Operations (CONOPS), Operational Plans (OPLANs), EU Crisis

Management Concepts (CMC), key lessons learned from past operations, and a Command Post Exercise (CPX) initiative to integrate all players that one might encounter in the field to include NGOs, Government Officials, Civil Military Information Centers (CIMIC), and locals. Role players often fill these roles.

Some of the new conceptual aspects in policing which the EU has developed to include the Integrated Police Units (IPU) are modeled closely on the Italian Multinational Specialized Units (MSU). There are several differences between the IPUs and civilian police, one being command and control. The IPU operates under military command (usually the Force Commander). They act as a back up force for local police, mobilize in emergency situations, and provide riot control.

Impact on Interagency: This personnel model would have a minimal impact on the interagency because it seeks to employ individuals and units from donor nations. The individuals can be trained in this system to accommodate interagency requirements.

Cost: Costs are defrayed by both mission funding from member states and contributions to the overall EU budget by member states. As in the U.S., members are always concerned that funds do not migrate between the operational and the institutional. The overhead for Directorate IX is 15 personnel to manage the policy aspect of keeping between 720 and 1,000 personnel on mission. The true overhead cost is not available, as the HR process varies among the member countries. However, the EU does have a fairly robust contingency funding process.

Twenty percent of the European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) Budget (out of the regular Commission Budget) is earmarked as a "reserve" to ensure enough remaining appropriations to react quickly in a crisis. This is foreseen as an "emergency reserve" and does not need to be fully committed by the end of the fiscal year.[5] The 2005 budget is 62.6 million Euro, so the emergency reserve would amount to 12.52 million Euro. In total, from proposal to decision, a Joint Action can take between 4 and 19 weeks, with the financial statement for crisis management options with operational needs appearing somewhere between the third and sixteenth weeks. If appropriations are not available, they may not be implemented as intended by the Joint Action. If the Commission deems that funds are not available, the European Parliament and the Council propose a solution to solve this matter to the Commission. Funds can

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5 CFSP Financing, Frequently Asked Questions, http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/cfsp/fin/faq.htm.

then be secured via transfers of appropriations or a supplementary or amended budget (this can take 10 to 12 weeks).[6]

In a crisis, a Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM) is used to expedite gaining resources for a surge requirement.[7] It is decided on an annual basis and for 2005 the amount is 30 million Euro. The RRM is flexible, yet it is constrained by a few aspects:

- The maximum duration of a project is 6 months.
- It cannot be used for humanitarian assistance.[8]
- It can only finance operations where other EC instruments can't respond in timely manner.

Emergency mechanisms for rapid funding of food aid, human rights and democratization, mine action, and rehabilitation already exist in other legal/financial instruments.

The RRM has five essential conditions of employment:

- Urgency: Immediate action required
- Political Priority: EU actively involved with political process aimed at resolving conflict or defusing civilian crisis or scale of emergency so great that might jeopardize EU long-term cooperation programs
- Opportunity: Window exists for intervention, conditions are stable for envisioned deployment, with reasonable level of risk
- Effectiveness: Well targeted program to meet objectives within 6mo time frame, must contribute to conditions of stability
- Follow-up: Readiness to adjust country strategies and programs to take into account this project. Follow-up measures need to be able to be financed and implemented rapidly under other medium and long-term projects.

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6 CFSP Financing The CFSP Budget, http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/cfsp/fin/index.htm.

7 See European Commission External Relations website, "Conflict Prevention & Civilian Crisis Management, Rapid Reaction Mechanism, Updated March 2005, http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/cpcm/rrm/index.htm and European Commission Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management Unit, "Civilian Instruments for EU Crisis Management," April 2003, p. 22.

8 The European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) provides humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

3. Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)[9]

a. General

OSCE focuses on conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation through addressing the human dimension of security that encompasses advancement of democracy, rule of law and human rights. OSCE provides monitoring, technical assistance, training, and regional assistance through their field missions as well as assists nations in implementation and compliance with their international legal obligations and OSCE commitments. The current focus of OSCE programming is local institution building and capacity building of countries that could best be described as transitioning nations as opposed to immediate post-conflict nations. OSCE seeks to build capacity, monitor and mentor as opposed to substitute for indigenous capacity.

The OSCE niche is long-term field missions with access to nationally seconded specialized expertise through the Rapid Expert Assistance and Cooperation Teams (REACT) program. In 2003, 90 percent of all OSCE staff positions were located in field missions with 90 percent of international field mission staff seconded.[10] The OSCE considers its area of responsibility (AOR) as its 55 member nations; it provides long-term field missions and shorter-term assistance missions in member nations upon invitation. Prior to the creation of REACT, OSCE HR had to contend with 400 different inconsistent job descriptions when vetting candidates. With the creation of REACT, HR revised that disparate list and honed the field position descriptions down to a matrix of 11 fields of expertise with generic job descriptions listing minimum requirements, desired qualities and levels of professional competence (education and experience). There is an overall general set of minimum job requirements for all REACT applicants. The specific job listings also include mission specific requirements, tasks and responsibilities in addition to general qualifications. The REACT website lists upcoming vacancies and candidates are either tapped from national databases of pre-qualified candidates or interested individuals contact their national focal points to apply for listed openings. The REACT system has four components: a staffing matrix with twelve fields of expertise and four professional levels, providing common sets of requirements for job descriptions; a

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9 Based on interviews conducted in Vienna and by telephone in fall of 2004 and spring of 2005, and the OSCE website at http://www.osce.org/.

10 OSCE, Financial Report and Financial Statements for the year ended 31 December 2003 and the Report of the External Auditor, PC.ACMF/73/04, 5 July 2004.

standardized application; a Human Resources Extranet; and a training support element, which is emphasized, so that no one is sent to the field without adequate training.

Overall REACT is a system intended to fill posts with civilians who fit baseline criteria in existing missions which do not require a quick turn-around. Police tend to be better prepared for these posts than do other civilian experts who typically need more training. Key areas of preparation for OSCE deployability from OSCE HR are security preparation, survival training and mission experience. Currently 33 percent of new mission staff is unprepared in this regard and inexperienced in hardship conditions. The United Kingdom, Germany and Switzerland have the best record with 100 percent of their secondees trained and properly prepared. The OSCE Secretariat does offer technical assistance to those states without their own training resources or curriculum. The Secretariat Training Section with a staff of seven full-time people (four professional program staff including the coordinator and three support staff) supports training for about 400 staff (permanent and seconded), conducts induction training at the Vienna Secretariat for secondees; develops and vetts the OSCE tri-annual training strategy; develops and maintains the OSCE training guidelines for member states; provides sample training modules upon request, and maintains an online database of trainer experts and training programs available around the world which is accessible to national training focal points.

Training partner institutions include the Swedish Folke Bernadotte Academy which conducts training for OSCE, UN and EU missions. The Swedish Development Agency (SIDA) recruits for the foreign office, and some private organizations also provide in-Mission training. The Austrian Peace Center/Austrian Study Center for Peace and Conflict Resolution (ASPR) at Burg Schlaining (which began as an EC funded private initiative) seeks to provide common training for OSCE, EU and UN civilian deployments. ASPR formerly was not linked to Austrian government candidate selection for OSCE, but this changed after consultations with the OSCE. Now the Austrian Foreign Ministry is working more closely with ASPR to link participation with selection of secondees.

The Annual Report of the OSCE Secretary General on Police-Related Activities in 2003 stressed the importance of rule of law and public order as a prerequisite to enable other facets of transition and democratic development. The Annual report urges member states to place higher national priority upon maintaining a pool of skilled police advisers and recommends that states employ systems for recruiting, selecting, providing pre-mission training for and developing the careers of police officers with skills and qualities

that meet the OSCE police assistant profiles. The report suggests that states should consider additional training for individual officers such as language training; states should include recently retired police officers in their reserve of officers and notes that if States are unable to improve systems for nominating qualified secondees, the OSCE should investigate the use of contracted experts instead.[11]

b. Comparison Criteria: The OSCE is focused on a few narrow skill sets and takes a relatively long time to deploy significant numbers of personnel, provided by member states as individuals or through national contributions. OSCE standardized training packages are an advantage, but cannot, at current resourcing, accommodate the numbers expected for employment by S/CRS.

Management Structure and Equipment. Management for the REACT online recruitment program resembles a spoke and hub system. Candidates are recruited/proposed to OSCE Secretariat HR by member states in one of several ways. Member states either select candidates from an existing roster of national applicants who meet the skill sets noted, or they advertise the position and forward a shortlist of their own vetted candidates to OSCE HR. Depending on member state the recruitment is nationally managed by the state or contracted out.

The OSCE has a small HR management staff of a few people dedicated to vetting REACT short-listed candidates. Member states that recruit candidates have varied national capacities to manage this. The United States has one focal point at the U.S. Mission to the OSCE in Vienna, Austria with which the OSCE Secretariat coordinates regarding recruitment and training. The recruitment, rostering and vetting of candidates in the U.S. is largely coordinated and handled by the State Department contractor Pacific Architects and Engineering (PAE) based in the United States, which also has offices in Vienna.

REACT, created in 2001, came from a U.S. concept introduced at the OSCE's Istanbul Summit in 1999. The intention of the REACT mission is to enable the OSCE to deploy civilian experts more rapidly to the field to undertake activities associated with conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation. The REACT concept was based upon the lessons learned in the Balkans and the desire to have trained teams ready to deploy on standby with on-call participants. The original idea was to have

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[11] OSCE, Annual Report of the Secretary General on Police Related Activities in 2003, SEC.DOC/2/04/Rev.1, 11 June 2004.

a central database at OSCE HQ Vienna that could tap into national databases. The central database concept eventually was abandoned due to the concerns of member states based upon stringent national personnel data protection laws, resulting in a system where each member state manages their own database or lists of candidates. The OSCE positions are advertised to the member states prior to public posting and then states screen, interview and train candidates to be proposed to OSCE Human Resources. Often candidates are already resident in the nationally held roster and it is a matter of identifying those candidates, ensuring they remain eligible, screening and interviewing them and passing their names to the OSCE Secretariat in Vienna, which would then make its own short list and further vet those candidates with the input of the field mission.

The distributed nature of the REACT program with member state recruitment at the center makes it easier to obtain the initial national short lists required for surge requirements, but the OSCE HQ HR team's small staff size would pose a problem for vetting appropriate candidates for rapid deployments. The average deployment is 500 per year; only during the Balkan crisis was there a need to send up to 1,000 personnel.

Ideally the objective is to deploy within two to eight weeks of posting positions for a specific mission. The quickest deployment was three weeks from initiation of a new mission, but this unusually quick deployment is not characteristic of the speed required for normal deployments. This time frame includes the national pre-mission training (which depending upon the member state policy may have occurred prior to nomination for a position or commence once the individual is selected) and the brief OSCE pre-deployment training in Vienna.

Personnel Skills and Areas of Expertise: The OSCE has a matrix of 11 fields of expertise with generic job descriptions listing minimum requirements, desired qualities and levels of professional competence (education and experience):

1. Human Rights
2. Rule of Law
3. Democratization
4. Elections
5. Economic and Environmental Affairs
6. Education
7. Media Affairs
8. Political Affairs

9. Administration and Support (11 subfields)
10. General Staff Monitoring
11. Military Affairs and Civilian Police.

The levels of professional competency were developed to overcome the situation in which many of the nationally nominated candidates were senior qualified subject matter experts but had no managerial experience. The four levels for all but police candidates are:

1. Professional: Normal professional qualifications, university degree or equivalent experience, 2 years of relevant professional experience, minimum one year in a relevant field
2. Middle Management: More managerial position, requires advanced degree or certified training course in relevant field, minimum 6 years of relevant diversified and progressively responsible professional experience at least 3 years at management level relevant to the position
3. Senior Professional: Research and Management requires advanced degree in relevant field minimum 6 years of relevant professional experience; and
4. Senior Management (heads of departments and units): advanced education/certified training course in relevant field, advanced degree in management, minimum 10 years of relevant, diversified and progressively responsible professional experiences, including at least 5 years at management level relevant to position.

The levels of experience for civilian police are slightly different as most police do not have the same university education as other civilian experts; their minimum requirements tend to be more experience related. For example the minimum qualification for a Senior Management level police officer would be 20 years of experience.

Force Numbers and Structure: With 55 member nations the potential for a relatively deep pool of candidates should be high. However, the effectiveness of filling positions based on REACT criteria seems to be variable across the 11 different fields of expertise listed in the matrix. While an average of 60 percent of the candidates proposed by member states met the posted criteria for REACT vacancy notices, the number of appropriately qualified candidates nominated by nations for civilian police posts is far less. In 2002 in response to 256 advertisements, 73 percent of the applicants sent to OSCE HQ by host nations did not meet criteria and were rejected. In 2003 in response to 151 advertisements, 75 percent of applicants did not meet criteria either. In both years posts were readvertised with disappointing results with the new applications as well. In

some cases, mission staffing imperatives forced chiefs of mission to accept individuals who did not meet the minimum criteria.

The operational deployments of OSCE secondees to missions require less than 1,000 staff per year. There is little modularity in these deployments as the OSCE recruits and deploys experts as individuals.

Operations and Logistics: REACT provides a common online portal for individuals to apply to national focal points, in order to be seconded to OSCE missions. Some nations keep their own websites and their own databases of qualified individuals, while others recruit as positions open. REACT provides a common application form which is available on the website and which can be sent online to national focal points or printed and mailed depending upon national requirements. Those who apply through REACT are only seconded through their nation. As of November 2004, out of the 55 OSCE member states, 8 have their own websites for application to REACT (including the UK and U.S.), 32 allow online application through the REACT site which is forwarded to the participating state's nominating authority, four second but don't accept electronic copy and have a preference for printed out/typed applications, and 11 member states do not traditionally send or second personnel.

Incentives are provided by member states, and the mission arranges logistics on a separate basis. Due to the OSCE mission criteria, their deployments are to relatively stable situations and the need for self contained or deployed support for transportation, lodging, communications, food, medical support, etc., is minimal.

Training: OSCE works closely with EU and the UN to ensure that their training and mission planning is complementary, particularly where they are deployed alongside each other in the field. EU training is based on OSCE training standards. Member states provide all pre-mission training to include security training at their own expense.

The Secretariat Training Section provides a 4-day induction training program to new secondees in Vienna and this cost is included in salary/expenses of Vienna training office budget. While member states are responsible for national pre-mission training, the OSCE has created a set of standards in their "Training Standards Handbook" developed in November 2000 and it has created a set of training modules nations may use. Additionally OSCE can conduct seminars and technical training upon request. The handbook is intended to serve as a guideline for national training programs; the areas covered include field work readiness indicators, and module guidelines on the following topics.

- International Community/Introduction to the OSCE
- Introduction to Rehabilitation in Post-Conflict Societies
  - Human Rights
  - Democratization Processes
  - Gender Issues in Crisis Situations
- Cross-Cultural Communication
  - International Working Environment'
  - Cultural Awareness
- Safety and Security Issues
  - Personal Safety
  - Mine Awareness
  - Map Reading
  - Four-wheel driving
  - Radio Communication
- Stress Management and First Aid
- Fieldwork Techniques:
  - Monitoring
  - Communicating via interpreters
  - Conflict Management
  - Information Flow and Coordination
  - Report Writing
    - Each section and module of the handbook has a list of suggested reference materials and pre-departure expectations relative to the modules.
    - The United States requires that all selected secondees pass online training offered in two modules by USIP.

The OSCE provides 3- to 4-day induction training in Vienna on OSCE practices and mission-specific requirements/context. In-mission individuals receive a briefing packet and training can range form formal classroom sessions to on the job training depending upon resources and requirements. Technical training on systems such as Oracle DB may happen back in Vienna.

Secondees receive their security training from their national pre-mission training. More robust security training would be useful, but it is not mandated by OSCE (a function of the consensus based organization). Suggested Security Training standards are

included in the OSCE Training Standards Handbook which is distributed to all member states. OSCE HR and Training personnel recognize that suggested modules and standards are not sufficient to insure that all candidates have received adequate training, but the consensus-based nature of the organization has prevented OSCE from levying training requirements upon secondee candidates. Events in the Balkans and in Kyrgyzstan have further reinforced the importance of such training to member states, which according to the OSCE training coordinator has led to an increased emphasis upon proper safety and security training of secondees. Minimum security training prior to deployment is something that a U.S. model would probably want to make a requirement. The areas of training suggested by OSCE include personal safety, mine awareness, map reading, four-wheel driving, and radio communication.

According to the REACT manager at OSCE HR, 33 percent of new mission staff is unprepared for austere environments with the proper security and survival training.

OSCE does not conduct exercises or participate in member state exercises in an official capacity.

Recognized OSCE partner training institutions include: Swedish Folke Bernadotte Academy (trains for OSCE, EU and UN missions), Austrian ASPR training center, Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), Norwegian Resource Bank for Democracy and Human Rights (NORDEM), and German Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF). The OSCE Training Coordinator hosts an annual meeting of training focal points including these centers and others from around the world. According to the OSCE Secretariat, the best trained secondees come from the UK, Germany and Switzerland. The UK provides military training including competency on using radios (important for personnel recovery) and they put their secondees through training in a Welsh area to force them into an unfamiliar language environment.

Legislation: To establish this type of HR system would either increase significantly the size of the S/CRS staff, or require a similar increase in the staff of DoS/HR and significant legislation to address the relationship of the Federal government to the states. The extensive network of member states, secondment procedures, training partners, etc., would require extensive coordination just to get personnel into the process, let alone go through a six to nine week period before they are prepared to deploy.

Interoperability: The OSCE HR system has strong points in that it possesses a well developed system of skill identification and qualification, and various standard operating procedures and guides, which have been adopted by other organizations and the

member states to train their seconded personnel prior to deployment. The personnel procurement system itself presents few challenges to interoperability.

Impact on Interagency Process: The OSCE model is designed for strictly civilian missions and the pool of secondees is drawn from civilian expertise. They do not prescribe any civil-mil training and they do not officially participate in exercises. Civilians in this model would not be a part of a military chain of command, but rather would be working for civilian mission leadership. Reporting is conducted within the mission and is coordinated with the relevant OSCE agencies and organizations. The OSCE cannot do large infrastructure projects or rebuild governments.

The OSCE does coordinate with the other international counterparts in a mission area, such as Macedonia, where there has been good HQ level coordination efforts between OSCE, NATO and EU. This may be largely due to the fact that the Ohrid Framework agreement clearly laid out the roles and responsibilities of each of the international actors. The NATO and now EU mission's responsibility has been the security framework within which the OSCE has worked to help transformation of Macedonia's governmental structures.

Cost: Overall OSCE is a field intensive organization with 90 percent of its personnel in the field and 60 percent of its overall costs are attributable to staff (includes staff costs, post and not-post as well as board and lodging allowance). In 2003 there were 4,059 staff positions in the entire OSCE, with 1,655 professional staff posts and 1,029 seconded international staff budgeted.[12] The 2004 staff budget cost category was 105 million Euro (at 1.28 Euro to the dollar, that equals $134.4 million), but all REACT secondees are paid salary, per diem by their host nations so that is not a cost borne by the OSCE. The report of the External Auditor on the 2003 budget notes that an estimated Euro 76 million ($97 million) was the value of national in-kind contributions for seconded staff salaries. When interviewing both training and HR recruitment staff it was noted that OSCE does not break out costs as per person/per annum for deployment, training and sustainment of seconded individuals and would only provide figures for certain aspects of this process as noted below.

The costs for the REACT program entail the following:

- Recruitment/Deployment:

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[12] OSCE, Financial Report and Financial Statements for the year ended 31 December 2003 and the Report of the External Auditor, PC.ACMF/73/04, 5 July 2004, pp. 1, 3.

- **Secretariat Human Resources/Recruitment Sections:** According to the 2004 Unified Budget Revision Proposal from 7 April 2005, HR recruitment is budgeted at 495,800 Euro with a proposed revision to 516,100 Euro. The Personnel Management Section is budgeted for 625,100 Euro with a proposed revision to 669,100.[13] This includes costs to maintain the web portal, develop job postings with specific criteria (based on the existing job descriptions and one of the categories in the matrix) in conjunction with Mission Staff, communicate position openings to the 55 member states (online), vet the nationally submitted short-lists of candidates in consultation with Chiefs of Missions (includes interviews and review of candidate applications), send out offers and process related paperwork for deployment to mission.
- **Member States** pay for salary, benefits (insurance), any required vaccinations and per diem of secondees in mission.

- Training for Secondees:
  - Overall training costs to OSCE for secondees to field missions is 1.6 percent of staff costs Secondees make up 62 percent of professional staff and 90 percent of international staff. The Secretariat training section budget for 2004 is 642,600 Euro with a proposed year-end revision to 673,400 Euro (2005 is still not approved) but the most recent overall training costs for OSCE provided training at HQ and in Mission was estimated to be 1.5 million Euro.[14] The typical secondee is in the field for 1.5 years, has 2 trips to Vienna (to include technical trips for computer system training such as Oracle DBs) and 3-4 workshops in the mission. The additional costs would be the 4 days of travel and per diem in Vienna.
  - Costs for Induction Mission budget also include per diem in Vienna (200 Euro /day) for induction training, and transport to mission from Vienna; this amounts to about 1,000 Euro per diem for typical induction period, plus the cost of transport to mission area from Vienna. In mission training is funded by mission budget, usually delivered by focal points in Human Resources in larger missions, and in smaller missions, staff with other functions perform training duties as well. Contracted training is rare, usually done with individual training consultants from the Secretariat held training consultant database, paid for out of mission budget.

The OSCE training coordinator conducted research into the cost for creating an OSCE training center to conduct all training for all secondees. This proved too expensive for member state support as it would have cost 1.5 million Euro ($1.92 million) to run such a facility with a 2-week pre-mission training to include security and survival training, a staff of three (coordinator and two support staff) plus training delivery to an average of 500 new staff per year (about 20 courses per year each 2 weeks in length). The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which similarly to OSCE

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13 OSCE, "Decision Note No. 665, OSCE 2004 Unified Budget Revision," PC.DEC/665, 7 April 2005, Annex p 2, also 13 April 2005 interview with OSCE Training Coordinator Thomas Neufing.

14 Ibid.

supports approximately 1,000 staff in the field, has a training facility in Geneva which trains delegates over a 3-week period to include pre-mission training and mission orientation. The cost of running the training center including equipment and accommodations is approximately 1.5 million Euro ($1.92 million) per year, using internal ICRC training staff.

4. Canadian Resource Bank for Democracy and Human Rights (CANADEM)[15]

a. General

CANADEM is the official name of a Canadian non-governmental non-profit organization funded by the Canadian government to match expertise resident in the Canadian population with requirements articulated by the Canadian government, other national governments, international governmental organizations, and non-governmental organizations. The general areas of expertise comprise human rights, governance, election monitoring, policing, disaster relief, and economic recovery. CANADEM does not provide experts in security related areas that require collective, organized units or executive policing authority. The organization is modeled after NORDEM, and both derive their names as a shortened version of the Norway/Canada "Resource Bank for Democracy and Human Rights." The effort grew out of the experience of hiring human rights experts for the UN in the aftermath of the 1994 Rwandan genocide. The Canadian government studied several models for organizing and accessing these skills and decided to establish a government funded NGO for the advantages in response time, oversight, policy stand-off and liability.

CANADEM operates as a market exchange or market clearing mechanism, by maintaining a database of 6,000 experts and matching human resources with agency needs. Experts have skills to sell, and agencies want to buy. CANADEM accepts resumes submitted by Canadian citizens and screens the submissions for requisite skills, and enters qualified applicants into the database. CANADEM accepts requests for experts from various governments and organizations and polls the database to develop a list of potential candidates, matching screened applicant resumes with the job requirements. CANADEM screeners contact the potential candidates and those

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15 Based on two interviews with Mr. Paul LaRose-Edwards, Chief Executive Officer of CANADEM, conducted in the fall of 2004 at USJFCOM and in the spring of 2005 in Washington, DC; the CANADEM website at http://www.canadem.ca/; and briefings and materials provided by Mr. LaRose-Edwards.

candidates indicate their interest in competing for the position(s). When a suitable list of prospective candidates (with the requisite skills and interest) is assembled, CANADEM ranks the applicants and the list is forwarded back to the requesting agency, which then contacts those applicants and enters into hiring negotiations. CANADEM usually does not hire candidates on behalf of the agency, and does not run field operations. On an urgent case-by-case basis, for a reliable, frequent, high visibility client, CANADEM may offer initial employment to a candidate to get them on a payroll, with the requesting agency reimbursing and completing a direct hire as soon as possible. One area of current difficulty is that CANADEM has some issues with providing this service to commercial for-profit contractors that may be operating in the same policy space.

Currently CANADEM has 6,000 resumes on file. They accomplish about 30,000 screens per year. They have the capability to respond to requests for a particular expert or set of skills within 30 minutes. In the case of the most recent Ukraine election, the Prime Minister of Canada made a statement three weeks before the re-vote and stated that Canada would send 500 election monitors to the Ukraine, and that interested citizens should contact CANADEM. CANADEM received 5,000 additional resumes in a four day period, but was able to screen candidates, select for the government, assemble the final list, hire and assemble the monitors, deploy them to the Ukraine and position them with various agencies including OSCE. The total cost was about $CAN 4.5 million, including limited training, transportation to port of embarkation, aircraft charter, per diem, but not including any salaries paid by operating agencies (generally these were straight volunteers for this mission).

CANADEM is proposing an expansion of the concept to achieve a "Canada Corps" which would be a much more comprehensive organization charged with resourcing and coordinating deployments and employment of a wider set of skills drawn from the Canadian citizenry.

b. Comparison Criteria: CANADEM is primarily a database search entity. No training is provided. The hiring process and deployment is the responsibility of the using agency. CANADEM success rate at placing candidates and the time required do not meet the requirements levied by S/CRS in their operational concept.

Management: CANADEM is a non-governmental non-profit funded for operations by the Canadian government. It does not have any operational capability and serves only to manage the connection of candidates of certain skills with agencies seeking those skills. CANADEM's core funding from the government covers about 4.5

man-years of full time equivalents, paid at market rates for a non-profit NGO, to conduct the screening, searches, and maintain the database. This management structure provides flexibility and allows the organization to ask for and maintain information that is beyond the reach of the government, thereby adhering to laws and principles of privacy, which are important to the people normally applying for these types of positions. Since CANADEM does not run field operations, it and the Canadian government are provided with some policy stand-off and "deniability" should an expert experience trouble when under the employ of a third party requesting agency. CANADEM does not provide the "total" personnel solution since it only provides "inputs" and matches, and does not provide the operational output or organizational capability to employ the skills. CANADEM uses the "askSam" commercial off-the-shelf database software (www.asksam.com) for the database and reports that they purchased the software for about $US 500. The "Resume Tracker 5.1" is listed on the askSam web site for $US 595.

The model offers the ability to place experts with either military or civilian experience with their counterparts to smooth the planning and execution of operations. There is no reason to limit the skills and experiences resident within the database records.

Personnel Skills and Areas of Expertise: This model could conceivably provide all skill sets; however, those to be employed on an individual basis are the most amenable. Advisors of all types, program management, monitors, police monitors and others without executive authority, judicial personnel, Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR) specialists, military planners, resource management personnel, intelligence and information management specialists, measurement and assessment personnel, etc., would all be easily accessible using this model. Skills requiring collective employment immediately upon arrival (most notably police and security units or working teams of infrastructure repair) would not be amenable to this model. Indeed, the agencies using CANADEM are looking almost exclusively for individuals and in the rare cases that they need teams, the agency assembles and trains the team upon arrival at the point of need. CANADEM organizes its skill set and database into the following 28 groupings:

- International Work Experience (11 regions)
- Field Mission Experience
- International Organizations Experience
- International Management Experience: (responsible for 5+ professional level staff)
- General Management/Supervision Experience

- International Human Rights Experience
- Refugee / IDP Experience
- Police Related Experience (domestic and international)
- Security Experience (domestic and international)
- Canadian Domestic Legal Experience
- International Legal Experience
- Foreign Electoral Experience
- Domestic Electoral Experience (e.g. Canadian)
- Reconstruction/Development Experience
- Assessment/Design/Evaluation Experience
- Training Experience
- Medical/ Social Work Experience
- Politics and Conflict Management Experience
- Governance Systems Experience
- Civil Society Experience
- Media Experience
- Field Communications Experience
- Information Technology Experience
- Mission Administrative/Logistics Experience
- Worked with local staff (from host country)
- Mines/UXO Experience
- Specialized International Field Expertise
- Miscellaneous Professional Backgrounds.

Force Numbers and Structure: CANADEM maintains about 6,000 resumes on file. There is no conceptual limit to this model, since it is only an input source to the overall R&S issue. Physical growth potential is only limited by the number of personnel needed/affordable to respond to requests. At a ratio of 4.5 full time equivalents (FTE) for 30,000 screens per year, one worker would have to be added for every 6,666 requests per year. That equates to about $100,000 (see the cost paragraph below). The proposed Canada Corps concept incorporates additional overhead for lessons learned, an intern program to "build a bench" of skills, and outreach and deployment programs that would considerably increase the overhead. This model could clearly provide the personnel

needed to augment S/CRS operational organizations such as the HRSTs and ACTs. However, as the table below shows there will be a large number of personnel in the pool who will not be selected for deployment. This will be a constant constraint on detailed HR planning and the ability to link a specific person with a needed skill and position prior to any given crisis or deployment, which will then reduce the amount of investment in training.

Table II-1. CANADEM Success Rate Comparisons[16]

CANADEM Success Rate Comparisons, FYs 2000-2003 FY

	Q3 2000-01		Q3 2001-02		Q3 2002-03		Q3 2003-04		Q3 2004-05	
Submissions	285		506		552		489		624	
Resumes	600		1447		1430		1502		2117	
Successes	% of Submissions	% of resumes	% of Submissions	% of resumes	% of Submissions	% of resumes	% of Submissions	% of resumes	% of Submissions	% of resumes
Shortlisted	35%	17%	29%	10%	29%	11%	33%	11%	40%	12%
Selected	29%	14%	23%	8%	17%	7%	23%	7%	28%	8%
Accepted	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	21%	7%	21%	5%
Deployed*	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	15%	5%	18%	5%

[1] Chart 6A demonstrates that apart from 2000-01, reflecting high Kosovo (UNMIK) recruitment, CANADEM's successes have grown both in absolute numbers, and although less dramatic, also as a % of total submissions and total resumes submitted.

[2] CANADEM registrants continue to decline positions due to long delays between submission and selection (alternate positions have been accepted) or for personal reasons. Acceptances were not statistically tracked until 2003-04. The higher percentage declining offers in FY 2004-05 is also due to the greater demand for civilian experts, allowing them to pick and choose from among competing offers.

Operations and Logistics: CANADEM is not involved in field operations or logistics. Once direct contact is established between the requesting agency and the candidates, the requesting agency funds all transportation, training, salaries, benefits, etc. CANADEM will, on an exception crisis basis, execute some of those deployment functions with funds passed through to the hired expert, and CANADEM imposes a variable administrative fee for such services. The internal operations follow a three-step process:

1. Preliminary Screening

16 Adapted from CANADEM Quarterly Report, Annex 3, Chart 6A. "FAC / CANADEM Contribution Agreement**,** Third Quarter Report for the Period April 23, 2004-December 31, 2004." Submitted to: Wendy Gilmour, Deputy Director, Regional Security and Peacekeeping Division (IDC), Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, January 11, 2005

- Résumés and other self-stated skills are reviewed for accuracy, consistency, completeness, and conformity to relevant UN or other guidelines.
- Additional personal history forms (UN "P11", OSCE "REACT" form) are requested from potential UN or OSCE candidates.

2. Advanced Screening
   - Reservists may be interviewed in person or by phone.
   - Referees are asked to fill out a written questionnaire. CANADEM reviews their responses, and follows up on inconsistencies and evident shortcomings.
   - CANADEM often consults past colleagues, supervisors and subordinates to confirm and expand on what is known about an individual. This can require substantial time and resources. CANADEM works to reach a level of certainty that a particular individual has sufficient skills to merit being short-listed.

3. Position Screening
   - Once an agency requests candidates, CANADEM searches its roster. It applies its knowledge of the mission/job in question and its knowledge of individual reservists to create an initial short-list of individuals that are a good fit.
   - CANADEM then e-mails these individuals to determine interest and availability.
   - Interested and available candidates are then forwarded to the agency in CANADEM's ***final short-list.***
   - Requesting organizations are expected to undertake the additional screening required to select the optimum candidates from the CANADEM ***short-lists***.

Training: Because of the uncertain demand for skills, the unpredictability of the situations into which CANADEM's experts will be deployed, and the extremely constrained operating costs, CANADEM conducts no institutional or pre-deployment training for its experts. Since candidates contacted by CANADEM can refuse any offers, there can be no guarantee that investing in institutional training for pool members will ever pay off in any individual case. CANADEM assumes that on-site training by the requesting agency and experience are the best teachers. Since it reviews resumes for appropriate qualifications, its members are often already qualified, or minimally qualified, prior to deployment. Professional development and career enhancement are the responsibility of the individual expert and the requesting agency. In the proposed Canada Corps, the intern program may provide an entry-level method to "build a bench," but the size of the current database records (6,000) and the expected size of the intern program

(between 100 and 500) will not accomplish replacement or expansion. CANADEM will continue to rely on volunteers who manage their own professional skills development.

Legislation: This model would require authorizing and appropriations legislation to ensure permanence and prescribe authorities for gathering information and connecting agencies, countries, etc., with volunteers. Additionally, legislation parallel to the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act would be needed to protect citizens from disincentives to volunteer or unfair employment practices.

Interoperability: Flowing from the model's underlying assumptions and connected to the training issue, interoperability would suffer from the inability to conduct institutional training and exercises to keep the "pool" up to date on current civilian and military practices. Learning curves in operational organizations would be extraordinarily steep and would impede initial operations. While the individual skills of the participating personnel may be assumed to be high, integrating those skills with highly complex planning and execution systems would require flexibility and time.

Impact on Interagency Process: There are no significant impacts foreseen at the organizational level. At the micro/individual level, competition for limited skills within the pool could create tensions and some USG personnel might be expected to volunteer for consideration (military reservists or government civilian personnel for example). Policies would have to be developed to govern request priorities and rationing of expertise. CANADEM currently uses its own judgment in filling requests for skills and expertise that exceed the available pool, based on relationship with the client agency, urgency, and global situation. With respect to government personnel, policies for volunteering and higher authority approval for temporary leaves of absence, etc., would have to be devised.

Cost: The Canadian government provides funding at the rate of about $CAN 500,000 (about US$ 413,000 at current exchange rates) per year, to cover the 4.5 FTE who run the program. Expansion of this program is fairly straightforward and linear, since any operational costs are outside the purview of the program.

B. PRE-ARRANGED CONTRACTUAL AGREEMENTS

1. U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) and Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA)[17]

a. General

OTI and OFDA emphasize quick-impact interventions to catalyze broader change and to leverage additional resources especially in-country, usually within two to three years. Both organizations use in-kind grants and direct assistance to NGOs and other "implementing partners." OTI focuses on local NGOs and/or informal community groups, such as student groups, local entrepreneurs, and rural villagers, to implement short-term projects in transitioning from governmental crisis to stability. OTI has flexibility to fund projects that do not meet USAID's standard grant criteria, usually in the $5K-50K range to limit exposure and risk. OTI uses startup projects to empower local capacities in rural areas, using a two to three page project nomination format. OTI uses a rapidly deployable staff (operations can commence within 4 weeks of notice) familiar with OTI programming in post-conflict environments and a field management system which rewards innovation and risk-taking at the team leadership level, with emphasis on seeking and building reliable implementing partners.

OFDA takes on larger projects that focus on humanitarian assistance in the aftermath of natural and man-made disasters that require immediate and large scale relief in the areas of food, water, sanitation, public health, population movements, etc.

b. Comparison Criteria: OTI and OFDA processes have some significant advantages. They provide rapid deployment and flexible organizations. They can access a relatively broad set of skills. However, they do not operate at the scale that S/CRS anticipates.

Management: OTI uses a roster of experienced specialists on a retainer who agree to work up to 130 days per year on short notice anywhere in the world. (They are referred to as the "bullpen.") These personnel conduct assessments and design country strategies to enable OTI to scale up quickly without creating a longstanding bureaucracy. OTI also has access to a pool of temporary contract workers through personal services contracts (PSCs), who comprise the majority of professional staff as opposed to direct-hire Foreign Service officers and civil servants. OFDA operates in much the same way.

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[17] Based on interviews conducted in the spring of 2005 and USAID website at http://www.usaid.gov/.

OTI uses an outsourcing contracting mechanism called the Support Which Implements Fast Transition (SWIFT) which was initiated in 2003. SWIFT is an indefinite delivery indefinite quantity (IDIQ) contract involving nonprofit organizations and commercial development firms as bidders on future unspecified OTI programs. These bidders must demonstrate an ability to initiate OTI-style programs within 72 hours of award. Pre-qualified bidders are chosen periodically. The current six companies pre-qualified to participate in SWIFT II are: ARD, Inc.; Casals & Associates; Chemonics; Creative Associates International, Inc.; Development Alternatives, Inc.; and PADCO. SWIFT advantages are rapid action, broad flexibility, and high responsiveness for foreign policy priorities. Funds committed to a SWIFT contract may be redirected from one program area to another at any time – from small-scale infrastructure rehabilitation to strengthening the independent media to job training for ex-combatants. SWIFT requires, however, politically adept, hands-on direction rather than arm's-length oversight. Because of its scale and multimillion-dollar management capacity requirements, SWIFT has not been very accessible to most NGOs. It is also expensive to use, because the contractor charges a fee for each subgrant and employee overhead.

To compensate for SWIFT's shortfalls, OTI may provide grants to international organizations like the ICRC or the International Organization for Migrations (IOM) etc., to support, for example, reintegration of displaced persons, promotion of civil dialogue, or prevention of the recruitment of children into insurgent forces in Columbia. It has also partnered with NGOs like World Vision and private firms such as Management Systems International to develop a remedial education program for ex-combatant youth in Sierra Leone.

OFDA developed the Response Alternatives for Technical Services (RATS) program to satisfy its growing need for surge capacity. In response to numerous disasters worldwide, it became clear that OFDA could not find adequate staff to cover all positions in the field on Disaster Assistance Response Teams (DART), assessment teams, in Washington on the Response Management Teams (RMT) and backfill those permanent staff deploying to the field in a timely manner. OFDA's Senior Management Team (SMT) approved a program that would bring on board select candidates who could work on a part-time basis, for no more than 130 days per calendar year, and be deployed within hours to facilitate OFDA's response to disasters. This program is limited currently to 50 personnel.

Personnel Skills and Areas of Expertise: OTI's function in USAID, implicit in its name, is to help transition from conflict to effective governance. Its sister

organization, OFDA, focuses on immediate humanitarian relief and the transition to developmental assistance. For both organizations, the skill sets represent experience in program management in relatively austere environments. "Implementing partners" who may be local or international NGOs, commercial firms, etc, however, accomplish the actual program and project execution.

Force Numbers and Structure: The contracting model, using both individual PSCs (RATS) and the SWIFT program, provides flexibility and expansion capability. The pool may be limited by competition for similarly skilled people. In the past, the focus has been on providing individuals, but the SWIFT contracting vehicle should allow for specification of modular teams and capabilities. RATS is currently limited to 50 individual persons, who may be employed in the United States as backfill for deploying government personnel or the RATS personnel may themselves be deployed. RATS personnel have agreed to work no more than 130 days overseas.

Operations and Logistics: Recruiting PSCs is usually done through public advertisement, as with most Government positions, with full and open competition per USG hiring regulations. OTI runs a periodic selection panel. The selection process runs normally between 10 and 30 days from the date of application. The SWIFT program can support operations with individual personnel within 72 hours and OTI claims that collective operations overseas can be started within four weeks of notification. OFDA solicits RATS candidates as individuals and they must be able to deploy to their duty station within 72 hours. OTI and OFDA personnel and teams obtain logistics support through USAID arrangements under a joint implementation agreement between USAID and DoS. OTI direct-hires and PSCs and OFDA RATS personnel are medically screened prior to deployment; PSCs make their own insurance arrangements, although OTI is working on providing some insurance coverage sometime in the future.

Training: Due to the short-term employment nature of these personnel, especially PSCs, training overhead is limited to pre-deployment orientation and on-the-job-training. The retained specialists in OTI (bullpen) provide some training to new personnel. In both programs, the prospective candidate is expected to have some previous experience and it is up to the candidate to take positions that begin at the entry level and progress. Professional development and career progression are the responsibility of the candidate. There is currently little capacity in funding to defray the costs of preliminary training.

Legislation: Using the SWIFT or RATS mechanisms would require little legislation to adopt the authorities for S/CRS, however, funds cannot be expended in the absence of an actual declared emergency that would allow personnel hired under this model to attend exercise training as part of an S/CRS Advance Civil Team (ACT), for instance. This constraint on using contracting vehicle funds for training would have to be changed.

Interoperability: USAID already has a formal working relationship with the Department of State and other agencies. USAID is increasing the size of its Military Affairs Office and one objective is to hire former Civil Affairs (CA) officers to staff this office. However, under this model, unless modifications are made to the funding and authorizations, personnel are not made available for recurrent institutional training. These personnel arrive on site only with the experience that they bring from previous deployments, rather than an expanded working knowledge of the overall USG systems in place.

Impact on Interagency: Applying the models used by USAID would present an interagency issue in the area of reconciling expanded USAID responsibilities into areas in which other USG agencies already have existing programs (U.S. Department of Agriculture, for example), and in the areas of increasing the interagency competency of the program managers.

Cost: OTI has flexible funding across countries and projects, within the same fiscal year, under the rules and authorities of funds appropriated by Congress. Funding decisions on project nominations up to $100K can be made in-country in days vs. weeks or months. Average funding for OTI has been about $5M annually; however, OTI has received $66M for Afghanistan and $180M for Iraq in emergency supplemental appropriations over the past three years. OFDA is the releasing authority for emergency payments made by Chiefs of Mission (CoM) in a declared emergency in a host country. The amount of funds that the CoM can disburse was raised in April 2002 from $25,000 to $50,000. In 2003, OFDA spent less than 10 percent of its overall budget on program management and mission support ($34 million out of #351 million).

2. U.S. Department of Justice (DoJ) International Criminal Investigative and Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) and Office of Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training Program (OPDAT)[18]

a. General

ICITAP is a law enforcement development program carried out in foreign nations and is tailored to meet the specific needs of a national police forces, including some or all of police raining, development of procedural, organizational, and/or administrative bases for law enforcement and penal agencies; development of forensic capabilities, and providing U.S.-based models for dealing with organized crime. OPDAT is a parallel effort that trains judges and prosecutors in foreign nations, and is intended to strengthen democratic governments by building justice systems that promote the rule of law and serve the public interest.

b. Comparison Criteria: ICITAP and OPDAT offer niche capabilities in the training of host nation justice institutions. They use both individual and corporate contracting to provide individuals with skills and organized modules. They do not approach the broad set of skills or the numbers that S/CRS requires.

Management: ICITAP has a five year contract which has just completed competition and has been awarded to a consortium led by Military Professional Resources, Inc., (MPRI) to provide personnel for the program. Previously other contractors provided similar services. ICITAP has about 10 persons working to supervise the contract and the contractors from Washington. They also emphasize that they have a person from the Department of Justice on site at all missions. Sometimes that government person executes the program through a single point of contact for the contract on site, and sometimes the DoJ person directly supervises a number of contractors executing the contract. It depends on the size and nature of the mission.

OPDAT uses a roster to recruit and appoint individuals for missions. This is a much smaller program and the requirements for numbers of supervisory and management personnel are significantly reduced compared to ICITAP.

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18 Based on interviews with the International Programs Division, International Criminal Investigative and Training Assistance Program and Office of Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training Program, Department of Justice in spring of 2005 and the Department of Justice website at http://www.usdoj.gov/.

Personnel Skills and Areas of Expertise: These two programs are narrowly focused, which provides excellent supervisory capacity and management ability. However, unless trained in legal settings other than the U.S., potential members of ICITAP and OPDAT are grounded in American common law traditions and procedures. Continental law and procedures (wherein for example the magistrate or sitting judge also runs the investigation to determine questions of fact) are significantly different, as are legal systems in the Middle and Far East.

Force Numbers and Structure: ICITAP needs to be able to respond to requirements quickly with many people, but within a focused skill set. Today there are some 300 ICITAP personnel in Iraq to train the national police; such training takes place at two academies, one in Baghdad and one in Amman, Jordan. It was necessary to ramp up the national police trainers from about 60 initially to 200 currently and that took a significant amount of time. To react faster in the future, the number of personnel supervising the ICITAP contract has been increased to 10. ICITAP currently focuses on those with management and teaching experience, not fielding police individuals and units with executive authority. Under new contract, MPRI will develop its own ready cadre of international police, who will have both executive and technical assistance responsibilities.

OPDAT is a much smaller program that to date has been able to work on an individual, almost personal basis.

Both programs can be expanded. ICITAP, using a commercial contractor model, has the most capacity to expand in the short term and the contract could be modified to address modules of police with both training and executive authority. OPDAT could expand, but would rapidly outgrow the ability of the program managers at DoJ to effectively recruit and deploy large numbers of personnel. Developing small modules of judge, prosecutor, defense attorney, clerk and bailiff is possible.

Both programs have limited access to serving officers. Eventually the Federal jurisdictions could be exhausted, and access mechanisms would need to be established to reach state and municipal jurisdictions.

Operations and Logistics: The personnel models are significantly different between ICITAP and OPDAT. Because of the numbers involved, ICITAP uses a contractor consortium, led by MPRI to provide police and investigative trainers, monitors and mentors. OPDAT, on the other hand, uses direct PSCs to hire judges, court officers, bailiffs, etc. This has proven acceptable at the level of involvement in recent operations.

Logistics support has been an issue, as the personnel are dependent on other government agencies for support. DoJ does not provide any organized support, so if support is not available from the host country on the economy, then it must be coordinated with the U.S. Mission or the military commander in country.

Training: ICITAP's program may require more substantial training due to the nature of both executive policing and police training/monitoring. The contractor can be required to provide that pre-deployment training and to provide contractors to participate in training exercises, if the resources are made available. This will become more important if and when the USG decides to field more robust police with executive authority. OPDAT's training requirements are and will continue to be less strenuous, since the small, technical teaming aspect of providing courtroom teams relies on the member's individual expertise rather than collective skill sets.

Legislation: These personnel models have precedent within the government and would not present any significant legislative or regulatory challenges to adapt for S/CRS use.

Interoperability: These particular personnel models (contracting firm and individual contracts) do not pose any particular interoperability challenge, as long as the resources are available to activate contractors for the purposes of training exercises and operational planning.

Impact on Interagency: These programs can be integrated into interagency planning, exercises and execution, with appropriate funding. DoJ is enthusiastic about working with other agencies, but strongly defends proponency for these programs because of the necessity of management and leadership to understand domestic, international, and operational law and how they can, and cannot, come together in operational settings. DoJ is adamant about retaining officers of the court/members of the bar in supervisory positions.

Cost: All funding comes from the Department of State, through the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL). Funding has increased from about $30 million in 1998 to $180 million today, largely due to Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom.

C. CAPABILITIES-BASED PLANNING SYSTEMS

1. USAID Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) and Urban Search and Rescue (USAR)[19]

a. General

USAID/OFDA has developed response capabilities for assisting countries hit by natural disasters. There are two organizational components to this response capability. Assessment Teams immediately enter the area and report on the scope of the disaster to the U.S. Chief of Mission (Ambassador) and OFDA and recommend U.S. relief efforts. A second team, the Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART), provides rapid response assistance to international disasters as mandated by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as amended. A DART provides specialists trained in a variety of disaster relief skills that assist U.S. embassies and USAID missions in managing the USG response to disasters.

The structure of a DART is dependent on the size, complexity, type, and location of the disaster and the needs of the USAID/embassy and affected country. The number of individuals assigned to a DART is determined by how many people are required to perform the necessary activities to meet the strategy and objectives. Dependent on the circumstances, the DART may be small, with some 5 members, or it may be larger, with 10 or more personnel; the DART may be sourced from within the region in which the disaster occurred and also augmented with additional personnel from the United States or elsewhere. A DART is composed of six functional areas: management, operations, planning, logistics, administration, and contracting. Management includes overall DART activities, including liaison with the affected country; NGOs and IOs; and the U.S. military. Additionally, it includes the development and implementation of plans to meet strategic objectives. Operations includes all operational activities carried out by the DART such as search and rescue activities, technical support to an affected country, medical and health response, and aerial operations coordination. This function is most active during rapid onset disasters. Planning includes collection, evaluation, tracking, and dissemination of information about the disaster. Also included are reviews of activities, recommendations for future actions, and development of the DART's operational (tactical) plan. Logistics includes providing support to OFDA/DART personnel by managing supplies, equipment, and services, and ordering, receiving,

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19 Based on interviews at USAID in fall of 2004 and spring of 2005, and previous IDA studies.

distributing, and tracking people and USG- provided relief supplies. Administration includes the management of fiscal activities of the team, contracts, and procurement of goods and services required by OFDA/DART. Also included is cost accounting of DART activities. A DART leader selected by OFDA organizes and supervises the DART. The team leader receives a delegation of authority from and works directly for the OFDA assistant director for disaster response or his designee.

The requirement for rapidly deployable Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) teams grew out of a need recognized by USAID/OFDA, based on the lack of response capacity in the Americas for the 1985 Mexico City earthquake. After that event, OFDA developed a relationship with the Fairfax Virginia and Miami-Dade Florida Fire and Rescue Departments to create "self-sustainable response resources." These two departments provided the sole U.S. internationally deployable USAR forces and the first international deployment of this resource was in the aftermath of the Armenia earthquake in 1988.

This capacity was further developed by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to respond in the case of domestic disasters. FEMA developed a domestic National Urban Search and Rescue system under direction of the Stafford Act and the Federal (now National) Response Plan, resulting in 28 rapidly deployable USAR teams based in counties and municipalities around the United Sates that are available for domestic response based on guidelines promulgated by FEMA. Currently, two are available to OFDA for overseas deployment: one from the Fairfax County Fire and Rescue Department and one from the Los Angeles County Fire department (vice the original Miami-Dade Fire and Rescue Department). USAID/OFDA in turn uses the FEMA guidelines to regulate the use of USAR teams in disaster response around the world, with additional requirements pertaining to both the need for their rapid deployability and sustainability in overseas locations and for their conformance to pertinent international standards.

The following description uses the Fairfax County unit as an example. International deployments are activated by a request by USAID/OFDA and the designation of the unit becomes USAID SAR Team 1. The team has a roster of 128 (its ceiling is considered to be 150) trained and equipped members with job descriptions. When activated, a Task force is formed with 70 plus persons consisting of firefighters and paramedics from the Fairfax County Fire and Rescue Department (career and volunteer) as well as highly trained civilians such as physicians, canine handlers, structural engineers, communications experts, and heavy rigging specialists. The team works under the guidance of USAID/OFDA as a supporting member of the DART in the

field. In cases where the UN has activated an On-site Coordination Center (OSOCC) the SAR team will work under the guidance of that unit and in some circumstances in smaller numbers under the management of a UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) team.

b. Comparison Criteria: DART and USAR are exemplars of systems that tap Federal intra-governmental and American societal resources to achieve trained, rapidly deployable capability that has use in both domestic and foreign operations. Their only disadvantage are the focus on a select skill set and their scale, which does not handle the numbers expected by S/CRS.

Management: Because they are designated on a crisis basis and represent a number of skills dependent on the nature of the crisis, DART members come from a variety of agencies and relationships with the government. They may be government civil servants, PSCs, etc. As a subset for USAR operations, the members of the teams from Fairfax County and Los Angeles County are government employees from the respective jurisdiction augmented with volunteers with specific expertise.

Personnel Skills and Areas of Expertise: The DART personnel represent management and coordination skills in humanitarian and disaster relief and they are generally not prepared to engage in skill sets involved with governance, security, or economic and social well-being, except to be able to alleviate immediate suffering. The USAR effort is focused on searching for and rescuing the live victims of natural disasters. After the event, when the likelihood of finding any survivors is reduced significantly by the passage of time, (usually a week to 10 days) the operations turn from rescue to the recovery of remains and the USAR teams will redeploy.

Force Numbers and Structure: DART teams are small, ranging from 5-10 personnel representing specific expertise. The team itself is usually not expanded, but in the event of widespread requirements, more teams will be dispatched. They have the capability to operate at very high and very low levels of aggregation. The USAR teams, which may operate as part of a DART, usually contain about 70 people. The number of DART teams which may be deployed is limited by the number of personnel available in the USG to form them. The USAR teams (given that two counties have approximately 300 personnel trained to international standards) are limited to a probable maximum of four.

Operations and Logistics: The HR system for identifying DART and USAR members is completely voluntary. Members of the USG and contract candidates with

expertise volunteer through USAID OFDA (see above on the RATS program). Members of the local community and county fire and rescue services in Fairfax and Los Angeles volunteer with the respective county authorities. Logistically, the DART teams rely on the U.S. Mission in country, or subsist from their own authorities and contracting capability on the local economy.

The USAR teams deploy with significant self-sustaining logistics capability, relying on the USG for strategic transport. The teams have lists of required tools, equipment, and personal protective items based on the FEMA Tool and Equipment Cache list augmented by OFDA requirements for international deployment. The additional international response requirements include life support equipment for the DART, additional food and water to support a 90-person team for a 14-day mission, extreme cold weather gear, and increased medical, pharmacy and telecommunications equipment.

Training: DART team members are selected for their expertise and usually achieve that through repeated deployments using their functional or country expertise.

USAR Task Force team members attend monthly functional training. As a whole, the Task Force conducts two "Full Team" exercises (one classroom and one 72-hour field exercise) per year. Additional readiness requirements to enable the task force to meet any assignment received include following mandates by the department, state, federal, and international partners. The federal requirements are those required by the DHS, FEMA, and USAID. The international requirements are those under the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) to include Emergency Response Awareness and UNDAC Team induction.

Because of the standards of training and selective nature of the USAR teams, they are competent and well respected within the emergency response communities. Such "elite" status, while incurring additional cost, is a prime motivator for joining the program.

Legislation: DART authorities exist. To broaden the USAR model to encompass other skill sets would require authorization and appropriations legislation.

Interoperability: Both the DART and the USAR concept foster interoperability, especially the ability to have personnel ready and (in the case of the USAR teams) able to train on a regular basis. Additional resources and coordination could provide the opportunities to train, exercise, and plan with military forces. A critical element of the USAR readiness is to have on-the-shelf procedures established to rapidly obtain surface deployment from home station to the appropriate U.S. Air Force base and onward

overseas air transportation; this latter support is pre-arranged with U.S. Transportation Command/U.S. Air Mobility Command. Critical to air deployment also are pre-arrangements for aircraft overflight and landing rights; the DoS Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM), Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and the Joint Staff (JS) coordinate such arrangements.

Impact on Interagency: The DART team is already a positive improvement on interagency coordination, as many agencies rely on DART assessments in mission planning. To adopt a more robust model for obtaining other skills based on the USAR concept would require intra-governmental agreements and coordination. As an example, The Geographic Combatant Commands (GCC) form Humanitarian Assistance Survey Teams (HAST) in response to disasters within their Areas of Responsibility. The USAID OFDA assessment teams, DART, and the HAST should work from a common assessment tool to ensure interagency coordination and seamless division of labor.

Cost: DART costs are borne by OFDA as part of the response to the given emergency. There are little, if any, recurring institutional costs.

When activated by FEMA or USAID, all related USAR expenses are fully reimbursed by either federal partner, resulting in no cost to Fairfax County. The TF receives annual funding, most of which is used on readiness, including the execution of the two full-team exercises as well as tool and equipment replacement and monthly skill functional training. The annual funding provided by OFDA also includes that necessary for the unit to maintain its readiness to meet international USAR standards.

2. United Kingdom (UK) Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit (PCRU) and Global Conflict Prevention Pool[20]

a. General

Authorized and established in September 2004, the PCRU is a dedicated structure to ensure the UK's contribution to post conflict recovery is better designed, faster, and

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20 Based on interviews with Mr. Gil Baldwin, MBE, in April of 2005, other members of the PCRU, and website at http://www.postconflict.gov.uk/. Information on the Global Conflict Prevention Pool is based on interviews with members of the UK MoD and Foreign and Commonwealth Office and websites http://www.mod.uk/issues/cooperation/gcpp.htm, and http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1013618138445. Briefing, "Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit," United Kingdom Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit, June, 2005.

more flexible. The PCRU is intended to be a cross-government and multi-disciplinary team initially being developed to be used primarily where significant UK forces are engaged. Its mandate is:

- To "Improve the UK contribution to post conflict stabilisation by:
  - developing strategy for post conflict stabilisation, including linking military and civilian planning, and working with the wider international community.
  - planning, implementing and managing the UK contribution to post conflict stabilisation, including practical civilian capabilities needed to stabilise the environment in immediate post conflict situations."
- The PCRU is intended primarily, but not exclusively, for situations where British troops are deployed.
- It was not set up for humanitarian purposes.

The PCRU is not a separate department of the government, but a resource upon which the Ministry of Defence (MoD), Department for International Development (DfID), and Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) can call. It provides expertise, manages operations, and deploys experts to the field.

b. Comparison Criteria: The PCRU is a coordination only agency that will operate only when troops from the UK are engaged. It is appropriate to examine only from the standpoint of coordination procedures that S/CRS may adopt and because it is a natural counterpart to S/CRS. The Conflict Prevention Pools offer instructive examples of how to develop interagency strategies, plans, and funding arrangements to overcome the "stovepiped" and restrictive approach to matching resources to requirements that have plagued past R&S operations.

Management: The PCRU has approximately 40 personnel assigned. These are recruited from many different countries, and the PCRU has made arrangements to permit foreign nationals to obtain clearances and work in this national coordinating body. They are organized into three teams: policy, resources and operations, and expect to rely on 400 deployable civilian experts for operational execution. They also have access to consultants and contractors on an as-needed basis. Their senior steering committee is chaired by DfID.

Personnel Skills and Areas of Expertise: The PCRU will coordinate across all aspects of stabilization and reconstruction, and the staff contains functional and regional experts to execute the responsibilities as outlined above.

Force Numbers and Structure: The PCRU is building their ability to deploy experts, and currently coordinates existing programs and capabilities. They are deploying smaller teams to the Palestinian territories and Iraq. PCRU expects to have full operational capability in mid-2006, with the expected maximum number of experts deployed reaching about 400 persons. They would work with the single UK Joint Headquarters.

Operations and Logistics: The PCRU expects to get their civilian expertise from three sources – the IO/NGO communities, citizens of the United Kingdom, and citizens of the affected nation.

Training: The PCRU staff are developing sectoral policy, doctrine, and procedures. The PCRU staff are participating in training. They are working with U.S. JFCOM as a participant in developing a multinational experiment that will be conducted in February 2006 with stabilization and reconstruction scenario. They expect to participate in Allied Command Europe (ACE) Rapid Reaction Corps (RRC) exercises in Germany and Norway in 2006.

Legislation: To adapt the PCRU coordinating capability would require some legislation similar to what is already proposed for S/CRS.

Interoperability: This agency should add considerably to interoperability at the national and international level, and will have considerable impact in the field. As the two organizations grow in parallel, there is significant opportunity to develop common operational tools and procedures.

Impact on Interagency: To adopt the PCRU model of operations would have a significant impact. USAID, DfID's counterpart, would have a significant role to play in coordinating S/CRS and DoD participation. DfID plays this role with the MoD and FCO to ensure that long term objectives and programs are set and drive the planning process and execution.

Cost: The PCRU has no demonstrated operational cost as yet. However, the PCRU will undoubtedly be involved with the system for linking strategy and funding developed by the UK as the Africa Conflict Prevention Pool and the Global Conflict Prevention Pool.

c. The UK Model for Funding Contingency Operations[21]

The UK's Global Conflict Prevention Pool and African Conflict Prevention Pool were established in 2001, with a unique funding arrangement adopted by parliament, in order to combine the resources and knowledge of three agencies – the MoD, FCO and DfID. The pools were established with the objective of integrating the three departments' activities and funding to achieve success in pursuit of a common strategy. Partner departments analyze situations separately and then agree on a common long term strategy toward which they commit resources obtained from the pool.

Both pools are overseen by Cabinet committees comprising the Foreign Secretary, the Secretary of State for International Development, the Defence Secretary and the Chief Secretary to the Treasury. DfID chairs the Africa Pool and the FCO chairs the Global Pool. Steering teams develop the priorities, objectives and processes for plans resulting from the strategies developed by the Cabinet committees. Priorities are established according to four criteria:

- How important is it that the conflict or the underlying cause is addressed in terms of the UK, the international involvement of interests and the number of people affected?
- Will UK involvement make a significant contribution to preventing or resolving the conflict?
- Is there an international effort underway to address the conflict?
- Within the UK government, would a joint effort between pool partners and any funding through the pool make the UK intervention any more effective?

Once priorities are established experts focus on turning their strategies and resources into programs. Under the leadership of a strategy manager, the relevant sub-organizations of the three departments conduct detailed planning, incorporating input from program managers and regional/country experts on the ground in the contingency location.

Activities under the strategies include:

- Conducting assessments

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21 Gadbois, Karen L. "Improving the Financial Resourcing Process for Stability Operations." Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, 2004. The Department for International Development, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and the Ministry of Defence, United Kingdom, "The Global Conflict Prevention Pool: A Joint IK Government Approach to Reducing Conflict." London, 2003.

- Supporting peace initiatives
- Promoting safety and security, which may include supporting military efforts to stabilize a situation
- Supporting fair and accessible justice systems
- Improving the professionalism and accountability of security forces, including police and military forces
- Enhancing local military capability to contribute to regional peacekeeping and other peace support tasks
- Conducting Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) tasks
- Assisting civil society organizations in defusing tensions, including some promotion of human rights
- Conducting research and ongoing evaluation for feedback to the Pool
- Assisting UN, EU, and OSCE to improve their capacity to plan and implement peace support operations, to include adopting best practices

The pool does not fund humanitarian relief work, or services to internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees, as other departments and agencies are fully engaged in such work. Most demining, governance and human rights activities are also excluded unless they can be shown to be part of an integrated conflict prevention strategy. At times, with great scrutiny, the pool has funded the supply of military equipment. Ministers approve any supply of weapons and ammunition by the pool.

3. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)[22]

a. General

The Federal Emergency Management Agency, a former independent agency that became part of the new Department of Homeland Security in March 2003, is tasked with responding to, planning for, recovering from and mitigating against disasters. The 1960s and early 1970s brought massive disasters requiring major federal response and recovery operations by the Federal Disaster Assistance Administration, established within the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD).

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22 Adapted from the FEMA web site http://www.fema.gov/ and from previous IDA studies. The NRP is located at http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/nrp/.

When hazards associated with nuclear power plants and the transportation of hazardous substances were added to natural disasters, more than 100 federal agencies were involved in some aspect of disasters, hazards and emergencies. Many parallel programs and policies existed at the state and local level, compounding the complexity of federal disaster relief efforts.

In 1974 the Disaster Relief Act (the Stafford Act) firmly established the process of Presidential disaster declarations and directed the President to establish an interagency process with specified membership to address the need for coordinated assistance. It took over a decade and a half before all concerned agencies and departments accepted the Federal Disaster Response Plan required by the Act.

FEMA absorbed: the Federal Insurance Administration, the National Fire Prevention and Control Administration, the National Weather Service Community Preparedness Program, the Federal Preparedness Agency of the General Services Administration and the Federal Disaster Assistance Administration activities from HUD. Civil defense responsibilities were also transferred to the new agency from the Defense Department's Defense Civil Preparedness Agency.

In March 2003, FEMA joined 22 other federal agencies, programs and offices in becoming the Department of Homeland Security. FEMA is one of four major branches of DHS.

b. Comparison Criteria: FEMA's coordination authorities offer instructive examples for legislative change that may be required to empower S/CRS. FEMA's training of Federal Coordinating Officers is an example of pre-qualification of selected leaders to assume responsibilities in crisis. FEMA does not have a personnel model that is adequate to adopt for S/CRS use.

Management: FEMA coordinates response to disasters according to the National Response Plan (NRP), directed by Homeland Security Directive 5. This plan levies requirements on 32 other departments, agencies, and organizations to provide support and services during an emergency. FEMA coordinates with all 50 states and the territories, divided into ten regions, to set priorities and organize the delivery of services.

As a response to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security, FEMA was tasked to create the National Incident Management System (NIMS). Developed by the Secretary of Homeland Security at the request of the President, the National Incident Management System (NIMS) integrates effective practices in emergency preparedness and response into a comprehensive

national framework for incident management. The NIMS goal is to enable responders at all levels to work together more effectively to manage domestic incidents no matter what the cause, size or complexity. The NIMS focuses on promulgating:

- Standardized organizational structures, processes and procedures;
- Standards for planning, training and exercising, and personnel qualification standards;
- Equipment acquisition and certification standards;
- Interoperable communications processes, procedures and systems;
- Information management systems; and
- Supporting technologies – voice and data communications systems, information systems, data display systems and specialized technologies.

Personnel Skills and Areas of Expertise: To coordinate the federal efforts, FEMA recommends and the President appoints a Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) for each state that is affected by a disaster. The FCO and the state response team set up a Disaster Field Office (DFO) near the disaster scene. It is from there that the federal and state personnel work together to carry out response and recovery functions. These functions are grouped into 12 Emergency Support Functions (ESFs), each headed by an agency supported by other agencies.

Table II-2. National Response Plan Emergency Support Functions

ESF	Definition	Coordinator	Lead Agencies	Spt Agencies
ESF 1	Transportation. Providing civilian and military transportation.	Department of Transportation	DoT	USDA, DoC, DoD, DHS, DoI, DoJ, DoS, GSA, USPS
ESF 2	Communications. Providing telecommunications support.	Department of Homeland Security, National Communications System	DHS	USDA, DoC, DoD, DHS, DoI, FCC, GSA
ESF 3	Public Works and Engineering. Restoring essential public services and facilities.	U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Department of Defense	DoD/FEMA	USDA, DoC, DoD, DoE, HHS, DHS, DoI, DoL, DoT, VA, EPA, GSA, NRC, TVA, ARC

ESF	Definition	Coordinator	Lead Agencies	Spt Agencies
ESF 4	Fire Fighting. Detecting and suppressing wildland, rural and urban fires.	U.S. Forest Service, Department of Agriculture	USDA	USDA, DoD, HS, DoI, EPA
ESF 5	Emergency Management. Collecting, analyzing and disseminating critical information to facilitate the overall federal response and recovery operations.	Federal Emergency Management Agency	FEMA	USDA, DoC, DoD, DoEd, DoE, HHS, HS, HUD, DoI, DoJ, DoL, DoS, DoT, DoTreas, VA, EPA, FCC, GSA, NASA, NRC, OPM, SBA, TVA, USPS, ARC
ESF 6	Mass Care, Housing and Human Services. Managing and coordinating food, shelter and first aid for victims; providing bulk distribution of relief supplies; operating a system to assist family relocation.	Federal Emergency Management Agency	FEMA/ARC	USDA, DoD, HHS, DHS, HUD, DoI, DoJ, DoL, DoT, DoTreas, VA, GSA, OPM, SBA, SSA, USPS, Corp for Nat'l & Vol Svc., Nat'l Vol Org Active in Disaster
ESF 7	Resource Support. Providing equipment, materials, supplies and personnel to federal entities during response operations.	General Services Administration	GSA	USDA, DoC, DoD, DoE, DHS, DoL, DoT, VA, NASA, Nat'l Comm Syst., OPM
ESF 8	Public Health and Medical Services. Providing assistance for public health and medical care needs.	Department of Health and Human Services	HHS	USDA, DoD, DoE, DoI, DoJ, DoL, DoS, DoT, VA, EPA, GSA, USAID, USPS, ARC
ESF 9	Urban Search and Rescue. Locating, extricating and providing initial medical treatment to victims trapped in collapsed structures.	Federal Emergency Management Agency	FEMA	USDA, DoC, DoD HHS, DHS, DoJ, DoL, DoT, NASA, USAID

ESF	Definition	Coordinator	Lead Agencies	Spt Agencies
ESF 10	Oil and Hazardous Materials Response. Supporting federal response to actual or potential releases of oil and hazardous materials.	Environmental Protection Agency	EPA/DHS/USCG	USDA, DoC, DoD, HHS, DHS, DoI, DoJ, DoL, DoS, DoT, GSA, NRC
ESF 11	Agriculture and Natural Resources. Identifying food needs; ensuring that food gets to areas affected by disaster.	Department of Agriculture	USDA/DoI	USDA, DoC, DoD, DoE, HHS, DHS, DoI, DoJ, DoS, DoL, DoT, EPA, GSA, USPS, ARC
ESF 12	Energy. Restoring power systems and fuel supplies.	Department of Energy	DoE	USDA, DoC, DoD, DHS, DoI, DoL, DoS, DoT, EPA, NRC, TVA
ESF 13	Public Safety and Security. Security planning, facility and resource security; access, traffic and crowd control.	Departments of Homeland Security and Justice.	DHS/DoJ	USDA, DoC, DoD, DoE, DHS, DoI, DoJ, VA, EPA, NASA, SSA, USPS
ESF 14	Long-Term Community Recovery and Mitigation. Impact assessment, assistance to States, local government and private sector; monitoring and program implementation.	Federal Emergency Management Agency	USDA, DoC, FEMA, HUD, DoTreas, SBA	DoC, DoD, DoE, HHS, DHS, DoI, DoL, DoT, EPA, TVA, ARC
ESF 15	External Affairs. Public information and protective action guidance; community, congressional and international, tribal and insular affairs.	Department of Homeland Security	FEMA	All

Force Numbers and Structure: About 2,500 full-time employees in the Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate are supplemented by more than 5,000 stand-by disaster reservists.

Operations and Logistics: In response to a presidential-declared disaster, FEMA may work with up to 32 agencies including the American Red Cross and other

private organizations to provide assistance. These agencies provide state and local governments with personnel, technical expertise, equipment and other resources, and assume an active role in managing the response. FCOs are the key to bringing together the right skills and capabilities. Prior to 2000 FCOs were full-time FEMA employees, but FEMA has established an intensive training program to develop FCOs that would be on call, called the Full-time Federal Coordinating Officers Cadre. Additionally, FEMA established Emergency Response Teams-National and three interagency response teams with 50 personnel on rosters for immediate response anywhere in the nation. Incident Management Teams (20 personnel organized into four teams) will serve as the core of the interagency coordinated response to disasters and consequence management in the event of a terrorist attack.

FEMA has established logistics capabilities to be anywhere in the nation on a self-sustaining basis within 72 hours.

Training: FEMA conducts training at all levels on a frequent basis for all personnel. It has an extensive system of training partners, including all levels of government, the military, and domestic NGOs. The NRP serves as a "process plan" against which agencies can develop supporting plans and train their staffs during individual training and exercises.

Legislation: FEMA's authorities for coordination and planning are established in the 1974 Disaster Relief Act, and have been modified by several executive orders. The resulting initial Federal Response Plan was not finalized and adopted by all relevant agencies until after Hurricane Andrew in 1991.

Interoperability: The FEMA personnel model fosters interoperability, since it draws from a wide array of agencies and has the resources to provide training in a number of settings.

Impact on Interagency: Adopting the FEMA personnel model would have some impact on the interagency process but would enhance interagency coordination.

Cost: FEMA's 2003 budget request included $50 million for the Office of National Preparedness to work with states and localities on terrorism preparedness and administer the first responder grant program. In the 2005 budget, FEMA requested $7 million to hire, train and operate four Incident Management Teams with a total of 20 personnel.

D. ASSETS ON STANDBY

1. National Wildfire Coordinating Group (NWCG)[23]

a. General

The National Wildfire Coordinating Group (NWCG) is made up of the USDA Forest Service (USFS); four Department of the Interior agencies: Bureau of Land Management (BLM), National Park Service (NPS), Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), and the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS); and State forestry agencies through the National Association of State Foresters. The purpose of NWCG is to coordinate programs of the participating wildfire management agencies so as to avoid wasteful duplication and to provide a means of constructively working together. Its goal is to provide more effective execution of each agency's fire management program. The group provides a formalized system to agree upon standards of training, equipment, qualifications, and other operational functions.

Under the NRP for which FEMA is the Office of Primary Responsibility, the Forest Service is the Primary and Coordinating agency for implementing Emergency Support Function (ESF) #4, Firefighting, and the Department of Interior (DOI) is the Primary Agency, along with the Department of Agriculture (USDA), for implementing ESF#11, agriculture and natural resources. The Forest Service and DoI also have Support Agency responsibilities under all 15 ESFs.

The NWCG uses two connected automated systems to manage personnel and resources. The Incident Qualifications and Certification System (IQCS) is a distributed networked database of personnel information, training modules, schedules, etc., used to manage the professional qualifications, certification, professional development and availability of approximately 75,000 firefighters nationwide. It serves as the backbone for the firefighting services. It is connected to the Resource Ordering and Status System (ROSS), which is the automated process by which firefighting leaders and staffs in local areas can request personnel and resources from across the country, and the system will automatically match requirements with available equipment and personnel resources and build a set of standardized teams for deployment.

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23 Based on interviews with members of the NWCG in April 2005, briefings provided and website at http://www.nwcg.gov/.

These two systems have become the foundation for an integrated management and leadership framework that connects real world experience (gathered during each fire season) to training and equipment requirements, and allows individual firefighters and their supervisors the opportunity to institutionalize excellence in performance. USAID used many of the products of this system (like the Fireline Handbook) as templates for their own DART system. The USAID Field Operations Guide (FOG) is patterned directly (to include size and red plastic cover) after the Fireline Handbook. The Fireline Handbook and the National Interagency Mobilization Guide of March 2005 provide the "bookend" documentation for mobilizing and then conducting operations. The mobilization document prescribes steps to contact personnel, assemble and deploy teams from regions throughout the U.S., and contains copies of all the existing interagency (including DoD with USDA and DOI) and international (including CA, AUS, NZ, and ME) memoranda of agreement; there are also MOAs with local organizations. The Fireline Handbook prescribes team composition, tasks, interactions, operations, logistics, and steps to transfer command, etc.[24]

b. Comparison Criteria: The NWCG has a tested process that links requirements to training, to personnel professional development, interagency mobilization, tasks, skills and team organization. It has been the model for USAID and other organizations. This management system accommodates 70,000 personnel and is exercised in real world contingencies every year and updated on a continuing basis by chartered interagency work groups.

Management: The NWCG is chartered by the member agencies and operates as a formal working group with sub-groups that address agenda items identified and proposed by member agencies and personnel. The NWCG adopts standards, develops and conducts training and exercises and maintains the IQCS and ROSS. It accomplishes most of its work through the "off-season" efforts of the personnel in the various agencies, who devote their time as part of their collateral duties to NWCG business. The computer systems and software for IQCS and ROSS are maintained under a contract. The IQCS uses PeopleSoft as a database platform and was installed and operational in about two years by Bearing Point. It takes 582 persons, distributed throughout the regions, to run

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[24] National Wildfire Coordinating Group, "Fireline Handbook," NWCG Handbook 3, PMS 410-1, NFES 0065, March 2004; National Interagency Fire Center, "National Interagency Mobilization Guide," NFES 2092, March 2005; and U.S. Agency for International Development, "Field Operations Guide for Disaster Assessment and Response," undated.

the system. The participating agencies designate personnel to sit on the various working panels of the NWCG and to work issues related to interagency coordination.

Personnel Skills and Areas of Expertise: The NWCG output is limited to firefighting personnel. However, through arrangements, the participating agencies and NWCG can assemble teams for support to USAID and DART for overseas employment, much as the Fairfax and Los Angeles counties do for USAR responses. The NWCG has provided teams for varied purposes including environmental and hazardous biowaste disposal. There is no inherent limit on the skills that can be supported by such a system.

Force Numbers and Structure: The system can deploy individuals or teams of specified size. As stated, there are about 75,000 firefighters in the system.

Operations and Logistics: The personnel system for accessing and deploying individuals and teams works through the regional centers. In preparation for emergencies and fire season, regional leaders and staff prepare requirements which are then levied through ROSS. ROSS then matches qualified and certified personnel with equipment from outside the region and forms deployable packages that meet requirements. The NWCG agencies have at their disposal about 700 aircraft (mostly tankers), both government-owned and contracted. Agencies use commercial contract aircraft to move the teams and equipment to the site of the emergency. They do not rely on DoD aircraft for deployment. The teams rely on pre-packaged logistics modules for the first few days and then the contracting officers and logisticians rely on the surrounding communities for contract and procured logistics support.

Training: The heart of this system is the training and evaluation system, predicated on experience and recorded through the IQCS. An excellent program of identifying tasks (Work Breakdown Structure (WBS)) for positions within the USFS has been developed as have job description manuals and required skills and training (e.g., required courses to attend). The primary criteria for qualification are individual performance as observed by an evaluator using approved standards. Real performance is the basis as measured on the job, versus perceived performance as measured by an examination or classroom activities. Personnel may have learned skills from sources outside wildfire suppression and are thereby qualified in such skills as law enforcement, search and rescue, and so on.

The NWCG develops and provides standardized training modules that are keyed to the job descriptions in the Fireline Handbook. Those training modules are conducted on a regional basis and the schedule is posted in IQCS. Any firefighter or

administrative/support personnel who wish to gain additional certification may find the pre-requisite courses in IQCS and schedule attendance at any regional training session. Of course, funding for travel must be available or the person may attend at their own expense. Seats are usually prioritized for members of the region where the training is conducted. After successful training (courses range in length from several hours to two weeks), in all the pre-requisite classroom and practical instruction, the candidate's supervisor verifies completion in IQCS. The supervisor then may schedule the candidate to serve as a deputy to a person certified for that position during the next emergency or fire call, (a "right seat" evaluation). Upon completion of that tour, the person to whom the candidate served as deputy enters an evaluation in IQCS. The candidate's regional supervisor reviews the pre-requisite course work and the field evaluation and then certifies the candidate for the position. IQCS prints out a new "red card" which carries the certifications of the individual person, with the new position certification printed on it.

With the new certification, the person becomes eligible to be assigned to that position the next time ROSS is queried to build a team requiring that level of skill in that position.

Legislation: The NWCG itself requires some legislative authorization or oversight, since the participating agencies bring resources to the effort for mutual benefit. For S/CRS to adopt this system and get access to the required skill sets from the Federal, State, and local governments and the broader civil society would require authorizing and appropriating legislation. The agencies that participate in NWCG are concerned about firefighting effectiveness and efficiency because it is their core competency that is tested in a domestic/constituent setting every year. That provides significant incentive to cooperate and to devote resources to the effort. The same conditions do not apply to S/CRS, other agencies and the problems of R&S operations, which are often perceived as tangential to agency and department core competency, have little domestic constituency, and do not happen on a frequent, regular basis. FEMA type legislation would be required.

Interoperability: This system, due to the training and performance certification base, achieves excellent interoperability with participating agencies. Adopted across skill sets, similar heavy emphasis on training would be required to support S/CRS operations.

Impact on Interagency: Adopting the NWCG system would have a significant and beneficial impact on interagency processes for R&S operations. Personnel would

need to be identified across the Federal government and at state and local jurisdictions in all the required skill sets. While the total numbers in an S/CRS managed pool would probably not exceed 75,000, the agencies would have to earmark personnel to support this system with training, evaluations, and operations. It is very similar to FEMA type management.

Cost: Because the NWCG system is based on collateral duties of personnel within the participating agencies, it was not possible to generate a cost breakdown for operating the system. It is embedded in the participating agencies budgets. The 582 personnel required to run the system is predicated on the regional structure of IQCS and ROSS and the regional operational requirements. S/CRS would probably not have the same sort of overhead burden to run such a system, but orchestrating the linked requirements, training, certifications, and operational systems would require more than the 80 personnel currently assumed to be the limit of S/CRS. The Bearing Point contract to develop and install IQCS took two years, but the cost was not released. The maintenance contract requires less than five man-years of time.

2. United States Institute of Peace (USIP) Office of Rule of Law Operations (ORLO) proposal[25]

a. General

The USIP proposal envisions an office located in the Department of State, comprising 55 to 60 personnel, which would oversee the U.S. capability to recruit, train, and deploy stability police units, individual police, judges, attorneys, court staff and corrections officers. This office would create and manage a Civilian Rule of Law Reserve. This reserve would be drawn from individual civilians and state and local jurisdictions, and would number between 5,000 and 6,000 personnel, organized into individuals, small teams and police units

b. Comparison Criteria: This proposed model is untested and focuses more on field operations than personnel recruitment and manning. However, it offers a method to redress a critical gap in U.S. capability to contribute to R&S operations, namely the provision of public security in environments that are between open combat and normal police operations. It offers innovative (for

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25 See Robert Perito, Michael Dziedzic, and Beth DeGrasse, "Building Civilian Capacity for Stability Operations: The Rule of Law Component." Special Report 118, Washington, United States Institute of Peace, April 2004. Interviews conducted with the authors in the spring of 2005.

the U.S.) organizational and procedural recommendations to redress this lack of capacity.

Management: The ORLO office would be organized under two associate directors, one each for operations and administration. The HR office would consist of two personnel, but within the administration section would be another 11 personnel (7 for roster maintenance and 4 for administration and support) that could be involved in managing aspects of the personnel system.

Personnel Skills and Areas of Expertise: This is a model focused on a specific set of tasks and skills required in reconstruction and stabilization operations, but it is arguably the most critical area in making the transition from military to civilian control of the situation and it is the one area in which the U.S. does not have significant capacity when compared to other abilities within the USG or available in the international community.

Force Numbers and Structure: The proposal is predicated on having approximately three times the requirement in the reserve structure to ensure that initial operations are viable and that continuing operations are sustainable. The proposal contains both unit and individual requirements:

Constabulary Police Units, modeled on Special Weapons and Tactics Teams and Civil Disturbance Units in municipal jurisdictions in the United States, and gendarmerie or Carabinieri units in European countries such as France and Italy are required. They would be organized into 125-man companies, complete with equipment, communications gear, vehicles, etc. Based on past operations and scaled to population requirements, the proposal envisions a requirement for about 2,000 personnel in these units.

Police with executive authority would be required and they could also be used as trainers, mentors, and monitors. Based on past operations, the proposal indicates that 4,500 police would be required in the reserve. Additionally, 600 police would be needed for personal protection details for judges, prosecutors and court officers, for a total of 5,100.

Judges and court staff could operate both in executive functions, to hear and adjudicate cases, and also assist in the rebuilding of indigenous justice institutions. The minimum requirement in the proposal is for 50 judges, 35 to 40 legal officers and clerks each, and 25 court reporters. To work in the court system, the proposal envisions 50 prosecutors, and additional 25 to 40 legal officers to work with the prosecutors, 25 court

reporters (a separate requirement from those supporting judges), 25 clerks, 35 defense attorneys and 35 investigators.

Fifty corrections officers would be required to establish facilities, take prisoners in and classify them, and manage the prison and jail facilities.

Operations and Logistics: The proposal contains three mechanisms for accessing the required personnel:

Judges, attorneys, court personnel and corrections officers (the pools of 50 or less specified above) could be accessed via simple rosters (much as OPDAT does now).

Individual police and court officers, judges, etc., could also be recruited through a system of agreements with local jurisdictions, much as OFDA does with the DART and USAR teams.

Finally, for large numbers of police and the constabulary police units, the organizational and collective training requirements necessitate a system of Federal funding for overstrength personnel resources at all levels of jurisdiction that could be called upon for deployment. This system resembles the military reserves or an expanded USAR model.

Training: The proposal envisions training for the collective units but personnel available through rostering would rely on their functional expertise. The ORLO office itself could send personnel to training at the national level.

Legislation: This model would require extensive legislation to authorize court officers, judges, and others to serve abroad in foreign jurisdictions, provide liability coverage, provide jurisdiction for misconduct by personnel serving abroad, and appropriate funds for the office and its operations.

Interoperability: This proposal would significantly improve interoperability by providing continuous and timely engagement with military planners and units. The opportunity for exercises, training, planning and operations at national, operational, and tactical levels would be a marked advantage.

Impact on Interagency: This proposal would require significant interagency input, as functions would shift from the Department of Justice to the Department of State. Federal interaction with local and state jurisdictions would increase, requiring additional coordination.

Cost: The proposal estimates a start up budget of between $15 million and $30 million, with annual operational costs adding over $100 million to the overall budget

3. Australian Federal Police International Deployment Group (AFP-IDG)[26]

a. General

The Australian Federal Police had been active in providing individual police to various international missions. As requirements in the Asia-Pacific area increased and the normal small deployment system proved inadequate to handle both the numbers and the timing of deployments, the Australian government decided to establish an International Deployment Group (IDG). The IDG manages the deployment of Australian civilian police overseas to:

- Multilateral law enforcement capacity building missions
- Bilateral law enforcement capacity building programs under the auspices of the AFP's Law Enforcement Cooperation Program
- International monitoring missions
- International peacekeeping missions as civilian police with the United Nations.

The government's initial program intent was to provide the ability to deploy and sustain about 500 policemen overseas on a continuous basis.

b. Comparison Criteria: While exceptionally resource intensive, the AFP-IDG is a tested example of how national domestic capability can be tapped for overseas operational duties. The AFP-IDG also has demonstrated the capability to lead security operations and control military forces in an interagency mission with civilian leadership. The training and personnel sustainment procedures are effective at maintaining the overseas operations and the morale and skills of the members. It is, however, focused on two skill sets, executive authority policing and police training, and it's scale and ratio of support to operational personnel illustrate the cost of this type of operation.

Management: The IDG headquarters devotes 142 FTE personnel to supervising and conducting the operations, planning, and support of the 500 overseas deployed

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26 Based on interviews with Mr. David Long and Mr. Paul A. Jones, Australian Federal Police, April and June 2005, and the Australian Federal Police website at http://www.afp.gov.au/afp/page/International/InternationalDeployment/Home.htm.

members of the AFP. In addition, IDG has access to additional personnel for functional support such as information technology, etc. After assessing initial operations, they established a Work Force Planning Group within the HQs to conduct human resource planning and analysis, as the system for deployments began to cause strain. With their deployment concept of operations, the available pool of volunteers for deployment could not sustain the requirements and the IDG was opened to state and territorial jurisdictions so that they could allow members of their police forces to volunteer for the IDG. This took additional coordination agreements and caused additional cost. Cost increases were due to the requirement to make up pay differentials between the AFP and other jurisdictions and the added training burden, since some of the state and territorial jurisdictions do not use the same equipment as the AFP and there are differences in the laws to be enforced.

Personnel Skills and Areas of Expertise: This is a very focused model that provides police with executive authority and police trainers and mentors. The AFP is very firm that executive police and police training are distinct tasks that require dedicated, non-interchangeable personnel to accomplish task execution well.

Force Numbers and Structure: The AFP contains approximately 4,500 officers. Of this potential pool, about 2,000 are sworn officers and 2,500 are members with other duties, from forensic scientists and investigators to administrative personnel. The IDG deploys numbers to missions as high as 250 in organized units to such missions as the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI), as well as small numbers to support UN and other police operations (2 to Cyprus, for example). They currently support about six missions. The AFP-IDG also possesses the capability to deploy special teams for specific purposes such as Disaster Victim Identification Teams that deployed to Bali in the wake of the terrorist bombing and to Indonesia after the December 2004 tsunami.

Operations and Logistics: The IDG accepts Expressions of Interest (EOI) from police in the AFP and participating jurisdictions. The submission of the EOI means that the policeman or woman has the permission from their home office and the intent to deploy. The EOI is not a request to be put on a standby roster for deployment to some undetermined mission at some later date. The policeman indicates on the EOI whether they are interested in being part of the IDG for 60, 80, or 100 weeks, with the IDG preferring 100 weeks in the group. The tour lengths are 16 weeks on the mission, 4 weeks back in Australia, 16 weeks on mission, 4 weeks back, and so on, until the agreed total number of weeks in the group is reached. At that point the policeman returns to his

home jurisdiction and cannot volunteer again for two years. Members of the IDG may withdraw at any time. Sixteen week tours, especially the first ones, are usually to the most demanding missions, but subsequent deployments may be to more desirable places (the most sought after is Cyprus, since family members may accompany the member in an unofficial capacity at the member's expense). The combination of tour length, tour restrictions, numbers required, and small pool of potential and actual volunteers drove the IDG to open up to state and territorial jurisdictions.

Logistics is provided externally to the IDG. If the military is deploying, there is an agreement between the AFP and the MoD to provide all logistics, administrative, and external security support to the deployed IDG members and installations. As conditions change and the military draws down, or if the deployment is done without the military, AFP has a contractor that provides all support, including external security for the installations and housing where the IDG personnel live.

Training: In the original concept, AFP members relied on their domestic expertise. Pre-deployment training is conducted both as training for the mission and an opportunity to further assess and screen applicants. This two week period contains refresher training, training on the culture and the specific mission, issuance of and training on special equipment, and a psychological and medical examination. The instructor to student ratio is 1 to 5, and the instructor has the authority to recommend dismissal for any prospective IDG member. After the IDG was opened to other jurisdictions, the training program added modules to bring those other personnel into compliance with AFP equipment and procedures.

Legislation: Adoption of this model would require significant legislation to access volunteers from Federal law enforcement agencies, other domestic jurisdictions, to indemnify participants and authorize executive policing in overseas missions. Additionally, legislation and executive orders would be needed to specify the relationships between the Departments of Justice, Defense, State, and Homeland Security with respect to the program.

Interoperability: The Australians have had some problems in communications equipment and other procedural issues with respect to working with the military. However, their training program, headquarters staffing, and the repetitive, focused nature of the work offers significant opportunities to work through the problems.

Impact on Interagency: The AFP-IDG has established innovative working relationships with other Australian government agencies. For the RAMSI mission, the

Chief of the AFP led the Interdepartmental Committee (IDC), the Australian equivalent of the U.S. Policy Coordinating Committee, and a member of the AFP-IDG commanded the entire mission, to include the military assets.

Cost: The Australian government has made a significant commitment of resources to the IDG. The overall cost for all operations is AS$ 1 billion (approximately US$780 million). The IDG headquarters of 142 personnel to keep 500 deployed, out of a total original pool of 4,500, and the instructor to candidate ratio for training reflects this commitment.

4. Military Reserve Components[27]

a. General

DOD has six reserve components: the Army Reserve, the Army National Guard, the Air Force Reserve, the Air National Guard, the Naval Reserve, and the Marine Corps Reserve. Reserve forces can be divided into three major categories: the Ready Reserve, the Standby Reserve, and the Retired Reserve. The Ready Reserve had approximately 1.2 million National Guard and Reserve members at the end of fiscal year 2003, and its members were the only reservists who were subject to involuntary mobilization under the partial mobilization declared by President Bush on September 14, 2001. Within the Ready Reserve, there are three subcategories: the Selected Reserve, the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR), and the Inactive National Guard. Members of all three subcategories are subject to mobilization under a partial mobilization.

The National Guard, however, has the dual mission of maintaining properly trained and equipped units available for war or national emergency, as well as provide forces for domestic emergencies or as otherwise required by state laws. Until federalized, National Guard forces remain under the jurisdiction of the State Governor and command of the State Adjutant General

b. Comparison Criteria: The military reserves offer a broad range of skills, sophisticated training and readiness systems, and the ability to deploy individuals and teams. There is significant institutional infrastructure and cost associated with the reserves. The appropriate focus is on military

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27 Based on interviews with U.S. Army Reserve and National Guard Bureau in spring of 2005, and websites at www.army.mil

combat and supporting skills rather than the broadest possible investment in other skills.

Management: The Federal portion of the Reserve Components (the U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps Reserves) is managed by the respective services under the direction of the Department of Defense. The National Guard (comprising the U.S. Army National Guard and U.S. Air National Guard), with its dual mission has state structures (in their constitutional role as militia) working under the direction of the States' Adjutants General (TAG) and a Federal structure directed by the National Guard Bureau (NGB). The NGB, Army and Air Force work to reconcile the constitutional and statutory shared responsibilities for personnel management, professional development, readiness, etc. The NGB and personnel and operations bureaus of the services reconcile requirements with available personnel to ensure that the President's mobilization requirements are met with the right people from either the Federal Reserve structures or the National Guard. The bureaucracy to support this system is extensive and complicated.

Personnel Skills and Areas of Expertise: The military reserves can provide any skill set required for stabilization and reconstruction. For many specialties, however, this apportionment is because certain skills and expertise can be best found in the Reserve Components (RC), as reflected below. CA, for example, are 96 percent RC, mainly because they are best suited for intense interaction with civilians and because of the plethora of civilian skills they bring – skills that cannot be duplicated in the Active Component (AC) without great expense. It can be argued, in fact, that RC forces such as National Guard combat forces may be better suited for missions like post-conflict stabilization and peacekeeping because of their civilian roots and citizen-soldier ethic. AC Military Police (MP) forces in particular may not be well suited for training civilian police because MPs do not learn civilian policing nor have that mission; RC MPs, while still not ideal, may have greater propensity to perform this mission well, especially if members of the unit are in the police forces as civilians. Figure II-1 uses the Army Reserve as an example.

While the military can provide such skills, it is not cost effective to have them do so under all conditions. Having military personnel execute most tasks may not be worthwhile if the substantive skill is needed in a situation that does not require all the other military skills.

Force Numbers and Structure: The military reserves have the capacity to furnish either individuals or units/organizations/capabilities as the situation requires. The

Individual Ready Reserve and Individual Mobilization Augmentees provide personnel with select skills to execute tasks or backfill active component personnel who are deployed.

Operations and Logistics: The military HR system recruits, screens, and selects members and the initial entry and professional development training throughout the tour in the reserves is robust, providing opportunities for continuing individual and collective training and education. The military provides all logistic support for deployed personnel, either through self-sustaining organizations or contractors.



Figure II-1. Select Army Reserve Capabilities

Training: Training is extensive. Initial entry training lasts between 14 weeks to over one year for certain skills, and takes place within a system that has facilities across the United States. Further training takes place in organized units, and consists of live, virtual, and constructive exercises, using field sites and simulations.

Legislation: Significant legislation would be required to authorize and appropriate funds to adopt this system for S/CRS

Interoperability: Adoption of this system would provide superior opportunities for interoperability, due to the availability of civilian expertise on a frequent and scheduled basis to participate in training, exercises, program development and operational plans.

Impact on Interagency: This model would have a significant impact on interagency coordination as it would provide another system to integrate into interagency operations as a start up. Over time, however, adoption of this type of model would provide superior opportunities for interagency coordination. There is the long term potential to develop habitual working relationships between local reserve component units and local civil response corps members which would significantly enhance training and the ability to begin operations immediately upon deployment.

Cost: Adoption of this system and its infrastructure and bureaucracy would present significant associated costs. At certain scale, there would be opportunities to leverage already existing capabilities to hold costs down (i.e. using the Foreign Service Institute, Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, closed military reserve centers, etc., for training). For illustrative purposes, the salary cost of a weighted average (officer/enlisted) 1,000 soldier reserve unit for one year is about $9.6 million. This pays for the normal weekend per month and two weeks of annual training. For a one year deployment, that same 1,000-man force costs an additional $56.4 million. These factors do not include operational costs, equipment, etc.[28] However, given that those operational factors for soldiers in combat are higher, one can infer that the overall cost for deploying and operating a civilian reserve unit will be less than a military reserve unit.

[28] Based on weighted averages of monthly base pay cost figures for Army and Air Force reserve component personnel. See cost data at Appendix E.

CHAPTER III

OBSERVATIONS

III. OBSERVATIONS

During the course of researching this study and other related work, the team came in contact with several agencies with capabilities and potential relevant value to S/CRS; these included the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). Each of these meetings generated information on capabilities and precedents that bear on the overall S/CRS challenge to find operationally deployable skilled personnel, but do not constitute a personnel model, per se. The team thought it was important to include these observations in the study as appropriate, because they offer some ideas about how to think beyond the current set of personnel models that are in use.

The findings and recommendations are based on a combination of the model assessments and information contained in this chapter. The rationale for inclusion of observation data with the model assessment criteria specified by JFCOM and S/CRS is that no single model considered by the study team met all assessment requirements. Developing a suitable recommendation thus meant combining aspects drawn from several models. The observations that follow offered precedents to combine those aspects in innovative ways to meet the R&S challenges faced by S/CRS.

This study effort focused on how to access domestic civil society and agencies. Through the course of research and interviews with several agencies, it became apparent that there was some commonality between the mission of DHS in consequence management, domestic disaster relief, first response, etc., and the overseas mission for the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization in the Department of State. The team compared task lists from S/CRS and the DHS Federal Response Plan. While the two task frameworks are organized differently, and the Federal Plan is much more developed, there is some similarity between the two. FEMA's ESFs also look remarkably similar to some of the tasks that USAID OFDA would expect to accomplish in a foreign disaster.

In addition, the study team quickly recognized that there are several existing mechanisms for obtaining the services of either individual experts or organized groups of people and that some of the considerations raised by contractors and government

supervisors should be incorporated into the study. The workshops conducted by the team for contractors yielded significant information.

Finally, there are other government agencies with significant expertise in the human resources field that might be engaged to support S/CRS in implementation of the model selected or devised.

A. THE U.S. COAST GUARD AUTHORITIES:[1] DUAL USE AUTHORITY AND CAPABILITY

In pursuing with DHS its mechanisms to access civilian capacity for domestic emergencies, a corollary question arose "Is there any agency that models access to domestic capability with authorities to act overseas?" The research team observes that there might be an opportunity to make transformative change in the way the USG approaches domestic consequence management, overseas stabilization, and reconstruction operations. The model for seeking dual use capabilities and authorities to employ capacities both domestically and outside the United States is the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG).

The USCG has a unique role to play in the national defense and in the enforcement of domestic laws. The evolution of USCG roles, missions, and responsibilities is instructive as a possible model for structuring the authorities, capabilities, and interagency employment for both domestic and overseas operations of organizations created or realigned for stability operations. Many of the tasks associated with consequence management in the domestic homeland defense area (including security, economic and social well-being, and continuity of government) must be executed in stability operations interventions overseas. This is not to suggest that the USCG itself ought to have an expanded role in stability operations, but that, when attempting to organize and bring to bear the significant capacity that exists within the United States, the USCG is an excellent model to illustrate how capabilities with domestic and international application can be authorized and employed.

The USCG was not formally established until 1915 when the Life Saving Service and the Revenue Cutter Service were formally merged. However, previously enacted laws continue to govern and influence the authorities of the USCG to this day. The 45th Congress enacted a rider on an Army appropriations bill that became known as the *Posse*

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1 U.S. Coast Guard History at http://www.uscg.mil/hq/g-cp/history/Policy_Changes.html.

Comitatus Act (Chapter 263, Section 15, U.S. Statutes, Vol. 20). This act limited military involvement in civil law enforcement, leaving the Revenue Cutter Service as the only military force consistently charged with Federal law enforcement on the high seas and U.S. waters. Over the 20th century, the USCG authorities were continually expanded by Congress to address navigation, environmental, law enforcement, counternarcotics traffic, and other activities. Many of these initiatives refined the dual role of the USCG in both domestic and overseas operations, and developed successful templates for interagency planning, operations, and mutual support.

On 9 August 1982, the Department of Defense approved the use of Coast Guard law enforcement detachments on board U.S. Navy vessels during peacetime. The teams conducted law enforcement boardings from Navy vessels for the first time in U.S. history.

The National Narcotics Border Interdiction System (NNBIS) began operations on 17 June 1983 under the direction of the Vice President and an executive board consisting of the secretaries of State, Transportation, and Defense; the Attorney General; the Counselor to the President; the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency; and the Director of the White House Drug Abuse Policy Office. Coast Guard anti-narcotic operations were reinforced when needed by military forces. The new system provided a coordinated national and international interagency network for prioritizing interdiction targets, identifying resources, recommending the most effective action, and coordinating joint special actions. With the National Narcotics Act of 1984, Congress formalized USCG participation in the NNBIS.

On 22 August 1990, the President authorized the call up of members of the selected reserve to active duty in support of Operation Desert Shield. Three USCG Port Security Units (PSUs), consisting of 550 Coast Guard reservists, were ordered to the Persian Gulf in support of Operation Desert Shield. (This was the first involuntary overseas mobilization of Coast Guard Reserve PSUs in the Coast Guard Reserve's 50-year history.)

Following the terrorist attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001, using the USCG's recognized capabilities for homeland security was a high priority. On 25 November 2002, the President signed HR 5005 creating the Department of Homeland Security. On 25 February 2003, the Transportation Secretary transferred leadership of the U.S. Coast Guard to the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security. As a

result of the attacks, homeland security moved to the forefront of the Service's primary missions, yet it retained its relationship with the Department of Defense.

Coast Guard units deployed to Southwest Asia in support of the U.S.-led coalition engaged in Operation Iraqi Freedom early in 2003. At the height of operations, there were 1,250 Coast Guard personnel deployed, including about 500 reservists. This included two large cutters, a buoy tender, eight patrol boats, four port security units, law enforcement detachments and support staff to the Central (CENTCOM) and European (EUCOM) Command theaters of operation.

The evolution of the authorities governing the domestic and overseas operations of the Coast Guard illustrate the precedent for organizing domestic capabilities and establishing procedures to bring those capabilities to bear overseas. The relationships among the Departments of Treasury (initially), Homeland Security, and Defense and their mechanisms for organizing, equipping, and training the Coast Guard for this dual use capacity could serve as a model for establishing similar relationships and mechanisms between the DHS and DoS for creating, maintaining, and employing capacities of use to both departments. Such an organization could provide the following advantages:

- A mechanism to further coordinate (with FEMA) domestic mobilization of assets and skill sets not yet developed for consequence management, such as extra security, rule of law, administration, etc.
- A mechanism for the Federal Government to tap into civil society and state, county, and municipal governments for skills required in both consequence management and stability and reconstruction operations.
- A mechanism for establishing habitual relationships at the local level between military reserve units and civilian response forces that would enhance interoperability at the operational and tactical level in responding to both domestic and overseas contingencies.

In employing the USCG as part of an interagency effort to combat the flow of illicit drugs into the United States, the USG established Joint Interagency Task Forces which, for about 15 years, have developed effective procedures for using authorities and coordinating activities and resource application in a seamless manner. Their growth and recognition by other governments who wish to participate illustrate their value. The interagency concept of the task force is illustrated by the leadership composed primarily of representatives from the Department of Defense, Department of Transportation (U. S. Coast Guard), and the Department of the Treasury (U.S. Customs Service). Other assigned agencies include Drug Enforcement Administration, Federal Bureau of

Investigation, Defense Intelligence Agency, Naval Criminal Investigative Service, and the National Security Agency. Great Britain, France; and the Netherlands provide ships, aircraft, and liaison officers to the task force, and the Flag officer of the Netherlands Forces Caribbean commands one task group in the task force. Since 1999, the countries of Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela also have assigned liaison officers to JIATF East. The result is a fully integrated, international task force organized to capitalize on the force multiplier effect of the various agencies and countries involved.[2]

B. CONTRACTING VEHICLES[3]

1. Exception to Civil Service Act Section 3161 Appointments

The exception to the Civil Service Act contained in Section 3161 allows appointments to the Federal Civil Service to be made for temporary emergency purposes to obtain the services of highly qualified persons. These persons might be paid well above the civil service scales in order to compensate them for the temporary nature of their positions and to entice them into government service from the commercial sector. During Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom, this exception was used with success in obtaining people with critical skills. Since these people are Federal employees, they have the advantage of being able to represent the government agency in an official capacity, which might be important in certain R&S settings. However, some drawbacks emerged:

- It is very expensive to pay individually competitive salaries for the expertise needed.
- There were some cases where the temporary nature of the employment was disputed by the hired person at the end of the term.
- Although quicker than normal Civil Service appointments, it is still a time-consuming effort that must be conducted by the HR office of the hiring agency.

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2 From http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/dod/jitf.htm, and http://www.jiatfs.southcom.mil/.

3 Based on meeting with several members of the Office of Personnel Management. LOGCAP information came from interviews and workshops with contractors and the Army Materiel Command LOGCAP website at http://www.amc.army.mil/logcap/.

2. Personal Service Contracts (PSCs)

Personal Service Contracts are contracts with individual people often referred to generically as "consultants" who are independent contractors hired for a particular task and time of service. Many government agencies use this type of contracting vehicle to access skills that do not require inclusion in the Federal civil service for the person to be effective. Examples are technical experts, language experts, etc. PSCs often get the expertise required for justifiable cost, but there is no guarantee of performance, the pool can get exhausted, and there is usually little funding for PSCs to attend institutional training. The assumption is that they have the expertise required, and there is no requirement for additional training. Finally, personnel under PSCs are contractors and cannot represent the Government in many venues.

3. Logistics Civilian Augmentation Program (LOGCAP)[4]

LOGCAP is a U.S. Army initiative for peacetime planning for the use of civilian contractors in wartime and other contingencies. These contractors will perform selected services to support U.S. forces in support of Department of Defense (DoD) missions. Use of contractors in a theater of operations allows the release of military units for other missions or to fill support shortfalls. This program provides the Army with additional means to adequately support the current and programmed forces.

LOGCAP is primarily designed for use in areas where no bilateral or multilateral agreements exist. However, LOGCAP might provide additional support in areas with formal Host Nation Support (HNS) agreements, where other contractors are involved, or where peacetime support contracts exist. LOGCAP is also available during Continental United States (CONUS) mobilizations to assist the CONUS support base and help units get ready for war.

LOGCAP is a Department of the Army Program that includes all pre-planned logistics and engineering/construction oriented contingency contracts actually awarded and peacetime contracts that include contingency clauses. These contracts are usually

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4 From information contained in GAO Report GAO/NSAID 97-63, "Contingency Operations: Opportunities to Improve the Logistics Civilian Augmentation Program, 1997, at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1997/ns97063.pdf; U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, EP 500-1-7, "LOGCAP Guide for Commanders," December 1994, at http://www.usace.army.mil/inet/usace-docs/eng-pamphlets/ep500-1-7/entire.pdf, and from Global Security at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/logcap.htm.

competed for a 5-year period, with subordinate task orders and statements of work used to match emerging requirements with contractor capabilities.

Contractors working under LOGCAP can place personnel with the planning elements of the using government agency. This ensures that when contingencies arise, the contractor's plan matches the agency's plan. For example, one of the original baseline plans for the Army was designed to meet the requirements to logistically support 1,500 soldiers in a remote theater for 180 days. Owing to the advantages in these types of contracts, other services have also created smaller LOGCAP-like contracting vehicles (the Navy for construction purposes only in 1995 and the Air Force in 1997) using them primarily for logistics capabilities. But there is no reason that the same sort of contracting vehicle could not be used to access other capacities from the civilian sector. As examples, LOGCAP provided 34 base camps in Bosnia to U.S. European Command (EUCOM) for $461.5 million. CONCAP is the U.S. Navy program. CONCAP provided hurricane relief services for $32 million at various bases. Initial contracts were solicited in 1995, and since then, CONCAP missions have been conducted in Haiti; the Caribbean; the Azores; Bosnia; Crete; and at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. AFCAP is the U.S. Air Force program. The initial contract was awarded in 1997. As an illustration of planning and preparation costs, the USAF planned to spend $4.4 million over 5 years for planning functions. AFCAP has been used for operations in Guam, Chile, and Diego Garcia.

4. Office of Personnel Management (OPM) Consulting

The Office of Personnel Management has established a human capital consulting service. In the course of a study meeting, OPM expressed interest in helping (on a reimbursable basis) S/CRS develop its HR planning and management capacity. Help would include developing job descriptions and WBS based on S/CRS task frameworks, thereby connecting the task framework, job descriptions, and operational organizations to required and available training.

5. Operational Resources Provided by the Business Community

The private sector has extensive capabilities to generate employment, investment, and economic growth in much of the world, and maintains significant resources that are often useful in foreign humanitarian relief and development operations. Many different types of businesses become involved in emergency operations, and for very different reasons. When a disaster or emergency occurs, companies are in a position to provide technical expertise, donate their products, or contribute financially to humanitarian

response organizations. In potentially volatile areas, multinational corporations with a stake in a country or region have a vested interest in promoting stability and preventing conflict situations that could disrupt or hurt their business.

To some businesses, humanitarian organizations are customers like any other, requiring large quantities of certain commodities on an irregular basis. To others, supplying humanitarian organizations with particular supplies or services is a primary function of their company.

Within a disaster area, local companies often play a very significant role by acting as contracted agents for international response organizations and shipping companies. These local companies often have expertise or assets such as trucking fleets or warehouse space that are needed in emergencies. Additionally, area companies might have agreements in place with local authorities or national disaster organizations as part of an overall disaster preparedness plan. Such arrangements can provide rapid access to needed services and commodities, such as telecommunications or heavy industrial equipment, from the for-profit community in the aftermath of a disaster.

a. Multinational Corporations

As international barriers to trade and investment have continued to fall, businesses have extended their reach into much of the developing world to acquiring natural resources and cheap labor, and/or expand market share. When a company invests in a less stable region, it automatically has a vested interest in preventing volatile situations that could prove detrimental to its business. It's in its best interests to support and cooperate with humanitarian organizations working to promote stability or recovery, albeit for different reasons. For example, some donor nation agencies such as the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) provide financial support to private business (typically 3 percent of its budget) to facilitate joint ventures between the private sector in Canada and those in developing countries.

b. Knowledge and Established Infrastructure

Multinational corporations are often very knowledgeable about the host nations in which they operate. They establish working relationships with local and national authorities, employ local personnel, typically have an understanding of local dynamics and available resources, and their supply chains are typically firmly developed.

Because of this established network, the multinational business community is a valuable resource for information and insight into humanitarian situations. They might

recommend quality suppliers and service providers, and provide background on the political and cultural dynamics that can influence the situation. Depending on the nature of their operations, local arms of these businesses might have under their control extensive global telecommunication systems, power capabilities, and transportation assets, such as fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters, as well as local contacts and contracting arrangements that can be helpful in a crisis.

Companies located in contingency areas usually can be identified through the Department of Commerce Officer at the American Embassy. If that source is not available, many countries have American Chamber of Commerce Chapters. There are approximately 94 local chapters located in 82 countries organized in four Regional American Chamber Umbrella Groups.[5]

c. Social Responsibility and Corporate Giving

Corporations are often criticized as being insensitive to issues of human rights, democracy, and conflict resolution, in favor of focusing exclusively on the "bottom line" for the benefit of their shareholders. In the past, there have been cases where businesses actually fuel conflict, for example, by buying diamonds or valuable minerals from belligerents, which increases the likelihood that asset-producing regions will be fought over by different factions. It also adds to the resources of conflicting parties, which can prolong their fighting ability, because funds might be used to buy weapons, pay recruits, or bribe government officials.[6]

Child labor exploitation, sweatshops, and bribes and kickbacks to local politicians are abuses less tolerated today by corporate management than in the past. Advocacy and human rights NGOs have become skilled at identifying environmental and labor rights violations overseas, and promoting public awareness of such situations. Both customers and shareholders can put pressure on multinational corporations to conduct their operations to include consideration for economic, political, and social justice.

To protect themselves against negative press, some companies have developed codes of conduct for their business operations and have begun to work directly with NGOs to formulate best practices policies that protect labor rights and the environment.

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5 Chapter locations are available at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce webpage at http://www.uschamber.com/chambers/chamber_directory.asp?st=other.

6 "Foreign Aid in the National Interest: Promoting Freedom, Security and Opportunity," USAID, 2002.

In conjunction with the International Youth Foundation, Nike Corporation created an NGO called Global Alliance to assess the situation of laborers in Nike factories in Southeast Asia. This NGO-corporate partnership includes the Global Alliance, the International Youth Foundation, The World Bank, and St. John's University. A similar initiative at Mattel, the Mattel Independent Monitoring Council, focuses on labor rights in overseas factories.

Reaching out to local communities in the host nation to "win the hearts and minds" of local residents might contribute to stability and security, and could, in turn, translate to greater profitability. Branches of multinational corporations in the affected nation might work with NGOs to provide disaster relief assistance or partner with them in longer-term cases to provide health care services and schools. These corporations might also work directly with residents to launch local programs. Corporations have a long history of supporting community-based initiatives in the United States, but active programs in other nations are relatively new.

Many multinational corporations have established corporate giving programs, and some have formed associated foundations, which provide contributions to NGOs in particular areas of interest to the company, and where the corporation maintains a presence. Examples of companies that maintain these types of programs include the AOL Time-Warner Foundation, and Microsoft Corporation. Leading executives often form their own foundations. Bill Gates formed the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation[7] to concentrate on global health and education, with particular emphasis on child immunization.

Typically, foundations are not the first place humanitarian relief organizations turn to when they are in need of emergency funds. As with government contracts, grants of this type usually take too long to prepare, get approved, and be put in operation. Foundation funds are utilized primarily for development initiatives, but not always.

Because of the vast amount of capital available in the private sector, the UN and other humanitarian organizations are targeting them more aggressively. The UN's Global Compact Initiative focuses on raising funds from foundations and member states, whereas the UN Fund for International Partnerships continues to work with the UN

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7 Founded in 2000 after a merger with the Gates Learning Foundation and the William H. Gates Foundation, the Seattle-based Gates Foundation has an endowment of approximately $24 billion through the personal contributions of Bill and Melinda Gates. Currently, over $6 billion has been distributed.

Foundation to inform private sector entities about UN activities.[8] The UN Foundation is the primary entity to promote partnership between the public and private sectors to raise funds and provide grants for UN initiatives. Its focus is on children's health, environment, women and population, and humanitarian projects.

d. Technical Assistance

Corporations might provide assistance in their areas of expertise to humanitarian organizations, such as advanced technologies that would otherwise be cost-prohibitive. For example, Microsoft helped to develop a refugee registration system for the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), as well as helped to create the Food and Commodities Tracking System (FACTS), a logistics system that tracks and reports on any type of supply from donation to distribution, in collaboration with Mercy Corps and other NGOs.

Another example is the Fritz Institute, created to bring together business best practices, technology, and academic research to augment the capabilities of humanitarian relief organizations involved in disaster relief. The Chief Executive Officer of the Fritz Companies, a global logistics corporation,[9] formed the institute to work with the International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC) to develop humanitarian logistics software that will serve as a supply chain management tool.

e. International Suppliers and Contractors

Businesses do not always view humanitarian organizations as entities asking for donations or "hand-outs." To some companies, humanitarian response agencies are a significant part of their customer base, a targeted consumer; however, because emergencies are by nature irregular and do not follow a predictable path, many suppliers require other stable outlets for their products. But a growing number of businesses are willing to significantly invest in providing supplies and services specifically to disaster response organizations.

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8 In the Secretary-General's reform plans, these entities would fall under one umbrella partnership office.

9 United Parcel Service (UPS) subsequently acquired the corporation.

f. Disaster Industry

The large amounts of money donor governments, UN agencies, and other responding organizations spend on humanitarian interventions for natural and manmade disasters, has created a "disaster industry."

The disaster industry is a loose conglomeration of companies and middlemen that supply the needs of both victims and relief workers. The disaster industry provides both commodities and technical expertise to donor governments, UN agencies, IGOs, IOs, and NGOs.

The call for greater accountability and developed standards for the humanitarian response community, such as the Sphere Project Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response, have caused response agencies and donors to turn more attention to for-profit providers. These businesses have standing inventories, standardized commodities, specialized items, and personnel expertise in areas applicable to humanitarian response.

g. Commodities and Shipping

Many different types of businesses provide supplies to relief operations, and it is becoming more common for response organizations to use multipurpose and flexible emergency equipment and supplies. This flexibility might initially require making adjustments to basic products. For example, the NGO Oxfam has developed what it refers to as the "Oxfam bucket," used for international emergencies, with a tight-fitting lid (hard for children to remove), a built-in spout, and attached cap (so it cannot be lost). It is round and made of polyethylene that is opaque to reduce risk of algae. It is designed to be carried on the head as well as stacked, which makes it easier and more efficient to transport than a jerrican. In an effort to attract humanitarian clients, some companies make a significant initial investment to create multipurpose products to meet varying environmental conditions.

In other cases, brokers (working on commission) specialize in searching for unique items, such as surplus field kitchens, bulletproof vests, or concertina wire. Auto dealers might also have exclusive franchise arrangements to provide special purpose vehicles for governments, UN agencies, and other humanitarian organizations.

These "disaster industry" middlemen maintain warehouses of supplies like plastic sheeting, prefabricated shelters, medical supplies, cooking oils, bulk food supplies, prepackaged Humanitarian Daily Rations (HDR), and personal hygiene items to support

relief operations. For-profit corporations currently fill the bulk of orders for medical supplies, selling at cost or with reduced mark-ups, because NGOs and UN agencies buy in huge quantities.

For the humanitarian customer, a primary factor in choosing a procurement partner, besides the quality of the product, is a company's ability and willingness to export and ship products to remote places in the developing world. Therefore, most successful "disaster industry" companies develop a production and logistical network of their own, which is often based on partnerships with local freight forwarding companies in developing nations, an arrangement that can be more economical, lowering production and transport costs.

h. Personnel

Some members of the disaster industry also maintain specialized, deployable teams or individual experts who are available to humanitarian response agencies, which give NGOs access to additional experts on demand without incurring the additional costs of maintaining them as part of their own organization.

i. Security Consulting

In less stable areas, multinational corporations, UN agencies, and other humanitarian response organizations sometimes need to hire security forces to protect their workers and supplies. Multinational corporations are accustomed to considering security when balancing the profitability of an overseas operation. Corporations operate in areas where executives have been threatened by terrorists or drug barons, and they are sometimes required to keep a business running in countries that lack law enforcement and rule of law. With these challenges, executives are particularly aware of security issues, and some corporations spend as much as 9 percent of their budget on security.

Corporations accustomed to threats such as airlines and shippers regularly have internal procedures for dealing with manmade and natural disasters. Multinational corporations often use security experts to train executives and local management in how to minimize risks to the business that arise from political instability, social movements, terrorism, fraud, and crime. Security personnel can also provide protected transportation, use of self-defense equipment such as non-lethal weapons, alarm mechanisms, body armor, and security training classes – including escape and evasion techniques. In other cases, security companies are hired to help multinational corporations secure the release of kidnapped executives or fly evacuation missions for expatriate staff.

The security consulting industry also serves NGOs, IOs, and IGOs as well as governments. Unfortunately, there is a growing international trend to target relief staffers. Since 1992, over 200 civilian UN staffers have been killed, most during humanitarian operations,[10] which reflect an increase in personnel working in dangerous places and in conflict situations. Additionally, lines have begun to blur between NGOs and governmental forces providing humanitarian assistance, which raises questions of neutrality that can result in belligerents suspiciously viewing NGO staff as enemy combatants.

To minimize their vulnerability, humanitarian organizations are increasing their use of security consulting companies to conduct staff training and implement measures for safer working environments. For example, measures might include developing regular field reporting mechanisms on security conditions, better communications equipment, and methods of exchanging security information between groups operating in the field.

Former military or paramilitary personnel with experience in a region often begin security companies. Larger, better-known firms originate in the U.S., United Kingdom, France, Belgium, Netherlands, and Israel, and actively seek business opportunities in Africa, South America, or other areas where their services are required. A great deal of controversy surrounds these businesses, referred to as private military corporations (PMCs), because some can become directly engaged in conducting combat operations, which raises legal questions of licensing, criminal procedures, and equal protection.

j. Businesses That Work for Governmental Agencies

Commercial businesses might partner with governments to accomplish projects that benefit a recipient organization. One example, Global Technology Corps,[11] recruits high-tech volunteers for short-term projects worldwide. GTC is a joint public/private partnership involving the U.S. Department of State and volunteers from various corporations, technology entrepreneurs, Internet experts, and NGOs. It works through U.S. embassies on projects that help spread the social and economic benefits of access to information technology to host nation governmental or non-governmental organizations. It promotes programs in health, education, humanitarian relief, e-commerce, Internet and

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10 "Foreign Aid in the National Interest: Promoting Freedom, Security and Opportunity," USAID, 2002, pg. 122.

11 See http://globaltechcorps.org/about.html.

web media training, and web development. GTC volunteers have completed projects in 22 nations to help build a future in which the global information network is not a luxury for the privileged by a resource open to all.

Businesses might also be a part of a donor nation's overall response capability, as is the case in Norway. The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has established a system that provides access to rapid relief assistance through a cooperative arrangement with the Norwegian Trade Council, NGOs, and many Norwegian suppliers of relief items. This system is called the Norwegian Emergency Preparedness System (NOREPS)[12] and allows various companies to offer their supplies, personnel, and equipment to organizations responding to crises. It was specifically developed to respond more effectively to the needs of the UN (particularly agencies like the World Food Programme (WFP) and OCHA) and to provide business opportunities to Norwegian companies.

Another example is the operations team provided by the UK Department for International Development (DfID) for rapid response to crises. This team of experts from a procurement and logistics agent called Crown Agents contracts DfID's Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs Department for on-call deployment to disaster areas and is also available to the UN. Crown Agents provide similar services to the Swedish and Canadian development agencies, (SIDA and CIDA), the Belgian, Danish, and Japanese governments as well as The World Bank, the European Commission, and regional development banks.

USAID can use for-profit firms to provide technical leadership for field missions and to manage more complex relief and development projects in an affected nation, where it essentially serves as the prime contractor who subcontracts with other for-profit firms or NGOs to accomplish the task.[13] In some cases, for-profit organizations provide post-disaster assessments to give donors an understanding of the commodities needed for immediate relief and long-term rebuilding.

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12 See http://www.noreps.com/.

13 Unless operating under a long term relationship (years or several missions) with a particular government agency, NGOs do not typically seek government contracts because of the time it takes to receive an award, and the amount of resources that must be allocated in preparing a bid. They may also be in competition with businesses that maintain similar stockpiles of resources. However, there are NGOs which may subcontract to for-profit companies.

Another example of business support to USG agencies include the DoS augmentation of security for some embassies by contracting with multinational security firms that employ local guards.

When civilian police are required for a contingency operation, DoS will contract with a multinational business to recruit, train, equip, and deploy the USG contribution to a UN operation.

Military contractors often provide operational support to armed forces. Governments that are in a weak or ambiguous status will sometimes hire contractors to equip and train their local military forces. For example, the Croatian government hired a U.S. private military corporation, MPRI, to train its military forces. MPRI has trained the Angolan police Rapid Intervention Force and has contracts with nations in West Africa and the Horn. Additional U.S. firms that perform similar services for governments, such as those of Saudi Arabia and Egypt, are BDM International and Vinnell Corporation. Multinational companies headquartered in other countries perform similar services by maintaining equipment for the indigenous forces, performing intelligence gathering, and providing personnel and site protection.

Some outside control is exercised over these contracts. For example, contracts between foreign governments and U.S. firms are reviewed and approved by the USG. Corporations headquartered in the United Kingdom and South Africa that perform these services usually require clearance by the host government Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense. These contracts can exceed $100 million annually, but many of the poorer contracting nations have limited cash available and must resort to barter arrangements instead, which can include direct commodity payments or shares in local firms that produce oil, diamonds, or other natural resources that the contracting nation seeks. When the arrangement includes partial ownership in a local firm, the corporate involvement in the country is typically extended.

k. UN Business Registries and Procurement Services

The UN represents a global market of approximately $4.6 billion annually for all types of goods and services.[14] The countries that provide the most supplies are (in descending order): the U.S., India, Belgium, France, and Italy.[15]

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14 See UN Common Supply Database at www.uncsd.org.

15 See IAPSO webpage "statistics" at www.iapso.org.

l. UN Common Supply Database

One of the primary ways businesses can access this market and register their procurement services with the UN is through the UN Common Supply Database (UNCSD), which provides supplier information to agencies within the UN system and shortlists suppliers for competitive bidding.

The UNCSD is a main supplier database for the following UN organizations:

- UNHCR: UN High Commissioner for Refugees
- UNICEF: UN Children's Fund
- WFP: World Food Program
- UNFALD: Field Administration and Logistics Division of the Department of Peace Keeping Operations (DPKO)
- UN OPS: UN Office for Project Services
- UNRWA: UN Relief and Works Agency
- UNDP: UN Development Program
- UNFPA: UN Population Fund
- IAEA: International Atomic Energy Agency
- ILO: International Labor Organization
- ITC: International Trade Center (UNCTAD/World Trade Organization)
- WIPO: World Intellectual Property Organization
- UNIDO: UN Industrial Development Organization.

Also available for companies interested in doing business with the UN is the General Business Guide that describes the procurement needs, procedures, and contracting details for all UN organizations. This guide allows businesses to match their abilities to those required by the different agencies.

The Inter Agency Procurement Services Office (IAPSO) of the UN Development Program serves as governing secretariat for the UNCSD. The IAPSO is mandated to act as a neutral procurement agent for UN agencies by providing such services as follows:

- Identifying requirements
- Preparing technical specifications and bidding documents
- Researching and selecting suppliers
- Evaluating and negotiating bids
- Handling claims

- Managing payments
- Making sure that logistics services include inspections, shipping, and insurance.

The IAPSO also maintains a two-volume catalog of emergency relief and development items that have standard specifications adopted by the UN that are available from business suppliers. Additionally, IAPSO has developed the UN WebBuy, which provides access to online catalogs,[16] and provides a booklet of practical tips for the for-profit community interested in doing business with the UN. Governments, NGOs, IOs, IGOs, and financial institutions can also use IAPSO resources for procurement.

m. UN Office for Project Services

UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS) is part of the UN system, but it is a unique project management service that differs in structure from other UN entities. It is the only completely self-financing entity of the UN, and its income is derived from fees earned from services rendered. It operates as a business to combine private sector enterprise with the humanitarian goals of the UN.

UNOPS manages development projects upon request, but provides project management in any field where the UN has a mandate – landmine awareness to eradicating poverty. It can also provide specialized services, such as selecting and hiring project personnel, procuring goods, organizing training, and managing financial resources, which are available to donor nations, financial institutions, and developing country governments.[17]

On behalf of its customers, UNOPS annually procures the services of approximately 6,000 professionals, contracts for services valued at more than $150 million, and purchases goods worth close to $200 million. In 2001, UNOPS delivered services valued at $504 million for more than 2,600 projects. Whereas procurement of goods and services typically accounts for the greatest portion of UNOPS tasks, the organization also contracts consulting and other professional services from individuals,

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16 The IAPSO is part of the UN Development Program (UNDP). The website is located at http://www.iapso.org/buying/.

17 By temporarily handling procurement for an affected nation's government, UNOPS can improve its business practices and procurement methods.

firms, engineering contractors, and NGOs. In 2001, these contracts totaled approximately $172 million.[18]

Headquartered in New York, UNOPS also maintains offices in Nigeria, Malaysia, Denmark (which handles close to two-thirds of all its large-scale procurement), Switzerland, Italy, Japan, and the U.S. (Washington, D.C.); sub-offices in Kenya and Guatemala City; and temporary units in El Salvador, Ethiopia, Kenya, Peru, Brazil, Guatemala, Austria, East Timor, and the Democratic Republic of Congo.

n. In-Country Businesses

International relief organizations often contract with local businesses in the affected nation to implement projects. These companies can play a very significant role for numerous reasons. They might provide transportation services that include maintenance and repair, rent out warehouse space or storage sites (including the staff to operate them), or other useful equipment or supplies. Other local organizations might be involved in actually distributing supplies to the affected population. In peacekeeping operations, local personnel might also be hired to work for various military forces.

Local businesses have established relationships with local authorities, are familiar with the current status of the affected nation's infrastructure, and understand the cultural and political context of the situation. Their supply chains are also usually firmly developed, and can provide access points to other quality partners, which can be cost-effective in many instances.[19] Additionally, local companies can often help communities recover more quickly from disasters or emergencies.

Local companies might also be involved in disaster preparedness initiatives as well as actual response. Some IGOs, such as the UN and other regional agencies concerned with disaster preparedness promote national disaster organizations to establish Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) with private sector businesses that permit rapid access to services and commodities in the aftermath of a disaster. Examples of these types of supplies included are telecommunications and heavy industrial equipment. National emergency response organizations might also arrange with companies that transport hazardous materials and require them to provide information on the scope and

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18 See UNOPS web page at www.unops.org "business and procurement."

19 At times, when a large number of NGOs converge on an area looking for the same supplies, equipment, and places to stay, it can rapidly inflate prices.

seriousness of potential spills, leaks, fires, and explosions, and maintain trained staff for these accidents.

CHAPTER IV

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

IV. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This chapter provides the results of analytical comparison of the models in the groups established in Chapter I, described in detail in Chapter II. Recommendations are developed using aspects of the models combined with information, precedents and authorities described in Chapter III.

A. FINDINGS

1. Management

Managed Rosters and/or Centralized Individual Recruiting are models that work through conventional human resource procurement processes. Despite this commonality, they vary widely in management techniques with some having very elaborate systems and others of relative simplicity. However, for those models that appear on the surface to be very simple, the management tasks that must be performed are in most cases displaced to another (usually the operational) organization. The voluntary nature of their systems and self-selection of the personnel places a premium on information sharing between potential employees and employers. This can result in systems wherein the number of potential applicants might be artificially constrained as in CANADEM, perhaps unknowingly excluding competent personnel, or so overwhelmed, as in the case of the UN, that the best applicant might never be identified. In addition, some systems, such as those of national contribution as in the EU and OSCE might depend upon national and even individual assessment of the mission that can inhibit pre-crisis planning and training.

These models appear to have high overhead at various levels for the number of personnel fielded. Even though at some IGO headquarters, only a few people work on personnel issues, it appears that much of the overhead for the IGO systems is distributed within the member states for preparation and training and within the missions themselves for personnel processing and additional training. Deployment of IGO capabilities is also subject to political oversight that can inhibit long-range planning or constrain missions. Since IGOs often develop niche capabilities, unity of effort for the overall mission might suffer.

With systems that contract with individuals, the overhead is embedded in the hiring agency's HR department. The implication for S/CRS is that hiring individuals will place a burden on either S/CRS or DoS/HR. This is probably unavoidable. As in R&S operations, some individual expertise will be needed at such a discreet or high level that individual hiring will have to take place. Hiring large numbers of individuals on this basis in a crisis situation, or for training, would place a large strain on S/CRS for identification and on DoS/HR for the personnel process. These systems do not maximize the management criteria.

Pre-Arranged Contractual Agreements that rely on commercial firms or non-profit organizations to provide capabilities through organized teams and large numbers of personnel appear to hold overhead down, or displace it to an organization that can achieve economies associated with scale and expertise. The actual personnel system used by the contractor is embedded in the contract cost but can be monitored. An advantage of hiring a central contractor to provide both individuals and organized units (such as with the LOGCAP system) is that the contractor can place planners with S/CRS for relatively little cost and mesh the contractors' personnel and support plans with the S/CRS operational plans.

Contractor based models do give decisionmakers a great deal of flexibility to tailor the actual capabilities employed, with associated costs, and if the contracts are developed correctly, monitored and modified as required, they can offer unity of effort and responsiveness. The operational overhead cost to S/CRS would be the requirement to have dedicated personnel within their operational organizations with the duty of contracting officer representative and manager.

Capability-Based Planning Models might be the simplest to adopt for gaining access to government employees, but since they coordinate existing capacity, their management structure might not yield access to all the skills that reside in American civil society, and they do not address the building of new capacity. Such models would require additional structure at the national level to bring agency capacity to bear. Some of this interagency coordination effort is already built in to the S/CRS concept and structure, and extending the interagency coordination responsibilities of the organization would yield benefits.

Stand-by Capability Models have high overhead, but dedicated management creates other advantages in training, interoperability and interagency coordination (see below). Adapting these models would require organizational change in the USG to

accommodate the development and maintenance of a new capacity, but in light of the other advantages, these models offer significant long-term potential to S/CRS.

2. Personnel Skills and Areas of Expertise

Managed Roster/Centralized Recruiting systems have the capability to access and deploy a wide range of skill sets. For organizational reasons, most IGOs that use direct hiring have chosen to focus on a restricted set of skills or employ them only under certain conditions. There is the opportunity, through MOA, to access these skills and gain additional capacity for a specific mission. The niche capabilities and the political and systemic challenges with accessing and deploying these skill sets probably means that they can augment or complement, but not be substituted for U.S. capabilities. The skill sets available through the IGO HR systems appear to meet S/CRS requirements, with the exception of executive authority policing.

Pre-Arranged Contractor models offer almost all the skill sets required, with the possible exception of executive authority policing.

Capabilities-Based Planning models bring together existing capacities rather than build substantial new ones. FEMA is a good example, but these models do not build capacity where none exists and appear inappropriate to generate the kind of robust operational deployable civil capacity to execute reconstruction and stabilization tasks overseas that the USG desires. The UK PCRU and Global Conflict Prevention Pool are mechanisms to coordinate existing capacities at the national level and devise integrated strategies and plans in order to get better performance and more effectiveness and efficiencies from those capabilities at the tactical level.

Although the military reserves offer the most robust set of skills (some of which are required only under non-permissive security conditions), **Stand-by Asset** models such as the USIP ORLO and AFP-IDG currently focus on rule of law and transitional security tasks. This capacity is critical, in short supply, and hard to generate. It might be an area of emphasis for S/CRS. These models might be replicated for other skill sets to provide comparable capacity, but at increased cost for structure and institutional growth to support a standing capacity. It appears to be a very effective method for accessing transitional security, policing, and rule of law personnel and teams from other Federal, state, and local jurisdictions.

3. Force Numbers and Structure

Managed Rosters and Centralized Individual Recruiting models can be used to deploy both organized teams and individuals. However, their personnel systems are oriented on individual staff members, and the formation of operational teams for task implementation has to be done after hire and in the face of deployment to the crisis. In the cases of IGOs that use these systems, organized units are almost always formed and sent by member states directly to the specific mission and are not part of the personnel system. The focus of the HR and training systems used by IGOs does not appear to meet the modularity criterion desired by S/CRS.

All the other models appear capable of providing both individuals and teams organized into capability modules and can be expanded to accommodate the numbers and types of missions in the S/CRS concept.

4. Operations and Logistics

Managed Rosters and Centralized Individual Recruiting models' HR operations illustrate a mix functions that take place in varying degrees at the individual member state, organization, and mission levels. This provides a maximum degree of flexibility and optimizes each operation at the four levels, but sub-optimizes the overall function of getting trained, rehearsed, integrated, operational capability to the point of need. Because of the voluntary commitment of resources, end users are never certain that requirements will be met. Sometimes the available volunteer is not actually the best person or organization for the task. Resources devoted to HR planning are small, and preparation of any *potential* recruit is usually non-existent. There is no guarantee that a skilled pool member will ever be deployed, and therefore either individuals are responsible for their own professional development, or training must occur during deployment. This presents the operational organization with the challenge of balancing training and preparation against rapid deployment, including the requirement for medical and security clearances.

Since these systems are primarily concerned with obtaining personnel, the logistics function (other than procuring logisticians) is usually handled by another part of the organization or is the responsibility of the operational/field organization. The complexity of the HR systems, length of time to deploy, and logistical arrangements do not appear to meet S/CRS requirements.

Pre-Arranged Contractual Agreements redress some of the drawbacks associated with rosters and centralized recruiting models. HR operations fit into two major categories – individual contractors hired through government agency HR offices, and firms/NGOs that are hired through contracting offices and provide their own internal HR management and operations. Individual contractors provide high level and specific expertise. The requirements for these types of contracts and appointments add to the workload of agency HR offices but appear manageable given the limited requirements for specific experts. Firms that provide "bulk" capacity or organized capabilities and perform HR functions as part of the contract relieve the Government of that particular burden. Contractual agreements can be as specific as necessary to provide training and educational opportunities for personnel and to provide personnel and modular capability for training with government organizations. Firms can also provide the interface to hire specific experts and get them working quicker than with government HR procedures. The use of contracting firms, however, levies a responsibility for monitoring and trained contracting officer representation at each level of supervision for the contract. Logistics support for contractors can be addressed within the contract or provided by the Government (either directly or from another contractor).

These characteristics appear to satisfy S/CRS requirements. S/CRS must recognize and plan for the capacity within its operational organizations to monitor contracts.

Capabilities-based Planning Models rely on some centralized HR systems to track personnel with specific skill sets (FEMA) and rely on agencies to provide individuals and team members or use a distributed, networked system to manage the HR requirements of individual personnel within participating agencies, including training, certification, and medical and security clearances, if specified. These models are focused on substantive outputs during emergency situations and might require additional logistical support if deployed for long periods of time. They have internal logistics specialists and distribution mechanisms, and rely on the local economy, contracting, and procurement personnel within their teams to obtain logistical support.

Stand-by Assets models have highly sophisticated internal HR operations that coordinate requirements with other jurisdictions and civil society. They have accurate databases of individuals and teams and conduct continuous HR operations in support of missions or training. Because of their focus on security and rule of law tasks, they use their respective Ministry or Department of Defense, or contractors, for logistical support. Within this grouping, the military reserves have the most sophisticated HR and personnel

management systems to recruit, select, and support the professional development of members. The reserves have extensive logistical support and are largely self-sustaining, although contractors are used to provide some logistic services. The military reserves also carry a great deal of equipment and supplies that are not necessary for R&S operations.

5. Training

Managed Roster and Centralized Individual Recruiting training systems parallel their HR management and operations systems. Training is conducted in varying degrees at the member state, organization, and mission levels, but almost always after the person is hired or seconded. Only the efforts of the OSCE and EU to standardize some training within member states to achieve broader integration goals address this problem. Again, the volunteer nature of the system relies on previous experience and repetitive tours to provide a significant component of training and professional development. To meet these challenges, and because of the incentives to hold down costs at all three levels, IGOs have been very good at establishing partnerships and standards to enhance and simplify training and operations. The EU and OSCE have established training partnerships with several organizations across Europe to provide selected training. However, the majority of the courses are of short duration and small size. All the IGOs have significant problems with member state training certification programs that do not produce qualified personnel for missions, despite member states' acceptance of the requirements. The UN and OSCE have established standards in a number of areas that have been adopted by other organizations.

Pre-Arranged Contractual Agreement models do not appear to offer significant training advantages, because of two aspects of the normal business model most contractors use. The first aspect is that they try to hire people with previous experience so they do not have to train them. The second aspect is that the lack of predictability in activating contracts means that spending money on institutional training might not pay off if the person who is trained is not deployed in a timely manner. These two aspects provide incentives to design short pre-deployment training that is conducted as the crisis unfolds. Personnel are usually not available for training, exercises, or experiments until operational funding associated with a mission is available. This does not preclude writing contracts that have funding and provisions for training select personnel or hiring PSCs specifically to engage in training.

Capabilities-based Planning models offer opportunities to train on core competencies during exercises, and they have extensive training programs that are open to any of the participating agencies. However, with few exceptions, their domestic focus has, until recently (with the establishment of DHS and U.S. Northern Command) provided little incentive to train with the active component military or multinational or multilateral organizations except in their core competency.

Stand-by Asset models, because of their focus and centralized resourcing, appear to offer significant opportunities to train on internal tasks and with supporting or supported organizations. The AFP-IDG and USIP ORLO models have significant training built into their concepts, specifically because the focus on transitional security and rule of law by definition means they will often operate with military forces and other civilian agencies. Military reserves have extensive, routine training prescribed according to established doctrine. Their citizen-soldier status and the make-up of their membership means members often have civilian experience that can be used in R&S missions and also gives them the opportunity to train and interact with civilian agencies in a domestic setting that can carry over into foreign R&S operations.

6. Legislation

Adoption of **Managed Roster and Centralized Individual Recruiting** models for S/CRS use would not require significant legislation, unless the CANADEM model were used, and S/CRS were to contract the management of the roster. To use any of these systems, legislation authorizing and appropriating additional human resources personnel at the Department of State or within some other agency to accommodate the expanded requirements would have to be approved.

Pre-Arranged Contractual Agreement models could be adopted from other agency authorities, but there are some special provisions of law regarding insurance (the Defense Base Act) and liability that would have to be revised and extended to protect both the DoS and the contractors.

Capabilities-based Planning models like FEMA would require significant legislation. FEMA authorities stem from the Stafford Act of 1974, and it took well over a decade for all the affected agencies to agree to the Federal Response Plan and to get their internal funding and organizations aligned to support FEMA.

Stand-by Asset models would require significant legislation to authorize and appropriate funds to get access to civilian and government personnel from other

jurisdictions. There are provisions of law that govern employment and movement between jurisdictions for government employees that would have to be addressed. They would also require authorizations and appropriations to establish the institutional capability to recruit and maintain the capabilities in readiness with training and exercises.

7. Interoperability

Accessing capable personnel using **Managed Rosters and/or Centralized Individual Recruiting** would have little impact (positive or negative) on current interoperability. They would not change significantly any current HR processes, but they also would not provide personnel for training or exercises with other R&S partners on a regular basis. The inability to train in the absence of crisis, coupled with the potential to recruit an early, as opposed to the best, applicant would not help overcome the interoperability challenges faced today in R&S operations.

Pre-Arranged Contractual Agreements offer the capability for improved interoperability, if the appropriate criteria (training, experience, language, etc.) are written into the contract and job descriptions. However, because of the disincentives to provide continuous training to contract personnel in the absence of a specific mission, contractor personnel might lose the perishable interoperability skills that require frequent practice. Contractors might also hire persons who have broadly relevant experience, but not specific training on aspects of the job or equipment that foster interoperability.

Capabilities-based Planning models, by their nature, foster interoperability. These models focus on specific situations confronting a finite community of agencies with resources who all have to work together to achieve results. FEMA and the USAID DART/USAR teams have been innovative in developing and using common standards for management, operations, and logistics interoperability.

Stand-by Asset models offer the best opportunities and examples of interoperability. Despite the skill focus, the ability to use centralized resources and currently employed personnel for training enables these models to leverage frequent training opportunities and the relationship they have with the military to achieve good interoperability. Additionally, they can respond rapidly to interoperability challenges, such as when the AFP-IDG expanded its pool to state and territorial police and had to revamp its training program to accommodate different legal requirements and equipment.

8. Impact on Interagency

Adopting or adapting **Managed Rosters and Centralized Individual Recruiting** models would have little impact on the interagency process, since the models use basic HR hiring systems and techniques and could work across the interagency. Personnel hired into Federal service could represent the Government at interagency and multinational/multilateral meetings.

Pre-arranged Contractual Agreement models could adversely affect the current interagency processes, since they cannot represent the USG in an official capacity, and their overuse might place them in situations calling for inherently governmental functions. Using contractors would not improve interagency coordination at the strategic, operational, or tactical level.

Capabilities-based Planning models, by their very nature, would challenge current processes and improve interagency effectiveness. The key appears to be that those agencies and communities who have authorities to participate and bring resources to the table coordinate best.

Stand-by Asset models would require significant, but positive changes to the interagency process, as new organizations would have to be integrated into the process. However, the ability to provide additional capacity at the operational and tactical level would alleviate the critical coordination issues that currently occur in the absence of civilian capacity to address many of the task requirements. This is a significant advantage.

9. Cost

In a study that focused on the peacekeeping operations in the 1990s, one author estimated that the cost of a peacekeeping soldier ranged from about $100,000 per year for a UN soldier to about $125,000 per year for a U.S. soldier, with EU soldiers in the middle of that range.[1] There are two central questions to evaluating the merits of the personnel models compared to their cost and the costs cited above. First, to what extent does the substitution of a civilian, who does not need all the training or equipment for combat that a soldier carries into R&S operations, reduce the pro-rated cost of the operation? Second, is there a trade-off between cost savings prior to deployments and expenditures during a deployment? Put another way, will expenditure of funds in institutional training give

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1 From UN documents at http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/pub/pko.htm.

additional capacity, effectiveness, and efficiency that will result in quicker mission success and reduced operational costs?

The answer to the first question is beyond the scope of this study. The answer to the second question appears to be yes.

When examining the various personnel models, it is apparent that those used by agencies that stress training, preparation, planning, and organization prior to crisis perform better in crisis situations. The team found that the biggest complaint about the roster and centralized personnel systems and the individual contractor based personnel systems was that using them increased the time required to recruit, assemble, deploy, and operate effectively. The learning curve for individuals and organizations was extremely steep, and missions fell behind or failed to accomplish goals. The UN DPKO has a budget of about $5 billion, about 90,000 troops and staff in the field, and 115 personnel in the HR office. Training at the UN, EU, and OSCE is spread among member states, the organization, and the missions creating gaps, overlap, and problems with certification. The OSCE considered $1.92 million too expensive to set up a 2-week training course for the several hundred personnel the organization has deployed to missions on a continuous basis. One can contrast that small investment in training with the significant sums that were inefficiently and ineffectively applied by untrained staff in the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) and the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in Operation Iraqi Freedom.[2]

Even within pre-arranged contracts for capabilities, both contractors and their sponsors have an incentive to defer training costs until an emergency exists, because there is no guarantee that the sponsor will get a return on investment for training someone in the absence of an immediate requirement. In meeting the requirement to deploy rapidly, marginally effective personnel are thrown together with minimal knowledge of their teammates, the situation, and the specifics of the mission. Subsequently, inefficiencies and ineffectiveness show up in operations and costs rise dramatically.

At the other end of the spectrum, those systems that link the personnel and training functions seem to perform better when deployed to operations. FEMA, USAID

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[2] See Office of the Inspector General, "Contracts Awarded for the Coalition Provisional Authority by the Defense Contracting Command-Washington" - Report No. D-2004-057(PDF) - Project No. D2003CF-0152.000. March 18, 2004 at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2004/04-057.pdf. And see the CPA and DoS reports to Congress required by the Iraq Reconstruction Supplemental (commonly referred to as the "2207" reports) at http://www.sigir.mil/reports_other.html.

DART, USAR, the NWCG, the AFP-IDG, and the Military Reserves all perform at a high level, but take significant resources and infrastructure to achieve their proficiency. Costs therefore have to be balanced between the investment and the operational effectiveness.

Figure IV-1 is a summary of relative rankings for the model groups against the assessment criteria. The reader should note that the assessment for any particular model with respect to a specific criteria may differ from the overall assessment for the group.

Model Groups/ Criteria	Mnged Rosters/ Cent Recruiting	Pre-Arranged Contracts	Capabilities-Based Planning	Stand-by Capability
Management				
Skills				
Force Structure				
Opns & Log				
Training				
Legislation				
Interoperability				
Interagency				
Cost				

Figure IV-1. Group Assessment Summary

B. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Optimal/Long-Term

The optimal solution for the challenge of providing a broad set of well trained, organized and rapidly deployable teams to accomplish R&S tasks lies in the realm of stand-by capacities accessible by the Federal government from civil society and intra-governmental jurisdictions. This capacity should be based on a partnership in which the Federal government may subsidize the development of additional capacity at the state and municipal level in return for access to those skill sets.

For the long term, S/CRS and the DoS should establish a partnership with DHS and DoD to exploit the potential for transformation and develop a new organization that would combine the requirements of DHS in the areas of consequence management with the requirements of DoS and DoD in stabilization and reconstruction operations. S/CRS,

DoS, DHS, and DoD should seek Congressional authorization for this organization using the employment authorities governing the U.S. Coast Guard as a precedent. This organization could be established within an appropriate department for institutional training and support, and have the authorities under Executive orders and Congressional oversight like the USCG to deploy modules and/or personnel to DHS for domestic employment and to DoS (under S/CRS) to execute reconstruction and stabilization tasks.

The establishment of a national capability to execute these tasks, distributed throughout the nation on a community volunteer basis, would enhance coordination between civilian agencies and jurisdictions, and with the military reserve components that are located in the same communities and share responsibilities for homeland security and consequence management. Establishing and strengthening these relationships would have beneficial effects on potential operations overseas, through increased interoperability and interagency coordination.

The organization would focus on operational execution of tasks in the S/CRS framework, with an initial emphasis on the critical shortage of executive authority policing and rule of law packages that inhibit transitional security, consistently hamper R&S operations, and slow the withdrawal of military forces. Adapting the USIP ORLO and AFP-IDG models, the USG and S/CRS should do the following:

- Establish a rule of law reserve force of up to 6,000 personnel that would comprise community police units, special police units, judicial teams composed of judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, bailiffs and court clerks, personal security detachment police, and administrative and logistics personnel. The police units would be established as a reserve within communities throughout the United States and would receive compensation for their required training while in reserve status. They would have to be certified sworn officers and would attend training at about one-half the time of a military reservist (one weekend every other month and one week per year. Care would be exercised to ensure that limited training time is devoted to critical tasks, interoperability, and readiness). The example model is the USIP-ORLO. (Cost: $100 million for salaries and limited equipment).
- Establish a Civil Response Corps of up to 2,500 that would comprise experts from civil society and Federal, State, county, and municipal jurisdictions and with the same dual-use authorities as the Rule of Law Reserve. This Civil Response Corps would execute operational tasks as implementers under the direction of S/CRS ACT in task areas not already covered by existing programs in other government agencies or to augment those programs (USAID, DoJ, etc.). They would be available to train on an as-needed basis but would be required to train every third year if they had not been deployed

on a mission for the previous three years. The example is the DART/USAR from USAID. (Cost: $25 million)

- Manage the Rule of Law Reserve and Civil Response Corps using cloned systems adapted from the NWCG IQCS and ROSS, and established during the interim system. (Cost: $1 million).
- Establish an R&S training center in cooperation with the National Defense University and U.S. Joint Forces Command (interagency training proponents and force provider), Army War College (Army is the DoD Executive Agent for R&S operations) and United States Institute of Peace to conduct exercises at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. These exercises should be made available for participation with DHS to ensure that training benefits the domestic consequence management requirements. (Cost: $25 million).
- Continue the logistical contracting, subject matter expert PSC and 3,161 appointment programs, and MOA that will be established in the interim system to complement and support the Rule of Law Reserve and Civil Response Corps.
- S/CRS will have to substantially increase its staff to lead and manage this system: the 80-person office currently envisioned would have to expand to about 200. Included in that number would be additional HR personnel, intelligence and interagency operations officers, exercise and operational planners, training, contracting and logistics officers, and transportation coordinators. (Cost: $40 million)

The estimated cost of operating such a system would be approximately $190 to $200 million per year.

The recommendation is summarized in the Figures IV-2 through IV-4:

Long-Term Solution Summary
Adapt USIP ORLO and AFP-IDG models; partner with DHS and DoD

Task Components	*Execution Vehicle*	*Estimated Cost/yr*
Establish a 6,000 person Rule of Law reserve force (see findings page IV-11) with community and special police units as well as Judicial teams	New Creation, Reserve Concept (Federal/State/local partnerships)	**$100 million for salaries and limited equipment**
Establish a 2,500 person Civil Response Corps (CRC)	Same dual-use authorities as the Rule of Law Reserve.	**$25 million**
Manage the Rule of Law Reserve and Civil Response Corps	Use systems adapted from NWCG IQCS and (ROSS) established under the interim system	**$1 million**
Establish and coordinate R&S training centers to conduct exercises at the strategic, operational and tactical levels.	New effort in cooperation with the NDU,USJFCOM, AWC, USIP, and the NWC	**$25 million**
Access to logistics in absence of DoD deployment, access to Subject Matter Experts from other agencies, departments within the USG; state, local, municipal government; private sector and NGOs.	Use logistical contracting, subject matter expert Personal Service Contracts (PSC) and 3161 appointment programs, and MoAs established in the interim system (See Below)	**See Interim System**
S/CRS staff increase to lead and manage new system: expand staff to about 200. Include additional HR personnel, intelligence and interagency ops officers, exercise and operational planners, training, contracting and logistics officers, and transportation coordinators		**$40 million**
	Total Cost ~ $191 to 200 m/yr	

Figure IV-2. Long Term Solution Components

Long-Term Solution Summary
Adapt USIP ORLO and AFP-IDG models; partner with DHS and DoD

Task Components	*Execution Vehicle*	*Estimated Cost/yr*
Establish a 6,000 person Rule of Law reserve force (see findings IV-11) • Community police units • Special police units • Judicial teams composed of judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, bailiffs and court clerks, personal security detachment police, and administrative and logistics personnel • The police units established as a reserve within US municipal communities; would receive compensation for required training while in reserve status. Certified sworn officers; would attend training at 1/2 time of a military reservist (one weekend every other month and one week per year)	New Creation, Reserve Concept (Federal/State/Local partnerships)	***$100 million*** for salaries and limited equipment
Establish a 2,500 person Civil Response Corps (CRC) • Experts from civil society and Federal, State, county and municipal jurisdictions • Execute operational tasks as implementers under the direction of S/CRS ACTs in task areas not already covered by existing programs in other government agencies or to augment those programs • Available to train on an as needed basis; required to train every third year if deployed on a mission for the previous three years	Same dual-use authorities as the Rule of Law Reserve	***$25 million***

Figure IV-3. Long Term Solution Details (1 of 2)

Long-Term Solution Summary
Adapt USIP ORLO and AFP-IDG models; partner with DHS and DoD

Task Components	*Execution Vehicle*	*Estimated Cost/yr*
Manage the Rule of Law Reserve and Civil Response Corps	Use systems adapted from the National Wildfire Coordinating Group (NWCG) Incident Qualification and Certification System (IQCS) and Resource Ordering and Support System (ROSS), established under the interim system	***$1million***
Establish and coordinate R&S training centers to conduct exercises at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. Exercises should be made available for participation with DHS to ensure that training benefits the domestic consequence management requirements	New effort in cooperation with the National Defense University, U.S. Joint Forces Command (interagency training proponents and force provider), Army War College (Army is the DoD Executive Agent for R&S operations), United States Institute of Peace and the Naval War College	***$25 million***
Access to logistics in absence of DoD deployment, access to Subject Matter Experts from other agencies, departments within the USG; state, local, municipal government; private sector and NGOs	Continue the logistical contracting, subject matter expert Personal Service Contracts (PSC) and 3161 appointment programs, and Memoranda of Agreement (MoAs) that will be established in the interim system to complement and support the Rule of Law Reserve and Civil Response Corps	**See Interim System**
S/CRS staff increase to lead and manage new system: expand 80 person office envisioned to about 200. Include additional HR personnel, intelligence and interagency operations officers, exercise and operational planners, training, contracting and logistics officers, and transportation coordinators		***$40 million***

Figure IV-4. Long Term Solution Details (2 of 2)

2. Interim Solution and Enablers for Optimal Solution

The interim solution would provide immediate capabilities and establish several mechanisms that would be essential for operations and for implementing the long-term solution.

The Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization should conduct a study to establish the firm operational requirements for the size of the organizations listed in Recommendation 1 above, using historical data, exercise data, and concepts of operations.

S/CRS should establish a family of contract vehicles to develop a Civil Response Force while the Rule of Law Reserve and Civil Response Corps are established. These should be organized as follows:

- S/CRS should contract with the Office of Personnel Management or an equivalent agency for consulting services to develop the job descriptions and work breakdown structure for the HRST and ACT organizations. Strongly recommend the use of OPM because the resulting product will meet government standards and be applicable to either commercial contractors or government personnel services. (Cost: $500,000)

- S/CRS should pre-arrange Personal Service Contracts using vehicles and authorities similar to the USAID OFDA RATS concept or Section 3161 Appointments as Exceptions to the Civil Service Act (as were used in the CPA) for by-name experts who will be used in key positions in HRSTs or ACTs. Execution of these arrangements could be made from operational funds.
- S/CRS should negotiate a contract with a single firm (either non-profit or for-profit) with a vehicle and authorities similar to the USAID OTI SWIFT program using several pre-certified contractors or the DoD Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) using a single contractor to obtain skilled individual personnel and organized teams for implementing projects and programs. This will require institutional funding to have contract personnel interact with S/CRS personnel in developing the HR annexes to support emerging operational plans. Activation of the contract will require operational funding. (Cost: $10 million over 5 years. This contract will cover (1) HR and operational planning, (2) using OPM job descriptions and Work Breakdown Structure to develop a mobilization guide and field operations guide modeled on the NWCG guides and the USAID Field Operations Guide, (3) implementing a system like IQCS/ROSS, and (4) provide selected personnel for training and exercises as required.)
- S/CRS should negotiate a contract under LOGCAP type authorities for logistical support, including communications, transportation, security, etc., in the absence of DoD support. Similar LOGCAP Baseline Plans for DoD have been negotiated that provide logistical and other specified support for 1,500 personnel for 180 days. This will require some institutional funding for planning and operational funds for execution. (Cost: $500,000)
- S/CRS should obtain Executive Authority to negotiate Memoranda of Agreement/Understanding with other government agencies and departments to gain access to their expert personnel in the event of a deployment. Examples are the Departments of Energy, Agriculture, Justice, and the Centers for Disease Control, etc.
- S/CRS should obtain permission to negotiate Memoranda of Agreements/Understanding from State, County, and Municipal/City jurisdictions and to solicit volunteers with special implementation and management skills. Volunteers should be eligible for deployment and have the permission of their respective jurisdictions to take temporary appointments with S/CRS.
- S/CRS should negotiate support agreements with select domestic NGOs such as Engineers Without Borders, the National Association of State Courts, etc., to gain access to their experts.

- DoS should expand the Orientation and In-Processing system with a stand-by module for S/CRS operations. DoS should negotiate an agreement with DoD to retain and jointly operate the Federal Deployment Center at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. (Cost: $200,000)

The total cost of this interim contracting effort should be approximately $3.5 million the first year, and $2.5 million each year thereafter, exclusive of operational costs for actual missions. The interim solution is summarized in Figures IV-5 through IV-7:

Interim Solution Summary

Establish Family of Contract Vehicles & Negotiate MoAs to access SMEs and Volunteers

Task Components	*Execution Vehicle*	*Estimated Cost/yr*
Job Descriptions for HRST and ACT	Consulting Services (from OPM)	***$500,000***
Pre-arrange Personal Service Contracts for by-name experts who will be used in key positions in HRSTs or ACTs	Use vehicles and authorities similar to the USAID OFDA RATS concept or Section 3161 Appointments as Exceptions to the Civil Service Act (as in CPA)	Execution of these arrangements could be made from operational funds
Obtain skilled individual personnel and organized teams for implementing projects and programs	Negotiate a contract with a single firm (either non-profit or for-profit) with a vehicle and authorities similar to the USAID OTI/SWIFT program or the DoD LOGCAP. To cover (1) HR and operational planning, (2) using job descriptions and Work Breakdown Structure to develop a mobilization guide and field operations guide modeled on the NWCG guides and the USAID Field Operations Guide, (3) implementing a system like IQCS/ROSS, and (4) providing selected personnel for training and exercises as required	***$10 million*** **over five years** Requires institutional funding for contract personnel interaction with S/CRS personnel to developing HR annexes in support of emerging operational plans. Activation of the contract will require operational funding
Access to logistical support, including communications, transportation, security, etc. in the absence of DoD support	S/CRS should negotiate a contract under LOGCAP type authorities. Similar LOGCAP Baseline Plans for DoD have been negotiated that provide logistical and other specified support for 1500 personnel for 180 days	***$500,000*** This will require some institutional funding for planning and operational funds for execution
DoS expansion of the Orientation and In-Processing system **with stand-by module for S/CRS operations**	DoS negotiate agreement with DoD to retain and jointly operate the Federal Deployment Center at Fort Belvoir, Virginia.	***$200,000***

Total Cost ~ $3.5 m first year, and $2.5 m/yr thereafter, exclusive of operational costs for actual mission

Note: Task components for accessing volunteers or SMEs not included here. See Back-Up slides and Chap IV for details

Figure IV-5. Interim Solution Summary (1 of 3)

Interim Solution Summary

Establish Family of Contract Vehicles

Task Components	*Execution Vehicle*	*Estimated Cost/yr*
Job Description for HRST and ACT	Consulting Services from Office of Personnel Management (OPM)	***$500,000***
Pre-arrange Personal Service Contracts for by-name experts who will be used in key positions in HRSTs or ACTs.	Use vehicles and authorities similar to the USAID OFDA RATS concept or Section 3161 Appointments as Exceptions to the Civil Service Act (as were used in the CPA)	**Execution of these arrangements could be made *from operational funds***
Negotiate a contract with a single firm (either non-profit or for profit) to obtain skilled individual personnel and organized teams for implementing projects and programs	Negotiate a contract with a single firm (either non-profit or for-profit) with a vehicle and authorities similar to the USAID OTI SWIFT program or the DoD LOGCAP (SWIFT uses up to five pre-certified contractors, while LOGCAP authorities emphasize using one contractor. Both systems are based on Indefinite Delivery Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) contracting authorities, yielding substantial flexibility)	***$10 million over five years*.** Requires institutional funding for contract personnel interaction with S/CRS personnel to developing HR annexes in support of emerging operational plans. Activation of the contract will require operational funding
Access to logistical support, including communications, transportation, security, etc. in the absence of DoD support	S/CRS should negotiate a contract under LOGCAP type authorities for logistical support, including communications, transportation, security, etc. in the absence of DoD support. Similar LOGCAP Baseline Plans for DoD have been negotiated that provide logistical and other specified support for 1500 personnel for 180 day.	***$500,000*** This will require some institutional funding for planning and operational funds for execution

Figure IV-6. Interim Solution Summary. Contract Vehicles (2of 3)

Interim Solution Summary

Negotiate MoAs to access SMEs and Volunteers

Task Components	*Execution Vehicle*	*Estimated Cost/yr*
Access to expert personnel from other government agencies and departments in the event of a deployment (e.g., the Departments of Energy, Agriculture, Justice, and the Centers for Disease Control, etc.)	Obtain Executive Authority to negotiate Memoranda of Agreement/Understanding with other government agencies and departments	***N/A***
Solicit volunteers with special implementation and management skills from State, County, and Municipal/City jurisdictions Volunteers should be eligible for deployment and have the permission of their respective jurisdictions to take temporary appointments with S/CRS	Obtain permission to negotiate Memoranda of Agreements/Understanding from State, County, and Municipal/City jurisdictions	***N/A***
Gain access to experts from select domestic NGOs such as Engineers Without Borders, the National Association of State Courts, etc.	Negotiate support agreements with select domestic NGOs	***N/A***
DoS expansion of the Orientation and In-Processing system with a stand-by module for S/CRS operations	DoS should negotiate an agreement with DoD to retain and jointly operate the Federal Deployment Center at Fort Belvoir, Virginia	***$200,000***

Figure IV-7. Interim Solution Summary. Subject Matter Experts (3 of 3)

APPENDIX A

ACRONYMS

APPENDIX A
ACRONYMS

AABB	American Association of Blood Banks
AC	Active Component
ACC	Administration Committee on Coordination
ACE	Allied Command Europe
ACT	Advance Civil Team
AFP	Australian Federal Police
AOR	Area of Responsibility
AR	Argentina
ARC	Active Response Corps
ARC	American Red Cross
ASPR	Austrian Peace Center/Austrian Study Center for Peace and Conflict Resolution
AU	Austria
BIA	Bureau of Indian Affairs
BLM	Bureau of Land Management
CA	Canada
CA	Civil Affairs
CAC	Children and Armed Conflict
CAP	Consolidated Appeals Process
CAS	Cooperation Agreement Strategies
CANADEM	Canadian Resource Bank for Democracy and Human Rights
CEB	Chief Executive Board
CENTCOM	United States Central Command
CEPOL	European Police College
CERF	Central Emergency Revolving Fund
CFSB	Common Foreign and Security Budget
CI	Cote d'Ivoire
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CivPol	Civilian Police(ing)
CMC	Crisis Management Concepts
CMIC	Civil Military Information Centers
COE	Council of Europe
CoM	Chief(s) of Mission
CONOPS	Concept of Operation(s)

CONPLAN	Contingency Plan
CONUS	Continental United States
CPA	Coalition Provisional Authority
CPX	Command Post Exercise
CRC	Civil Response Corps
CRSG	Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group
CZ	Czech Republic
DART	Disaster Assistance Response Teams
DDA	Department for Disarmament Affairs
DE	Denmark
DESA	Department of Economic and Social Affairs
DFO	Disaster Field Office
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DfID	Department for International Development
DMIS	Disaster Management Information System
DoA	Department of Agriculture
DoC	Department of Commerce
DoI	Department of the Interior
DoJ	Department of Justice
DoL	Department of Labor
DoS	Department of State
DoT	Department of Transportation
DoTreas	Department of the Treasury
DPA	Department of Political Affairs
DPI	Department of Public Information
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DR	Disaster Relief
DREF	Disaster Relief Emergency Fund
ECOSOC	Economic and Social Council
EOI	Expressions of Interest
ECOM	Emergency Corps of the Order of Malta
ERD	Emergency Relief Detachment
EPA	Environmental Protection Agency
ERC	Emergency Relief Coordinator
ERU	Emergency Response Unit
ESB	Emergency Services Branch
ESF	Emergency Support Function
EU	European Union
EUCOM	United States European Command
EUFYROM	European Union Mission to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
EUPM	European Union Police Mission to Bosnia-Herzegovina

FACT	Field Assessment and Coordination Team
FACTS	Food and Commodities Tracking System
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FCC	Federal Communications Commission
FCO	Federal Coordinating Officer
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office
FCSS	Field Coordination Support Section
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FI	Finland
FTE	Full Time Equivalents
FWS	Fish and Wildlife Service
FYROM	Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
GA	General Assembly
GCC	Geographic Combatant Commander
GPOI	Global Peace Operations Initiative
GSA	General Services Administration
HA	Humanitarian Assistance
HAST	Humanitarian Assistance Survey Team(s)
HC	Humanitarian Coordinator
HDR	Humanitarian Daily Ration
HEB	Humanitarian Emergency Branch
HHS	Department of Health and Human Services
HNS	Host Nation Support
HQ	Headquarters
HR	Human Resources
HRST	Humanitarian Reconstruction and Stabilization Team
HS	Homeland Security
HU	Hungary
HUD	Department of Housing and Urban Development
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
IAPSO	Interagency Procurement Services Office
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
ICITAP	International Criminal Investigative Training and Assistance Program
ICMMP	International Committee of Military Medicine and Pharmacology
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
ICVA	International Council for Voluntary Agencies
IDC	Interdepartmental Committee
IDG	International Deployment Group

IDIQ	Indefinite Delivery Indefinite Quantity
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IERCM	International Emergency Response Consultative Mechanism
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
IFI	International Financial Institution
IFRC	International Federation of the Red Cross
IGO	Intergovernmental Organization
INL	Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, Department of State
INSARAG	International Search and Rescue Advisory Group
INSTRAW	Institute for Research and Training for the Advancement of Women
IO	International Organization
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IQCS	Incident Qualification and Certification System
IPU	Integrated Police Units
IR	Ireland
IT	Italy
JEU	Joint Environmental Unit
JO	Jordan
JS	Joint Staff
JTF	Joint Task Force
LH	Lithuania
LOGCAP	Logistics Civil Augmentation Program
LSS	Logistics Support System
LSU	Logistics Support Unit
MCDA	Military and Civil Defense Assets
MCDLS	Military, Civil Defense and Logistics Section
MCDU	Military and Civil Defense Unit
MEC	Movement Execution Cell
MMC	Movement Monitoring Cell
MoD	Ministry of Defense
MOVCON	Movement Control Section
MP	Military Police
MPC	Movement Planning Cell
MPRI	Military Professional Resources, Inc.
MSU	Multinational Specialized Units
NASA	National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCWG	National Wildfire Coordinating Group

NE	Netherlands
NGB	National Guard Bureau
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
NIMS	National Incident Management System
NNBIS	National Narcotics Border Interdiction System
NO	Norway
NORDEM	Norwegian Resource Bank for Democracy and Human Rights
NOREP	Norwegian Emergency Preparedness System
NPMP	National Political-Military Plan
NPS	National Park Service
NRC	Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NRP	National Response Plan
OAS	Organization of American States
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OCHR	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
ODCCP	Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention
OLA	Office of Legal Affairs
OPDAT	Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training
OPLAN	Operations Plan
OPM	Office of Personnel Management
ORLO	Office of Rule of Law Operations
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
OSOCC	On-Site Coordination Center
OTI	Office of Transition Initiatives
PADRU	Pan-American Disaster Response Unit
PAE	Pacific Architects and Engineering, Inc.
PCC	Policy Coordinating Committee
PCRU	Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit
PL	Portugal
PM	Bureau of Political-Military Affairs
PMC	Private Military Corporation
PO	Poland
PSC	Personal Service Contract
PSU	Port Security Unit
RAMSI	Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands
RATS	Response Alternatives for Technical Services
RC	Reserve Components
RC	Resident Coordinator
RCB	Response Coordination Branch

REACT	Rapid Expert and Assistance Cooperation Teams
RO	Romania
ROSS	Resource Ordering and Support System
RMT	Response Management Team
RRC	Rapid Reaction Corps
RRM	Rapid Reaction Mechanism
RRT	Regional Reconstruction Teams
R&S	Reconstruction and Stabilization
SAS	Standby Arrangements System
SBA	Small Business Administration
S/CRS	Department of State Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization ("S/" indicates direct report to the Secretary
SE	Sweden
SEO	Senior Emergency Officer
SG	Secretary General
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
SHIRBRIG	Standby High Readiness Brigade
SHR	Security and Humanitarian Response
SI	Slovenia
SIDA	Swedish Development Agency
SMG	Senior Management Group
SMOM	Sovereign Military Order of Malta
SMT	Senior Management Team
SP	Spain
SPINS	Special Instructions
SRC	Standby Response Corps
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary General
SW	Switzerland
SWIFT	Support Which Implements Fast Transitions
TAG	The Adjutant General
TC	Technical Corps
TO&E	Table of Organization and Equipment
TVA	Tennessee Valley Authority
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNA	United Nations Agency(ies)
UNCT	United Nations Country Team
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNCSD	United Nations Common Supply Database
UNDAC	United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination (Team)
UNDMT	United Nations Disaster Management Team

UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNHAS	United Nations Humanitarian Air Service
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNHCHR	United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
UNHRD	United Nations Humanitarian Response Depot
UNHSP	United Nations Human Settlements Programme
UNICEF	United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund
UNIDROIT	United Nations International Institute for the Unification of Private Law
UNIFEM	United Nations Development Fund for Women
UNITAR	United Nations Institute for Training and Research
UNJLCs	United Nations Joint Logistics Centers
UNMAS	United Nations Mine Action Service
UNMEE	United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea
UNO	United Nations Organization
UNOCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
UNRISD	United Nations Research Institute for Social Development
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency
UNS	United Nations System
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
UNSECOORD	United Nations Security Coordinator
UNU	United Nations University
USCG	United States Coast Guard
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USAR	Urban Search and Rescue
USFS	United States Forest Service
USG	United States Government
USIP	United States Institute of Peace
USJFCOM/JFCOM	United States Joint Forces Command
USPS	United States Postal Service
VA	Department of Veterans Affairs
VCA	Vulnerability and Capacity Assessment
WBS	Work Breakdown Structure
WFP	World Food Programme
WHALS	Worldwide Humanitarian Assistance Logistics System

WHO	World Health Organization
WTO	World Trade Organization
ZIF	German Center for International Peace Operations

APPENDIX B

CONTACT LIST JOINT INTERAGENCY EVALUATION: CIVIL RESPONSE FORCE

APPENDIX B

Contact List for Joint Interagency Evaluation: Manning a Civil R S Response Capability

Country	Agency	Name	Title
US	**USAID**	Alfred Nakatsuma	Division Chief of the Technical Support Team
US	**USDA**	Greg Power	Emergency Response Training Coordinator, Wildfire Service
	DoD		
US	**DoD Stabops**	Dr. Jeb Nadaner	DASD, Stability Operations
US	**US Army C&GSC**	BG Volney (Jim) Warner	Dep Cmdt, USA C&GSC/CAC
US	**ASD HLD**	Scott Rowell	DASD, HLD
US	**ASD HLD**	Erik J. Leklem	Planning and Integration Analyst
US	**ASD HLD**	Dr. Donald F. Herr	
US	**ASD HLD**	John Williamson	
US	**JFCOM detailed in S/CRS**	Lt. Col. Christopher Farris	Liason Officer and Task Cognizant Techical Officer
US	**OSD(NII)**	Brian D. Fila	Dir, Cont Spt and Migration Plng
US	**USFS**	Sharon Allen-Brick	Emergency Operations Training Specialist
US	**USFS**	Angie Taulbee Graham	Specialist in the Resource Ordering and Status System
US	**DHS**	Matt A. Mayer	CoS, Off of Sec'y, Office of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness
US	**DHS**	James Buchanan	DHS Ops Ctr
US	**DoJ**	Joseph Jones	Ch, Int'l Dev & Tng Pgms
US	**DoJ-ICITAP**	R. Carr Trevillian	Ass't. Director, ICITAP
US	**DoJ-OPDAT**	Carl Alexandre	Director, Ofc of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training
US	**DoS/FSI**	Michael J. Harwood	Program Coordinator, Special Programs
US	**DoS/PM/PPA**	Donna Leigh Hopkins	PM Plans & Policy, OPPA, Bureau of PM Affairs
US	**DoS/PM/PPA**	Mark H. Sweberg	PSO Plans & Policy EIPC PM
US	**DoS/INL CivPol**	Eric Rubin	Director, Ofc of Pol Plng Coord, INL
US	**DoS/INL CivPol**	Robert Gifford	
US	**DoS/INL CivPol**	Michelle Greenstein	Pgm Off, Civ Pol, INL
US	**DoS/TF MOMS**	Daniel Santos	Director, Model for Overseas Mgt Spt
US	**DoS/USUN**	Jeffrey M. Hewlett	Deputy Military Advisor
US	**DoS/USUN**	Joseph Contarino III	Military Advisor
US	**DoS/CRS**	Laura Hall	Dir for Reconstruction and Stabilization
US	**DoS**	Sara Craig	Policy Coordination Staff
US	**OMB**	Douglas Pitkin	Examiner
US	**OMB**	Jamie Price-O'Donnell	Pgm Examiner
US	**OPM**	Ray Decker	Human Capital Leadership and Merit System Accountability (HCLMSA) Division, Deputy Associate Director (DAD), Center for National Security
US	**OPM**	Frank Esquivel	OPM, Human Resource Products and Services (HRPS), Asst. Director, Center for Talent Services, Examining and Consulting Services Group
US	**OPM**	Gail Redd	Human Capital Officer (HCO) for State
US	**OPM**	Jeanne Friedrich	HCLMSA, HCO for NASA and NSF
US	**OPM**	Karen Simpson	HCLMSA, HR Specialist for State
US	**OPM**	Barbara Swanson	HCLMSA, HR Specialist, Talent Team
US	**OPM**	Anita Hanson	HCLMSA, Center for National Security, Operations Supervisor
US	**OPM**	David Amaral	HCLMSA, DAD, Center for Small Agencies
US	**OPM**	Kerry McDonnell	HCLMSA, HCO for Small Agencies
US	**OPM**	John Rekstad	HCLMSA, Center for Small Agencies
US	**OPM**	Roger Knadle	HCLMSA, HCO for USAID
US	**SFRC**	Evelyn Farkas	PSM, SFRC
US	**Cong Rsch Service**	Nina Serafino	Specialist in Nat'l Security Aff.
Contractors			
-	**ArmorGroup**	Giles Howson	
-	**ArmorGroup**	Kristina Dodd	
-	**Blackwater USA**	Brian L. Berrey	
-	**Booz Allen Hamilton**	Letitia K. Butler	Senior Associate
-	**DEI/CITSC**	Johan van den Heever	
-	**Dyncorp International**	Andy Michels	
-	**Dyncorp International**	Sean McFate	

APPENDIX B

Contact List for Joint Interagency Evaluation: Manning a Civil R S Response Capability

Country	Agency	Name	Title
-	**Evergreen**	Sam White	
-	**IPOA**	Doug Brooks	President
-	**IPOA**	Garret Mason	
-	**International Resources Group**	Timothy R. Knight	Director, Relief and Reconstruction Division
-	**J3 Global**	Joseph Woolslayer	
-	**J3 Global**	Nancy Roberts	
-	**MPRI**	Bill Clontz	
-	**Triple Canopy**	John Aliveto	
US	**National Assoc for Pub Admin**	Terry Buss	
US	**National Society of Professional Engineers**	Roger Hoogerheide	Chair, Tech Adv Cte
US	**Center for Law and Military Operations**	Bernard L. Seward, Jr.	Director, Interagency Operations Law
US	**U.S. Center for Research and Education on Stategy and Tecnology**	Dominique Orsini	Deputy Director
US	**USIP**	Mike Dziedzic	Pgm Off, Rule of Law Programs
US	**USIP**	Beth DeGrasse	Pgm Off, Peace and Stability Ops
US	**USIP**	Robert Perito	Coord, Iraq Exp Project
UN	**UN DPKO**	Dr. Jane Lute	ASG for Mission Support
UN	**UN DPKO**	Joel A. Cohen	Special Assistant to the Assistant General Secretary
UN	**UN DPKO/HR**	Donna-Marie Chiurazzi-Maxfield	Ch, Human Resources, DPKO
UN	**UN DPKO/HR**	Shari Klugman	Dep Ch, Mgt and Spt Svc, Admin Spt Div, DPKO
Europe	**OSCE**	Barry Myers	QPM, Senior Advisor to the Director for Human Resources, Department of Human Resources
Europe	**OSCE**	Richard Monk	Dir, Strategic Police Matters and Senior Police Adviser to the Secretary General
Europe	**OSCE**	Thomas Neufing	Training Coordinator, Dept. of HR
Europe	**OSCE**	Lamberto Zannier	Dir, Conflict Prevention Centre
EU	**DGIX**	Bruno Hanses	Dir, Ops Unit: Planning and Conduct (non police aspects)
EU	**DGIX**	Supt. John Henriksen	National Expert, Police Unit
EU	**DGIX**	Dr. Allison Weston	Administrator, Civilian Crisis Management
EU	**DGIX**	Michael Matthiessen	Dir, Civilan Crisis Management Directorate
AS	**Aus Fed Pol IDG**	Paul Jones	
AS	**Aus Fed Pol IDG**	David Long	
CAN	**CANADEM**	Paul LaRose-Edwards	Executive Director
UK	**PCRU**	Gil Baldwin, MBE	Head of Operational Planning

APPENDIX C

THE UN SYSTEM RESOURCE MANAGEMENT PROCESSES

APPENDIX C
THE UN SYSTEM RESOURCE MANAGEMENT PROCESSES

The UN Organization (UNO) and System (UNS) include a number of coordination mechanisms and processes that provide both civilian and military resources to meet requirements caused by natural or manmade disasters or complex emergencies. The resources may include UN agency staff, equipment, or stockpiles, but member state contributions are the main source of support to the UN. Contributions may come in the form of financial contributions and/or in-kind donations of commodities, services, or personnel to accomplish objectives or execute programs.

A. UN INTERAGENCY RESPONSE MECHANISMS FOR COMPLEX EMERGENCIES

The UN Charter allows the ECOSOC to furnish information and assistance to the Security Council when requested, and the Secretary-General can also bring an issue of peace and security to the Security Council's attention. Yet, there is a lack of formal mechanisms to coordinate the aspects of humanitarian assistance with the Security Council.

Most advances are along informal lines, with increases in the number of open meetings, participation by non-members of the Security Council, briefings for the wider membership of the Organization, and improved consultation with troop-contributing countries. The Security Council has also adopted measures to allow NGO voices to be heard by its members. The Arria Formula enables NGOs to give testimony to Security Council members in relation to specific crises, as well as on issues such as children in armed conflict, outside of official meetings.

More formalized collaborative mechanisms have been instituted as reforms implemented by the current Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, through the Secretariat. Under the Secretariat, the Senior Management Group (SMG) and four sectoral Executive Committees are used to facilitate strategic planning. These Executive Committees are made up of the UN Secretariat Departments, Programs and Funds, and certain Specialized Agencies. Figure C-1 describes the headquarters and regional collaborative

mechanisms used by the UN in complex emergencies, which include the SMG and Executive Committees.



Figure C-1. UN Executive Committees

Table C-1 provides a listing of the four Executive Committees and their member agencies. The discussion following the table describes composition and responsibilities of other UN bodies that address functional or regional issues related to complex emergencies or humanitarian relief.

Table C-1. Executive Committees and Member Agencies

Peace and Security	Humanitarian Affairs	Economic and Social
DPA*	OCHA*	DESA*
DDA	DPA	DPI
DPKO	DPKO	INSTRAW
DPI	DPI	ODCCP
OCHA	FAO	UNHCHR
UNHCHR	UNHCHR	ECOSOC Regional Commissions
OLA	SRSG CAC	UNDP
SRSG CAC	UNCTAD	UNHSP
UNDP	UNDP	UNITAR
UNHCR	UNEP	UNRISD
UNICEF	UNHCR	UNU
UNSECOORD	UNICEF	
World Bank	UNRWA	
	WFP	
	WHO	

Development Group[a]	
UNDP (Committee Chair)	UNAIDS
DESA	UNDCP
DPI	UNCTAD
FAO	UNESCO
IFAD	UNFPA
UNHCHR	UNHSP
SRSG CAC	UNICEF
ECOSOC Regional (Economic) Commissions	UNIFEM
Europe	UNOPS
Asia and the Pacific	WFP
Latin America and the Caribbean	WHO
Africa	
Western Asia	

a According to the UN plan for reform, the Development Group is to have an implementation plan by September 2003, to strengthen the effectiveness of the organization's presence in developing countries.

Source: "Strengthening the United Nations: An Agenda for Further Change," Report of the Secretary-General to the General Assembly, A/57/387, September 9, 2002. See http://ods-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/583/26/PDF/N0258326.pdf?OpenElement

- The UNS Chief Executives Board (CEB) for Coordination: (formerly the Administration Committee on Coordination (ACC)1 is the forum that brings

1 Formerly the ACC was used to supervise agreement implementation between the UN main bodies and the Specialized Agencies, but has since expanded to promote cooperation across the entire UN System.

all the executive heads of the UNO, Secretariat Departments, Programs and Funds, and Specialized Agencies together to promote cooperation on a multitude of issues facing the UN System.

- Regional Collaboration: The ECOSOC resolution 1998/46 of 31 July 1998 states that regional commissions will work with the specialized agencies, funds and programs to strengthen the coherence of the UN at the regional level.[2]
- Inter Agency Standing Committee (IASC): The principal role of the IASC is to ensure collaboration across UN Agencies and the larger civil society community in response to humanitarian crises.
- Special Representatives of the Secretary-General (SRSG): In situations of armed conflict, the SG typically appoints a Special Representative to head the UN mission. Additionally, the SG has appointed special representatives to specifically advocate for Children in Armed Conflict (SRSG CAC) and for Internally Displaced Persons (SRSG IDP).
- Peacekeeping: Peace and security operations are established by the Security Council and directed by the Secretary-General, often through the Special Representative. Depending on the mission, the Force Commander or the Chief Military Observer is responsible for the military aspects, and operations are planned and managed by the DPKO.
- Humanitarian assistance field operations: OCHA is the office mandated to strengthen coordination across the UN in response to humanitarian emergencies. OCHA provides the ERC that chairs the Inter Agency Standing Committee, and appoints the Humanitarian Coordinator that is approved by the IASC. In the field, OCHA coordinates with the UNDMT and the UNDAC. Figure 10-4 on the next page provides a more detailed depiction of interaction between these responding entities while in the field,.

B. FIELD LEVEL MECHANISMS

Outside of a crisis, the UN is typically represented in country by the UNDP, which conducts disaster preparedness as well as development initiatives. The UNCT comprises the heads of the UN Agencies that are present in the country and the Resident Coordinator (RC) is responsible for overall coordination of these agencies. Most often, the RC is selected from UNDP.

When a crisis strikes, coordination for the response becomes the responsibility of the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) and pertinent members of the UN country team then

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2 See: "Report of the Secretary-General to the General Assembly," September 9, 2002, pg. 20.

become part of the UNDMT. One person may hold both titles as RC and HC, but in some cases, they may exist concurrently and in competition with each other. Figure C-2 depicts the collaborative mechanism used in country prior to a complex emergency and after.



Figure C-2. UN Field Operation Mechanisms

Other bodies involved with field operations are described below.

- OCHA: If requested by the HC, OCHA will deploy an UNDAC team made up of various experts, which includes OCHA staff. It helps coordinate the deployment of Military and Civil Defense Assets that includes personnel and equipment from various donor nations and humanitarian organizations, and coordinates appeals for funding for the response. A detailed profile of OCHA capabilities is given later in this chapter.
- Programs and Funds: Some of the primary agencies for response to humanitarian crises are the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the World Food Program (WFP), and the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF). The UNHCR provides assistance to refugees and other people of concern, such as displaced persons. The WFP provides food aid to victims, and UNICEF focuses on assistance to children and women. Additionally, the

UNDP provides funds for assistance and may serve as the HC, if the position of HC and RC are dually held.

- Specialized Agencies: The World Health Organization (WHO) provides assistance in health related areas. The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) work to re-establish agricultural production.
- The Special Representatives: The Programs, Funds, and Specialized Agencies support the SRSGs during humanitarian response, but the SRSGs exercise no control over their programs and policies.
- Peacekeeping: The SRSG heads the mission, but, as the operational arm of peacekeeping missions, the DPKO plans and manages the operations and maintains contact with Security Council, troop and financial contributors, and parties to the conflict in the implementation of Security Council mandates. Within the DPKO, the Office of Mission Support is made up of the Administration Support Division and the Logistics Support Division, and provides dedicated personnel, administrative, finance, and logistics services for field missions. The UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS), managed by DPKO, plans and advises on mine clearance and explosive ordnance disposal activities. DPKO also coordinates the use of Standby Forces (SAS), where countries may volunteer personnel, equipment, and supplies or other support for a peacekeeping mission.

C. OCHA RESOURCES AND CAPABILITIES

1. Response Coordination Branch (RCB)

The RCB plays the leading role in mobilizing funding resources and coordinating the international assistance in the aftermath of an emergency as shown in Table C-2.

Table C-2. Response Coordination Branch (RCB)

Response Coordination Branch (RCB)
• Mobilizes and Coordinates International Assistance • Maintains regular contact with other UN agency partners and NGOs at Headquarters level. • Strengthens field offices through standardization of procedures and terms of reference. • Channels contributions and grants for relief programs • Promotes improvement of OCHA field staff working conditions • Improving collaboration with regional organizations
5 Geographic Sections
• Europe and Central Asia • Latin America and Caribbean • Asia and the Pacific • Africa I • Africa II
Over 30 Field Office Locations

Consolidated Appeals Process Section (CAP)[a]
• Supports Inter-Agency Consolidated Appeals
Surge Capacity
• Project designed to enable rapid deployment and include the deployment of Senior Emergency Officers (SEOs) to conduct missions to field locations and develop or upgrade coordination structures, contingency plans, facilitate appeals, provide guidance on humanitarian law and carry out assessments. These missions support the Humanitarian Coordinator and OCHA field offices. • Missions are used to incorporate field perspectives into headquarters policy initiatives.

[a] The Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) is a mechanism that enables an effective system-wide response to complex emergencies. It is described in more detail in Chapter 6.0 Acquisition and Funding. In 2003, the CAP section will be reorganized to reflect the growing importance of the CAP as an inter-agency process requiring dedicated support and management. Restructuring the CAP section with increased capacity for the analysis of global financial assistance, supporting strategic planning in the field and advocating for forgotten emergencies, including financial and donor funding trends. Humanitarian Emergency Branch (HEB)

2. Humanitarian Emergency Branch (HEB)

The HEB provides extensive coordination and liaison work at the strategic and policy level, see Table C-3. It acts as the primary point of contact for the Humanitarian Coordinators with the USG/ERC and OCHA New York.

Table C-3. Humanitarian Emergency Branch

Humanitarian Emergency Branch (HEB)
• Extensive coordination and liaison work at strategic and policy level. Located in New York • Supports the Under-Secretary General and Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) • Principal advisor to ERC for coordination with Secretary General and the political, peacekeeping and security arms of the Secretariat. • Provides support for briefing the Security Council on specific emergencies. • Liases with IASC/ECHA on Humanitarian Coordinator appointments. • Leads or participates in interagency assessment missions to the field. • Contributes to OCHA surge capacity through staff deployment to the field.

3. Emergency Services Branch (ESB)

The objective of the ESB is to further develop OCHA's capacity to provide and expedite emergency field services in disasters and emergencies. The ESB is located in Geneva and is responsible for mobilizing and coordinating international and bilateral rapid response of teams, equipment and supplies. Figure C-3 provides a general description of the extensive response capacities, units and activities found within the ESB.



Figure C-3. Emergency Services Branch Schematic

The ESB is the primary branch that develops OCHA field response capabilities. The Military, Civil Defense and Logistics Section (MCDLS), the Field Coordination Support Section (FCSS), and the Environmental Emergencies Section, make up the vital components of this branch. Table C-4 describes the different capabilities of the Military, Civil Defense and Logistics Section of the Emergency Services Branch.

Table C-4. Military Civil Defense and Logistic Section Capabilities

Military, Civil Defense and Logistics Section (MCDLS)[a]
The Military and Civil Defense Unit (MCDU) is one component of the MCDLS. The MCDU was established by a decision of the IASC to ensure the most efficient use of military and civil defense assets in support of humanitarian operations. The MCDU serves as a focal point for governments, international organizations, and military and civil defense partners to provide certain assets—many logistical in nature, for humanitarian relief. The MCDU conducts the UN's Civil-Military Coordination (UN CMCoord) courses and promotes the participation of various agencies and organizations in major exercises that have humanitarian components. This unit also maintains the web-based Central Register on **Military, Civil Defense and Protection Assets (MCDA)** that contains data on military and civil defense expertise, capacities and range of services that may be offered by Member States in case of emergency.

The **Logistics Support Unit (LSU)** is also part of the MCDLS and is responsible for enhancing logistics coordination. It manages OCHA's stocks of basic relief items (other than those of military origin) that are stored in the United Nations Humanitarian Response Depot (UNHRD) in Brindisi, Italy. Primarily, these stocks have been donated by governments, and the LSU arranges for the dispatch of relief items in cooperation with the World Food Program (WFP), which manages the UNHRD, and is responsible for replenishing the stockpile.

OCHA stocks are usually transported to the disaster-or emergency site through air charter, and the **LSU coordinates** the shipment with the transporter and advises the consignee(s) and other involved partners of the operation on delivery schedules, cargo composition and other information related to the arrival of the shipment.

LSU responds as needed to requests from various partners – mostly governments, for assistance in preparing or raising funds in connection with the dispatch of relief items to affected areas. LSU also provide assistance to field offices for the drafting of specifications, the identification of suppliers or the procurement of emergency relief items on an ad-hoc basis. As a consequence, LSU acts as OCHA focal point for potential suppliers and maintains an information list of contact details and technical information on proposed goods and services.

The LSU is also a focal point for the concept and operation of **UN Joint Logistics Centers**, and for helping to sponsor discussions on the adoption of a UN-wide Logistics Support System (LSS) in cooperation with WFP and the World Health Organization.[b] It is also responsible for maintaining the Register of Stockpiles within the Central Register and the Customs Facilitation Agreements.

a www.reliefweb.int/mcdls/

b The Pan-American Health Organization (regional arm of the WHO) has developed a logistics tracking system called SUMA that is being discussed as a potential platform for UN-wide application. A detailed description of SUMA can be found in Chapter 8.0 under logistics tracking systems.

4. MDCA Modules

UN OCHA and the responding UN agencies have identified various types of modules normally required when a disaster strikes. Sixty-one module types are specified, with a description of the capacity sought and the duration they are expected to work. Capabilities for approximately 350 modules have been established and pledged by nations and IOs, and some NGOs have organized their capabilities to these requirements. OCHA activates the system from 25 to 35 times per year.

5. UN Joint Logistics Centers (UNJLCs)

The UNJLCs are interagency units or facilities, with WFP acting as the lead technical support agency, and with focal points in OCHA, such as its Logistics Support Unit (LSU). In the case of a major disaster that requires multi-sector response, the UN agencies have the option of establishing a UNJLC, an example is given in Table C-5. These centers are located in the affected region with satellites at key logistics nodes.

Major Sectors of Military and Civil Defense Assets

Sectors	Number of Modules
Communications	3
Coordination Secretariat	5
Electricity	1
Engineering	5
Explosive Ordnance Disposal	3
Food and Catering	1
Items for Disaster Relief	6
Medical Support	2
Multi-Role Logistics	5
NBC	7
Sanitation	3
Search and Rescue	5
Transport/Air	4
Transport/Road and Rail	3
Transport/Sea/Inland Water	1
Water Supply	7

Signal Communications: Establish a HF/VHF Radio system to support information exchange within AOR. (24 nations)

Site Construction/Preparation: Rapidly develop virgin territories into safe camps for affected populations. (1)

Mine Clearing: Provide mine clearing services in support of HR operations (5)

Chemical/Radiation Sensory Team: Determine NBC threats in given area, provide limited decontamination facilities, SAR missions, and provide recommendations to relief HQ and local authorities. (14)

Cargo Road Transport: Provide stand-alone, 7 days a week, unit size elements for road and off-road delivery of food and non-food items needed in HR operations. (17)

Water Treatment/Purification-1: Operate water purification equipment to provide up to 10,000 liters of potable water per day. (16)

Source: MCDA Register

6/28/05-17

This center can serve as an information platform for humanitarian logistics operations. Its functions may include:

- Coordinating the use of available warehouse capacity and the influx of strategic humanitarian airlift into a crisis area. (An interagency air cell may be established in conjunction with the UNJLC.)
- Identifying and proposing solutions to logistical bottlenecks.
- Serving as the focal point for coordinating logistical measures with local authorities for importing, transporting and distributing relief commodities into the country.
- Serve as a focal point for logistics coordination with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and other relevant military entities.
- Schedule the movement of humanitarian cargo and relief workers within the crisis area using commonly available transport assets.

Normally, UNJLC responsibilities are limited to logistical activities between the points of entry and distribution in the crisis area.

Table C-5. Examples of UNJLC Sections

The Movement Control Section (MOVCON) – This organizational section of the UNJLC is responsible for efficient coordination, safe employment, and monitoring of movement operations. This includes coordination with civil and military authorities involved in movement (such as convoy operations) and air space management. This section helps establish load plans and passenger lists and may support the UN Humanitarian Air Service (UNHAS).[3] It also may provide Special Instructions for Aircrew (SPINS) and provide information on material handling equipment, fuel, and storage availability. It is divided into three primary cells: Movement Planning (MPC), Movement Monitoring (MMC), and Movement Execution (MEC) **Information Management Section** – This section compiles, analyzes, and distributes information pertaining to humanitarian logistics activities in coordination with other UN entities, such as the UNDAC/OSOCC and DPKO. Data includes comments, updates, maps, and reports. This section also maintains the UNJLC country-specific website.

Source: UNJLC Field Operations Manual

Also within the Emergency Services Branch is the Field Coordination Support Section. Table C-6 provides a synopsis of its capabilities.

6. The Environmental Emergencies Section

The Joint Environmental Unit is a partnership between the UN Environmental Program (UNEP) and OCHA. It is a unit located within the Emergency Services Branch in Geneva and is responsible for mobilizing rapid response and coordination of resources for environmental emergencies, monitoring worldwide situations and providing early notification and situation reports. The JEU also acts as a clearinghouse for information on chemicals, and provides maps, satellite imagery and reference material. It mobilizes funding resources, and arranges for deployment of international experts for impact assessments.

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[3] The UN Humanitarian Air Service (UNHAS) coordinates passenger flights for humanitarian personnel.

Table C-6. FCSS Capabilities

Field Coordination Support Section (FCSS)
The main purpose of the FCSS is to prepare and maintain standby capacity for rapid deployment to sudden-onset emergencies in support of affected nation authorities and the UN Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator in carrying out assessments of priorities and coordinating international relief on-site. The FCSS maintains a number of tools to accomplish these tasks – to include teams that are used to coordinate relief activities in natural disasters and complex emergencies. These tools include: (1) the UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination Team (UNDAC); (2) the International Search and Rescue Advisory Group (INSARAG); and (3) the Virtual Operations Coordination Center. The specific missions and objectives of these teams are described in more detail in Chapter 9.0 Coordination. Their structures are described below. The **UNDAC team** consists of more than 140 national emergency managers from over thirty-one countries in Europe, Latin America, the Caribbean, Africa, Asia and the Pacific, together with staff from OCHA and 5 other International Organizations including UN Agencies. The UNDAC team has regional wings: Europe, Latin America, the Caribbean and the Pacific. In major international emergencies, UNDAC teams are drawn from the entire membership. In disasters of more regional or national concern, they are normally drawn from amongst members in the affected country or region.[a] The **INSARAG** is divided into three regional groups to facilitate worldwide participation: Africa/Europe, Asia/Pacific and the Americas, and FCSS functions as the INSARAG Secretariat. The INSARAG also creates regional and international working groups as needed to address specific issues. When the goals of the working groups are accomplished, they are discontinued. Additionally, FCSS has developed the International Emergency Response Consultative Mechanism (IERCM) that provides a platform for professional emergency managers from governments and other major participants to come together to raise issues of concern, propose solutions and best practices and improve preparedness measures.[b] The FCSS also maintains the Emergency Response Roster within the Central Register as a measure to increase surge capacity, and may choose to establish an **On-site Operations Coordination Center (OSOCC)** in the field to help coordinate these assets.

a www.reliefweb.int/undac/undac_the_team.html.

b The IERCM is due to the achievements of the INSARAG, MCDA and UNDAC networks. The IERCM is to be broader in scope, and will include regional entities such as NATO's Partnership for Peace program members into the consultative process.

7. The Internally Displaced Persons Unit[4]

This is a separate, non-operational unit in Geneva established in January 2002. It was designed to assist the ERC in coordinating activities in response to the needs of internally displaced persons.[5] This unit, with one liaison office in New York, provides

4 www.reliefweb.int/idp/about/index.htm

5 OCHA guiding principles on Internal displacement can be found at http://www.reliefweb.int/ocha_ol/pub/idp_gp/idp.html

support to field responses as implemented by the IASC members and OCHA under the Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator. It may conduct assessments on IDP situations, determine the capacity of the national government to respond and provide technical expertise on issues of security, protection and the need for strategies to be reflected in the Consolidated Appeals Process and to prevent funding gaps. This unit is made up of staff on loan from agencies such as UNDP, UNHCR, WFP, UNICEF, OCHA, and IOM.

8. OCHA Funding

OCHA receives funding through two main channels: the UN regular budget and by voluntary contributions. Also, OCHA manages the following funds and appeals, which are open to various UN agencies.

- Interagency Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP): The CAP provides a framework for joint programming, common prioritization, and joint resource mobilization. OCHA prepares the appeal, follows up with donor nations and monitors the receipt and use of contributions. Most appeals are launched on a yearly basis, but OCHA sometimes issues flash or interim appeals, prepared over the course of a few weeks and covering short-term emergency requirements.[6]
- OCHA Central Emergency Revolving Fund (CERF): The CERF was established to provide funds within the UN system to respond rapidly to emergencies. It is funded through voluntary contributions and is set at $50 million. The CERF can be used for cash advances, but these advances are to be reimbursed as a first charge against income subsequently received, usually as a result of a consolidated appeal.
- OCHA Disaster Response System: The OCHA Response Coordination Branch (RCB) can provide an emergency cash grant of up to $50,000 through the local Resident Coordinator's office for natural disasters. This money can only be granted when the affected nation's government has launched an appeal for international help.

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6 There are currently 20 Interagency consolidated appeals in 2003. (Source: ReliefWeb)

APPENDIX D

RESPONSE MECHANISMS OF SELECTED INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

APPENDIX D
RESPONSE MECHANISMS OF SELECTED INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

A unique distinction exists between International Organizations (IOs) and NGOs that maintain a presence in various countries. IOs are formed under provisions of international humanitarian law rather than those of a particular country, and are recognized as international entities with privileges and immunities from national laws. They may also issue their own travel documents for their staff.

In conducting operations, IOs use a distinctive insignia to identify themselves and to represent the protection extended by international conventions and adherence to neutrality and impartiality. These organizations are governed by private citizens and maintain permanent observer status with the UN General Assembly.

Three organizations are currently recognized as IOs and have standing capabilities or procedures to acquire resources when required:

- The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)1
- The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC)
- The Sovereign Military Hospitaler Order of Malta (SMOM).

A. ICRC RESOURCES AND CAPACITY

The ICRC maintains a robust support capability to carry out its mandate. In 1999, all procurement, warehousing, and transport activities were combined into the Logistics Division to coordinate actions between headquarters, regional logistics centers, and delegations. The Health and Relief Division promotes synergy between the complementing services. Table D-1 provides an overview of the ICRC's significant logistics and rapid response capabilities.[2]

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1 The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement is the broad name for International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), and the National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. The ICRC and IFRC are recognized as IOs while the national chapters are NGOs.

2 Sources: ICRC Overview of Operations 2003, December 2002 and ICRC website at www.icrc.org.

Table D-1. ICRC Response Capabilities

Maintains delegations in at least 60 countries with operations ongoing in over 80 countries

Maintains flexibility for rapid response

- Delegations can deal directly with state and non-state parties to a conflict
- Permanent delegations can act as early-warning systems for potential conflict situations
- Regional delegations may provide logistics support as well as operational delegations

Maintains extensive logistics capability

- Owns and operates 3,000 trucks and other vehicles
- Operates 15 aircraft and two to five ships
- Has access to 950 warehouses

i) Maintains two ICRC worldwide logistics centers

- The center in Nairobi, Kenya, specializes in relief, with emergency food and nonfood items sufficient to support 100,000 people for three months
- The center in Geneva specializes in medical and water and sanitation equipment
- Reinforces the two primary centers with temporary backup structures in various countries as needed

Maintains extensive stocks and assistance programs

- Value of field and emergency stocks average 60 million Swiss francs
- Annual purchases average 250 million Swiss francs
- Maintains a very detailed two volume "Emergency Items Catalogue" that includes standardized equipment and supplies for radio and telecommunications, engineering, food, housing, transport, economic rehabilitation, water and sanitation, emergency response units, drugs, medical renewable supplies, medical equipment, kits, modules and sets, and administrative support
- In 1999, provided and installed water supply and sanitation equipment valued at 16.8 million Swiss francs
- Distributed medicines and medical supplies valued at 25.6 million Swiss francs to about 200 hospitals in 54 countries in 1999
- Provided detainees and their families with material and medical assistance valued at 13 million Swiss francs in 1999

National Societies provide extensive support

- Almost 50 percent of field logistics stocks are maintained by the National Societies in countries throughout the world

Has extensive access to specialized personnel

- After the Logistics Division was separated from the Health and Relief Division, the number of expatriate logistics personnel in the field increased from 40 to 140, and they were supported by almost 2,000 local staff
- In 1999, dispatched water and sanitation teams to 31 countries to provide displaced people with safe water, and to repair water treatment and distribution systems
- In 1999, sent medical teams and supplied most of the medicines, medical material, and equipment for 11 hospitals in Africa and Asia, which admitted approximately 48,000 patients and provided 200,000 people outpatient treatment

Conducts extensive protection and assistance programs

- In 1999, visited 225,313 people deprived of their freedom (prisoners of war, civilian

internees, or detainees) in a situation of conflict or violence, and monitored 166,075 of them throughout their period of detention
· Visited 1,726 places of detention in more than 60 countries
Funding[a] for ICRC operations is through appeals generally once a year
· Appeals for 2003 are initially estimated for 788.8 million Swiss francs
· Emergency Appeals cover operations in the field
· May make use of special appeals for country and region-specific programs
· Headquarters Appeals cover activities such as human resources and administration that support the field operations[b]
· In 2001, ICRC expenditure totaled U.S $145.3 million for headquarters and $684.2 million for field operations
ICRC Donors include
· Donor nations provide funds for field operations, with ICRC preference for non-earmarked funds to preserve independence in decision-making[c]
· Donations are also provided by IGOs like the UN agencies and from public or private sources
· The national societies provide between 6 to 9 percent of the ICRC annual budget
· The endowment fund, managed by the Foundation for the ICRC, is a collateral fund that provides secure long-term funding.

a ICRC Annual Report 2001 and Overview of Operations, December 2002.

b The ICRC receives donations from inter-governmental organizations, UN agencies, donor nations, public/private sources and the Red Cross and Red Crescent National Societies.

c The ICRC will negotiate with donor nations that wish to contribute earmarked funds. Typically, an agreement is reached.

B. IFRC RESOURCES AND CAPACITY

The IFRC is the world's largest humanitarian organization. It is comprised of 178 member Red Cross and Red Crescent National Societies, a secretariat in Geneva, 14 regional offices strategically located to support activities around the world, and 63 country delegations. The IFRC maintains significant mechanisms for responding to disasters.[3] These capabilities are summarized in Table D-2.

Table D-2. IFRC Resources and Capabilities

Maintains a flexible response structure
· Responds to requests for assistance from National Societies and can conduct humanitarian operations in any of the countries where it has members
· Almost every nation has a Red Cross or Red Crescent Society providing the IFRC with global breadth and a day-to-day local presence
· The IFRC and National Societies have nearly 100 million members and 300,000 employees who conduct programs that affect approximately 233 million people annually

3 See: IFCR website at www.ifrc.com under disasters.

Provides extensive disaster assistance

- Approximately 30 million people receive disaster and emergency assistance annually, including refugees and those affected by natural disasters

Maintains significant preparedness mechanisms

- The Disaster Management Information System (DMIS) is a web-based tool for staff use only, and provides disaster trends, internal, and external resources, tools, and available databases
- Conducts Vulnerability and Capacity Assessments (VCAs)

Maintains Regional Logistics Centers

- Centers are located in Nairobi, Kenya, and Budapest, Hungary, and at the Logistics/Fleet Base in Abu Dhabi, UAE
- Has access to individual National Society stockpiles within various countries; extensive supplies are available in Germany, Norway, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Chile, and Panama
- Is developing a field logistics tracking system for better control and oversight of the supply chain

a) Emergency Response Teams and Rosters

- Field Assessment and Coordination Team (FACT): A rapid-response assessment team that is deployable with 12 to 24 hours notice for two to four weeks to any location in the world. It is a core group of Red Cross and Red Crescent disaster managers from within the Federation and National Societies with expertise in relief, logistics, health, nutrition, public health, and epidemiology, water and sanitation, finance, administration, psychological support, and language fluency. The notification system is automated and the roster consists of 200 personnel from 40 National Societies, the Federation, and the ICRC. The methodology used by the FACT was developed in close coordination with UN OCHA to be compatible with the UNDAC system. The team will identify the most urgent needs and develop a plan of action and draft appeal. It will also facilitate and coordinate the start up of relief activities. FACT may request Emergency Response Units and coordinate their deployment along with other human and material resources. It acts in coordination with the ICRC, national societies, the Federation's regional and country delegations and other partners, such as the UN, local authorities, and NGOs.
- The Emergency Response Units (ERUs): These are self-contained teams of specialists available within 48 hours with pre-packed and standardized supplies and equipment that enable them to be operational on-site within one week. They consist of three to six professionals, such as doctors, nurses, engineers. and technicians. They are sponsored by individual national societies and are deployed by the Disaster Management and Coordination Division to support Federation programs at the request of the IFRC secretariat. They are also used to respond in areas where no Federation delegation or National Society structure is present. ERUs work with the local National Society in the affected country, which supplements the core ERU staff, and ERU personnel pass on specialized skills so that activities are sustainable once the ERU is withdrawn. Four months is the maximum life of an ERU operation; it is then handed over to a National Society or Federation delegation. ERU personnel may be integrated into a delegation or society if necessary at this time. There are five types of ERUs:
  - Basic Health Care ERU: can serve the primary health care needs of up to 30,000 people and has 20 beds for patients needing overnight care.
  - Logistics ERU: Manages the arrival, clearance, storage, and distribution of relief

supplies and for incoming personnel.

- Water and Sanitation ERU: Has four modules:
  - Treatment and supply unit: capable of treating up to 600,000 liters/day and providing drinking water for up to 40,000 people
  - Distribution and trucking unit: capable of storing and distributing 75,000 liters of drinking water/day to three separate storage and distribution systems (not designed to treat raw water)
  - Specialized water and sanitation unit: capable of treating and providing safe drinking water and basic sanitation for health installations, and for up to 15,000 people
  - Mass sanitation unit: capable of providing basic sanitation for up to 40,000 people
- Field Hospital ERU: can serve as a field hospital with modular medical and surgical units. Has 120-150 beds and can serve a population of up to 250,000.
- Telecommunications ERU: sets up communications between disaster area, field offices, delegations, National Societies and the Federation for accurate information exchange and donations accounting.

A more detailed description of each ERU's specifications and capabilities, and the National Societies that provide these units is provided in Appendix H of IDA Document D-2963 Worldwide Humanitarian Assistance Logistics System (WHALS) Handbook

- The Pan-American Disaster Response Unit (PADRU): Located in Panama, this unit is activated when needed to provide support to the National Societies in coordination with the regional delegation. This unit may provide personnel, logistics capabilities, and management services.

IFRC Funding is provided from many sources

- Disaster Relief Emergency Fund (DREF): The DREF is a pool of non-earmarked money that can be used for immediate response (even within 24 hours) to a disaster prior to any donor response. Funds for DREF are sought through a Federation annual appeal and contributions are received from National Societies and other sources. These funds are allocated on a recoverable basis and are reimbursed when contributions are later received from emergency appeals. The target level of the DREF is 10 million Swiss francs,[a] with allocations for start-up not to exceed 2 million or 15 percent of an emergency appeal. A maximum of 500,000 Swiss francs can also be allocated annually for disaster preparedness activities. When appeals are deemed inappropriate or there is a lack of interest by donors, 30 percent of the DREF may be used for smaller scale or less visible emergencies.
- Annual Appeals and Emergency Appeals: The IFRC's appeal in 2002-2003 sought 270 Swiss francs million to fund 72 humanitarian assistance programs. On average, 30 new emergency appeals are launched each year.
- In 2002, IFRC received appeal contributions of over 285 million Swiss francs.[b]
- Other Funding Sources: The IFRC, with its 178 National Society members, has considerable aggregate resources. Combined turnover reaches into the billions.

a Current level of the DREF is at CHF 7 million (Source: IFRC website under disasters)

b Source: Appeals in 2002, IFRC website under statistics.

As the international coordinator for the National Societies, the IFRC places emphasis on collaboration. Partnerships with donor National Societies and their governments are typically through Cooperation Agreement Strategies (CAS), which are also used for long-term partnership with organizations outside the IRCM. In addition, the National Societies build partnerships with community groups, businesses, and government ministries within the country in which they operate. As part of the IRCM, the IFRC has the additional responsibility of coordinating with the ICRC, although each entity maintains its independence.

Additional partnerships have been developed with many IGOs, such as ECHO, and agencies of the UN, such as the WFP, UNHCR, UNICEF, WHO, and OCHA, and donor nations. The Federation maintains permanent observer status with the UN General Assembly, providing it with opportunities to express its views through participation in the UN IASC meetings.

C. THE SOVEREIGN MILITARY ORDER OF MALTA (SMOM) RESOURCES AND CAPABILITIES

The Sovereign Military Order of Malta (SMOM),[4] often referred to as the Order of Malta or Knights of Malta, is a unique international relief organization that was granted sovereignty under international law. Its legal status as an independent Order of the Catholic Church derives from Papal Bull.[5] SMOM is one of the oldest religious orders of the Catholic Church and is at the same time an Order of Knighthood.

As a sovereign entity, the SMOM issues its own travel documents and passports to its members and staff. In countries that have recognized the Order, it maintains diplomatic missions.[6] When volunteers and other members are sent to emergency sites, they travel under SMOM passports, and not their national identity. The symbol of the Order is a white eight-pointed "Maltese" cross on a red background.

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4 See: SMOM Website at www.orderofmalta.org.

5 SMOM was founded in Jerusalem in 1099 during the First Crusade. It began as a monastic community dedicated to St. John the Baptist, administering a hospice-infirmary for pilgrims to the Holy Land and became an independent Order by the Bull on 15 February 1113. It was placed under the protection of the Holy See, with the right of freely electing its heads without interference from any other ecclesiastical or lay authority. Because of this Bull and subsequent Papal acts, the hospital became an exempt Order of the Church. The Order's independence and international sovereignty was based on its universally recognized right to maintain armed forces and wage war.

6 Where the Order does not enjoy *de jure* recognition, it often receives *de facto* recognition as an international organization.

The SMOM has significant resources and capabilities to respond to humanitarian emergencies. These capabilities are summarized in Table D-3.

Table D-3. Capabilities of SMOM

Rapid Response Teams

Emergency Corps of the Order of Malta (ECOM)

A multinational corps that carries out relief operations in disasters and armed conflicts. It is headquartered in Cologne, Germany, and is made available by eight SMOM National Associations with seven more having observer status. These teams provide specialized units that act as "operational modules." ECOM National Association providers include: Austria, Belgium, Britain, France, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, and Switzerland. Observers include: Brazil, Czech Republic, Hungary, Italy, Mexico, Poland, and Spain. English is the common language of operations and the source of a standard terminology.

The Emergency Relief Detachment (ERD)

This unit serves as the controlling headquarters for the various ECOM teams. In most cases, these modules are structured to interact with each other, but some work independently. There are currently five types of operational modules available to the ECOM:

- Mobile Ambulance Units
- Detached Medical Units
- Kitchen and Food Supply Units
- Housing Units
- Water Purification Units.

A rapid deployment medical unit has also been established and is maintained in a permanent state of alert so it can be mobilized in less than 48 hours to take part in peacekeeping missions.

Extensive presence of SMOM capabilities

SMOM maintains an active presence in 54 countries, has relief agencies in 32, and full diplomatic relations with 92 nations

Operations are currently conducted in 110 countries

Logistics Capacity

Maintains regional offices that offer logistical support

- Located in Nairobi, Kenya, and Bangkok, Thailand, these offices are operated by the Order's German Association called the *Malteser Hilfsdienst* (MHD).

Provides medical supplies and equipment

- In 2000, SMOM sent 243 tons of surplus medicines to 88 countries
- In 2000, SMOM procured additional medicines that included:
  - Anti-malarials: 2,000,000 patient-days of prevention
  - Anti-worm treatment: 250,000 patient-days of treatment
  - Anti-amoeba treatment: 350,000 patient-days of treatment
- Provided 450 tons of medical supplies in 2000

Provides equipment for water and sanitation and emergency healthcare

- Water purification system can produce 80,000 liters daily
- Emergency Health Kit includes 1.5 tons of medicines capable of serving 30,000 people

for one month

SMOM Funding[a] is provided by several sources

- Members primarily fund activities, which allows for greater flexibility and fewer restrictions on how funds are allocated. SMOM can therefore use them to react more quickly and effectively to new or changing needs.
- Hospital resources are often provided from agreements with the particular national health and social system of a country.
- Emergency operations are often funded by Priories and National Associations, which in turn seek contributions from the European Union, the UN, donor governments, and the public.
- Caritas and other church-based organizations also provide funding.

a See: www.orderofmalta.org

The Order of Malta maintains permanent missions with the following organizations:

- United Nations Headquarters in New York, Geneva, and Vienna
- United Nations Education, Science and Culture Organization UNESCO) in Paris
- Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) in Rome
- United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Geneva
- World Health Organization (WHO) in Geneva
- Commission of the European Union in Brussels
- International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in Geneva
- Council of Europe (CoE) in Strasbourg
- International Organization for Migration (IOM) in Geneva
- International Committee of Military Medicine and Pharmacology (ICMMP) in Brussels
- Organizations American States (OAS) in Washington
- UN International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT) in Rome

When implementing relief programs, SMOM coordinates its efforts with the affected government, its National Associations, and other international relief providers. SMOM may coordinate food distribution with the WFP and refugee camp operations with UNHCR or ICRC. It might also work under its established partnership with ECHO when providing supplies of humanitarian aid.

APPENDIX E

SELECT COST METHODOLOGY AND PLANNING FACTORS

APPENDIX E
SELECT COST METHODOLOGY AND PLANNING FACTORS

Cost estimates for both recommendations are based primarily on personnel and contracting costs, and estimates of training costs. The costs for contractors and civilian personnel include the full "man-year" equivalents, including not only salary but overhead, benefits, etc. This gives a more accurate picture of the liability the government may incur when hiring a contractor or establishing a government position. Therefore a contractor or government employee drawing a salary of $100k per year may actually charge the government or incur the long term liability (pension, health care, overhead, etc.) of $200k.

These costs are estimates and more complete definition of operational concepts and requirements will probably force the costs higher. In addition, the team did not estimate the potential for intra-governmental subsidies to use Federal funds to defray costs for hiring additional domestic local capacities (like the USAID relationship to USAR county teams available for deployment). This estimate should be regarded as a minimum expenditure to achieve the capabilities desired.

1. Rule of Law Reserve: The Rule of Law Reserve takes the USIP-ORLO proposal for structure and proposes a reserve of approximately 6,000 personnel.

Research and documents from the OPM state that the hiring of Federal officials on average takes 40 days and half their estimated average salary of $70k+ for a full time equivalent (FTE). Therefore hiring 6,000 civil responders as Federal employees would cost $210 million before any training or deployment (6,000x$35,000). One can target exiting military police, civil affairs officers, police, and other law enforcement, and sitting judicial personnel (prosecutors, judges, etc.) through associations, current jurisdictions, etc to reduce the recruiting costs. The team assumed recruiting costs of 100 percent of reserve salaries (as opposed to FTE salaries).

See Tab 1 for reservist pay factors, based on military pay and weighted averages for officers and enlisted. The cost method uses those factors, and assumes that the 6,000 personnel would train in reserve status at half the rate of the military. For the weekend training this equates to two days *every other month* or 6X2=12 days). The rough

"average of the average" of the monthly pay for reserve status for Army and Air Force (800 and 1100) is about $1,000. 12 days of reserve duty applied to a monthly salary = 12/30X1,000=$400. $400x6,000=$2,400,000. So reserve duty pay alone is $2.4 million per year.

For their week of active duty annual training, one week = .25 months and the average of the average monthly pay for active duty is $5650. .25X5650=1412.5. Each week, each reservist receives, therefore, approximately $1400. 6,000X$1,400= $8.475 million.

So the salaries for the reservists, just to get them to training location (which could be a local armory, school gym, reserve center, police station, etc.), to train is about $11.5 million. Doubling that figure to account for recruiting gives a figure of $22.5 million.

USIP estimated training and outfitting at $7,500 per officer. $7500 x 6,000= $45,000,000. That brought the total to $68 million.

Select individuals and small teams are assumed to be available for additional training and exercises, including some that would require travel to other locations in the United States (FSI, USIP, NDU, USAPKSOI, etc) and in select foreign locations (Geographic Combatant Commands, U.S. Missions, etc). Participation in exercise planning and execution would require additional pay, per diem, and travel. Those exercises, including at least one exercise each year in each of the GCC and with selected U.S. Missions for HRST and ACT were assumed to add up to $30 million. That increased the pay and training cost to $100 million.

2. The Civil Response Corps is assumed to contain 2,500 personnel. This would cover three simultaneous missions (most stressful case) that spanned the spectrum from the most intense (replicating the Coalition Provisional Authority), a medium sized deployment, and a minor deployment. The CPA originally was expected to be manned by approximately 1100 persons. Medium sized missions could occupy about 750-1,000, and small missions could require about 250-500.

The CRC is 41 percent as large as the Rule of Law Reserve. However, it is funded at 25 percent ($25 million) because the members retain their expertise as members of functioning organizations or as individual subject matter experts and their mandatory training periods are not as frequent as the Rule of Law reserves.

3. Establish and maintain a management system for the reserves: Four man years of work (man-year = $250k in salary, benefits, overhead, etc. comparable corporate and

government rates) to develop and transfer the management systems (Incident Qualification and Certification System and Resource Ordering and Support System) to S/CRS use.

4. Training Exercises: $25 million covers facilities use/reimbursement, exercise development, materials preparation and execution costs, etc. Exercises could range from individual events for a few personnel that might cost $10,000 to a series of large networked exercises involving complex staff, remote locations, etc., that might cost several million dollars to plan and execute.

5. The increase in the S/CRS office from 80 to 200 is based on the management requirements for the rule of law reserve, the civil response corps (i.e. operating the IQCS and the ROSS), planning and conducting exercises, oversight of contracting mechanisms, etc., and is equivalent to a "brigade" sized headquarters that manages forces of this size. The cost is based on 200 man-years at 200,000 per man-year (not quite as high an average rate as the management systems transfer persons – there will be some administrative personnel that are compensated at a lower rate) for a total of $40 million.

6. The total approaches $190-$200 million. By comparison cost, during the period before Operation Iraqi Freedom it was estimated that a heavy division of the Army costs $11 billion to buy and $1 billion per year to operate in peacetime. It has about 17,000 personnel in it, none of whom are "optimized" for R&S operations. A brigade "slice" of that organization, operating independently, could be about the size of the Rule of Law reserve and the Civil Response Corps, or about 8500 people. Their pro-rated share of the cost is thus 8500/17000X$12,000,000,000 or $6 billion. The long term recommendation for S/CRS is 3 percent of the equivalent military force.

RESERVIST PAY FACTORS

1. DESCRIPTION: Salary factors for reservists called to active duty and reservists on reserve duty. The active duty pay and the reserve status pay is a weighted average of officer and enlisted salary for all grades. When activated, the reservist will receive active duty pay and the reserve status pay is considered an offset or savings to the government.

2. VALUES:

Reserve Pay on Active duty

Service	Officer %	Enlisted %	Monthly Officer $	Monthly Enlisted $	Weighted Avg $/Mo	Source
Army	16.45%	83.55%	9,311	5,199	**$5,875.37**	CEAC & Demographic Data
Air Force	19.65%	80.35%	9,167	4,545	**$5,453.56**	AFI 65-503 Table A19-2

Reserve Pay on Reserve Status

Service	Officer %	Enlisted %	Monthly Officer $	Monthly Enlisted $	Weighted Avg $/Mo	Source
Army	16.45%	83.55%	1,374	688	**$ 801.10**	CEAC & Demographic Data
Air Force	19.65%	80.35%	2,129	899	**$1,140.66**	AFI 65-503 Table A23-1

3. DATA SOURCE:

Data Source: CEAC Cost Factors Handbook , Military Personnel Costs , Military Pay and Allowances – Reserve, Enlisted & Officer, and AFI 65-503. Last Updated: 17-Feb-04

4. METHODOLOGY : Weighted average of active duty pay and reserve status pay for reserve personnel.

1. Monthly Officer on Active Duty is O1-O8, Component Full Time.
2. Monthly Enlisted on Active Duty is E1-E9, Component Full Time
3. Monthly Component Pay Offset is Component Annual Base Rate divided by twelve.
4. Grade Distribution percentages are from the DMDC web site.

COST FACTOR C3
OTHER PERSONNEL COSTS

1. DESCRIPTION: Costs for "Other Personnel Costs". This factor includes two major categories of cost. The first is operations overhead and is defined as those costs that are not 100 percent attributable to the activity under study, but are generally associated with the recurring management or support of the activity. The second is general and administrative overhead and includes salaries, equipment, space and other activities related to headquarters management, accounting, personnel, legal support, data processing management and similar common services performed outside the activity, but in support of the activity.

2. VALUE: 12% of all direct labor costs.

3. DATA SOURCE: CIRCULAR A-76 -- UPDATE XI, 1 March 1999 at http://www.hqda.army.mil/AAAWEB/IMT/overheadcosts.html.

Accessed 18 May 2005.

4. METHODOLOGY :

For each year of the cost estimate, "Other Personnel Costs" are is calculated by multiplying all direct labor costs in the estimate by 12 percent (.12).

COST FACTOR C1A
SALARY RATE FOR S/CRS PLANNERS

1. DESCRIPTION: Cost per person per year.

2. VALUE: $87,849 FY 05 dollars.

3. DATA SOURCE:

Data supplied by Avue, Inc. Avue Technologies Corporation has been serving Federal government agencies with respect to job evaluation and classification, compensation, staffing and recruitment, performance management and optimization, management-employee relations, labor relations,

https://www.avuedigitalservices.com/casting/avueIndex/mainstreamOccDD.jsp

Last Revision: March 24, 2005

4. METHODOLOGY : Selected a representative personnel type from the table below as the average salary for a S/CRS planner.

Occupation	Permanent Employees	Average Salary	Average Length of Service
FY06 Cost factors State Department Personnel			
0130-FOREIGN AFFAIRS	4,876	$80,648	12.1
0301-MISCELLANEOUS ADMINISTRATION AND PROGRAM	1,823	$87,849	18
0080-SECURITY ADMINISTRATION	1,471	$70,771	11.4
0318-SECRETARY	1,174	$48,398	15.9
0334-COMPUTER SPECIALIST	1,123	$67,227	14.1
0967-PASSPORT AND VISA EXAMINING	798	$59,641	14.5
0110-ECONOMIST	568	$80,306	12.9
2210-INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY MANAGEMENT	568	$81,917	17.1
0343-MANAGEMENT AND PROGRAM ANALYSIS	481	$81,205	18.3
0201-HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT	403	$77,791	19.3
Department of State	**18,166**	**$75,638**	**14.7**

COST FACTOR C1BG
SALARY RATE FOR DOCTRINE AND EXERCISE DEVELOPER

1. **DESCRIPTION:** Salary Cost per person per hour.

2. **VALUE:** **$102.42 FY 05 dollars.**

3. **DATA SOURCE: GSA Schedules** GSA Advantage!

Labor Rates

SIN 27-400 Instructor-Led Training
SIN 27-500 Course Development; Test Administration

http://www.anteon.com/contracts/gsa_schedules/gs-02f-0134n/gsasched-gs-02f-0134n_laborrates.htm

4. **METHODOLOGY :** Selected a representative Instructional system designer from an approved GSA Schedule multiple-award fixed-price, indefinite delivery-indefinite quantity (IDIQ) contracting effort. This contract is typical of the contract vehicle used to support a limited development effort and the labor rates are generally consistent.

Labor Type Name	**Instructional System Designer IV**
Description	Functional Responsibility: Develops associated media products needed to support courseware products. Could include graphics, animation, audio, digital video, still images, etc. Conduct field production and postproduction to produce video elements of a curriculum development program. Designs and develops computer based training, electronic performance support systems and other technology-based learning solutions. Develops appropriate training objectives and test methods and design instructionally valid training materials. Works on complex instructional systems design projects. Acts as a technical task lead. Supervises the work of lower-level training personnel.
Hourly Rate	$102.42
Unit	per person government site

APPENDIX F

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14. ABSTRACT

This report evaluates models for recruiting (identifying and selecting), organizing, training, and deploying civilian experts (who are not part of the Federal government) in reconstruction and stabilization operations for the newly established Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization in the Department of State. The aim of the study is to find a model for rapid deployment of civilian experts (indivuals as well as teams of personnel) to nations at risk of collapse or emerging from conflict to reduce the requirement for military forces to be deployed, and to accomplish stabilization and reconstruction tasks. Using literature review and interviews of key personnel, the study examines a variety of domestic, international, government, and private for-profit and non-profit personnel models and compares them using criteria given by the sponsor. The evaluation criteria for the 15 models include: Management Structure & Equipment; Personnel Skills & Areas of Expertise; Force Numbers & Structure; Operations & Logistics; Training; Legislation; Interoperability; Impact on Interagency Process; and Cost. The models are broken down into four groups for comparison: Managed Rosters and Centralized Individual Recruiting; Pre-Arranged Contractual Agreements, Capabilities-Based Planning Systems; and Assets on Standby. Based on this analysis, the study recommends an optimal long-term system and an interim, contract-based system to establish a Civil Response Force to meet both sponsor and Department of State objectives.

15. SUBJECT TERMS

S/CRS, Civil Response Force, reconstruction and stabilization operations, models, rosters, recruitment, training, standby, rapid deployment, rule of law, civilian experts, contractors, State, DoD, USAID, DHS, FEMA, USIP, ORLO, AFP, Civil Response Corps, interagency

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